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Colonial Currency Policies
Legal historians have long emphasized the role courts played in
promoting the development of a market society in colonial America.
Indeed, judicial enforcement of debt agreements and other contractual
obligations has been viewed as the central and most important aspect of
government promotion of the nascent colonial economy. Nevertheless,
there has been substantial disagreement about the extent of colonial
economic development and about colonists' attitudes toward markets and
commercialism. Judges have been characterized in contrasting terms as
bulwarks of pre-industrial cultural norms impeding development or as
knowing catalysts of commercial transformation. Legal historians, however,
have universally (if implicitly) agreed that focusing on the court system and
judicial decisionmaking is the best means of assessing the role of law in
economic development.
An emphasis on judicial decisionmaking has led legal historians to
accept two underlying assumptions about the relationship of law to the
development of markets. First, colonial law has been generally perceived as
rooted in inherently local cultural norms and local market conditions. When
the principal source of law is considered to be the decisions imposed by
judges on disputing parties, "law" in a more composite sense is naturally
characterized as emerging endogenously out of relationships between
individuals within local communities. Legal historians therefore principally
see the impact of law on economic development as the combined effect of
many individual decisions relating to the economic matters emerging within
particular communities.
Legal historians' focus on judicial decisionmaking has also led to an
assumption that the law adjusts in some natural way to changing economic
and cultural climates. According to this view, lawsuits are an indirect
reflection of prevailing cultural norms and market conditions. Judges adapt
the law as those norms and conditions change. The court system therefore
fulfills an institutional role of ensuring that the law keeps pace with societal
transformation. As described in greater detail below, however, colonial
legal historians have characterized the court system not merely as keeping
pace with changing conditions. According to current legal historical
scholarship, whether by formalistically requiring parties to adhere to their
commitments and thereby promoting economic advance and the extension
of a market society, or by resolving disputes in a matter consistent with
communitarian values, judges actively promoted an agenda in harmony
with local preferences. Colonial courts are therefore typically depicted as
optimally satisfying the legal needs of local communities.
The most prominent description of the insular and community-oriented
base of colonial law is in Morton Horwitz's The Transformation of
American Law, 1780-1860. Horwitz emphasizes the centrality to
eighteenth-century law of limitations on market activity such as the just
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price and usury doctrines, contracts involving transfers of property rather
than monetary payments, and damages based on equity and fairness rather
than on satisfying expectations.' Emphasizing the prevalence of litigation
based on direct property exchanges, Horwitz concludes that the law
reflected undeveloped markets and a community-oriented society in which
goods "were usually not thought of as being fungible.... [and] [e]xchange
was not conceived of in terms of future monetary return." 2 To Horwitz,
colonial law reflected a pre-industrial communitarian mindset, "essentially
antagonistic to the interests of commercial classes,"3 in which the
justification for contractual obligation was "the inherent justice or fairness
of an exchange." 4 Colonial law applied by judges, therefore, reflected the
values associated with pre-industrial, agrarian societies.' In this respect,
Horwitz contrasts the judicial doctrine of the eighteenth century with that of
the nineteenth century, when judges began using common-law decisions to
promote capitalist values and a market economy. With regard to both the
colonial period and the nineteenth century, however, Horwitz portrays the
law as harmoniously synchronized to advance prevailing cultural norms and
preferences regarding economic advance.
More recently, legal historians such as Bruce Mann and Cornelia
Dayton have examined colonial court records and have developed a vastly
different interpretation of colonial law and its relation to market activity. By
focusing on legal practice and litigation trends, rather than strictly on
1. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
160-73 (1977).
2. Id. at 162-63.
3. Id. at 167.
4. id. at 160.
5. The scholarship supporting the conception of colonial law as static first gained prominence
with ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938), and includes GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF
THE COMMON LAW (1975) [hereinafter NELSON, AMERICANIZATION]; and WILLIAM F. NELSON,
DISPUTE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS, 1725-1825
(1981) [hereinafter NELSON, DISPUTE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION]. See also Charles Fried, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1858, 1864-66 (1980) (reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT (1979)) (criticizing Atiyah for overemphasizing the extent to which judges valued
community consensus above individuals' promises in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries);
Robert W. Gordon, Book Review, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 686, 687-88 (1976) (reviewing NELSON,
AMERICANIZATION, supra) (criticizing Nelson for characterizing colonial law and society as static
and consensus-oriented).
6. According to Horwitz, "[o]nly in the nineteenth century did judges and jurists finally reject
the longstanding belief that the justification of contractual obligation is derived from the inherent
justice or fairness of an exchange." HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 160.
In a well-known article, A.W.B. Simpson questioned the extent to which judges applied
doctrines that seemingly restricted market activity such as, for example, just price and usury, in a
way that actually limited commercial activity. See A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the
History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 535-42 (1979). Simpson also challenged the merits
of Horwitz's conclusion that colonial courts failed to award expectation damages in contract
litigation. Id. at 547-61. Simpson's critique was widely accepted, but was chiefly negative,
providing no affirmative explanation of colonial law.
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doctrine, these historians conclude that civil law in colonial New England
was neither static nor reflective of antimarket communitarian beliefs.
According to Mann and Dayton, seventeenth-century civil law derived from
economic conditions of predominately household subsistence production
and market transactions that were largely confined within relatively insular
communities. In the seventeenth century, judges tailored their decisions to
individual litigants and to the relationship between the parties underlying
the transaction. By the first half of the eighteenth century, however,
economic advances made these informal procedures untenable. In response
to commercialization, judges began to apply more formal and predictable
legal rules, which provided greater certainty to contractual promises and
generated, as a result, even further economic development. The law,
therefore, modernized in the New England colonies during.the first half of
the eighteenth century in response to, and to promote, the expansion of
markets and the growth of contractual promises between citizens of
different communities.7
Bruce Mann's and Cornelia Dayton's theories of legal development in
eighteenth-century New England have been widely accepted and endorsed
by a generation of legal historians. Although a relatively recent addition to
legal scholarship, this "modernization theory" 8 of legal change parallels a
7. See CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW & SOCIETY
IN CONNECTICUT, 1639-1789 (1995) [hereinafter DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR]; PETER
CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA (rev. ed. 1998); BRUCE H. MANN,
NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT (1987); Peter
Charles Hoffer, Honor and the Roots of American Litigiousness, 33 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 295
(1989); Deborah A. Rosen, Courts and Commerce in Colonial New York, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
139 (1992) [hereinafter Rosen, Courts and Commerce]; Deborah A. Rosen, The Supreme Court of
Judicature of Colonial New York: Civil Practice in Transition, 1691-1760, 5 LAW & HIST. REV.
213 (1987) [hereinafter Rosen, Civil Practice in Transition]; Cornelia Dayton, Law and Disputing
in Commercializing Early America, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1538 (1989) [hereinafter Dayton, Law and
Disputing] (reviewing MANN, supra). For a discussion of the relation between Mann's, Dayton's,
and Rosen's works and earlier scholarship characterizing colonial law as static, see Rosen, Civil
Practice in Transition, supra, at 213-14; and James A. Henretta, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 793, 796
(1988) (reviewing MANN, supra).
8. Cornelia Dayton characterizes Mann's Neighbors and Strangers as "a sustained argument
for the emergence by 1750 of a legal system geared to serve the interests of a commercial (or
capitalist) political economy." Dayton, Law and Disputing, supra note 7, at 1546. Dayton's
Women Before the Bar focuses on the changing nature of women's role in the legal system during
the colonial and early republican periods. Her analysis of the relationship between economic
development and legal modernization, however, largely complements Mann's analysis in
Neighbors and Strangers. Although with some reservations, Mann describes his own argument as
a modernization theory, arguing that
the importance of a rational, predictable legal system to economic activity is a staple of
the modernization literature. One need not address the simplistic and misleading
question of whether Connecticut was undergoing modernization in the eighteenth
century to accept that mercantile transactions can proceed more smoothly and on a
grander scale when the impediment of individuality is removed....
An expanding economy requires that individual transactions be governed by
generally applicable rules.... Rational economic exchange requires the assurance that
13072001]
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longstanding body of scholarship among historians that describes the
decline in community in colonial New England as the society transformed
from one oriented around close-knit, cooperative Puritan towns to one with
extended markets and market values. The decline in community also
coincided with increased immigration, geographical mobility, and the
growth of urban centers.9
The central evidence supporting the legal modernization theory consists
of widely accepted statistics relating to the volume and substantive content
of litigation. These statistics show that, in the first half of the eighteenth
century, the total volume of litigation rose exponentially, far above
increases in population. These statistics also show that the increase in
litigation is largely attributable to an increase in the volume of cases based
on debts-suits to reclaim money, goods, and services."0 The modernization
hypothesis claims that this increase in litigation volume resulted from
growing commercialization and the use of more formal credit instruments
that resulted in an increase in the number of debt obligations entered into
and, as a result, an increase in the number of debt cases to reclaim money
owed on those obligations." Proponents of the modernization theory show
like cases will be treated alike. To provide that assurance, general rules override the
individuality of particular cases and force them into a common mold.
MANN, supra note 7, at 36. Deborah Rosen refers to her argument as a modernization theory,
arguing: "[T]he American legal system underwent steady change in response to economic
developments well before the alleged modernization of the nineteenth century.... In the
eighteenth century, legal practice changed in order to make sure that law served the interests of
commercial people and a commercial economy." Rosen, Courts and Commerce, supra note 7, at
139-40.
9. For examples of historical scholarship establishing the "decline of community" theory, see
RICHARD L. BUSHMAN, FROM PURITAN TO YANKEE: CHARACTER AND THE SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONNECTICUT, 1690-1765 (1967); KENNETH A. LOCKRIDGE, A NEW ENGLAND TOWN: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS (expanded ed. 1985); and sources cited in CHRISTINE LEIGH HEYRMAN,
COMMERCE AND CULTURE: THE MARITIME COMMUNITIES OF COLONIAL MASSACHUSETrS,
1690-1750, at 6 n.4 (1984).
10. Reference to "debt" cases in this Article follows the practice of other colonial historians
and includes all cases brought to reclaim money or goods (but not rent or other land cases), which
means that actions on "Debt" have been grouped with actions on "Case." Colonial courts used a
more informal variation of the English writ system. According to Zechariah Chafee, who studied
the cases of the Suffolk County Court in Massachusetts in the period from 1671 to 1680, there
was "no apparent differentiation between debt and case .... [S]uits on debts are called case or
debt without any apparent reasons for the distinction." Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Suffolk County
Court and Its Jurisdiction, Introduction to 29 PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF
MASSACHUSETTS, RECORDS OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT 1671-1680: PART I, at xxxviii-xl
(1933) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT 1671-1680: PART I].
11. Mann attributes the increase in litigation rates to rising indebtedness accompanying
economic growth:
Commercial expansion brought with it-indeed, rode the crest of-a rising tide of
indebtedness. . . The sharp increase in uncontested debt actions in the
1730s ... underscored not only the massive increase in indebtedness but also the
acceptance of indebtedness as a necessary cost of doing business.
MANN, supra note 7, at 62. Dayton, largely following Mann, clearly specifies the correlation
between economic growth and increasing civil litigation. According to Dayton, "[t]he
proliferation of notes-and other written instruments such as bonds and bills-fueled an
1308
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that the legal system was becoming more formal and predictable by
demonstrating increases in the percentage of uncontested debt cases,
pleadings based on purely technical issues, as well as a decline in the use of
juries. In essence, modernization theory scholars contend that rising
litigation accompanied a process of legal formalization and was a function
of economic advance and commercialization.
The acceptance of the modernization theory has led to a partial
rejection of Horwitz's and others' conclusion that colonial law was static in
comparison to the more development-oriented law of the nineteenth
century. Although the modernization theorists do not dispute that
communitarian values may have influenced judicial decisionmaking in the
seventeenth century, they identify the eighteenth century-not the
nineteenth century-as the key moment when the legal system began
promoting the expansion of markets. Much of the success of the
modernization theory has derived from its seemingly superior ability to
explain colonial litigation data. The Horwitz hypothesis of dominant
communitarian norms does not explain, for example, the remarkable rise in
enormous rise in debt litigation across New England, an expansion that far outstripped population
growth.... In essence, the burgeoning volume of uncontested debt cases represented the
capitalization of the New England economy." DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR, supra note 7,
at 90, 102. Rosen states similarly that "[in colonial New York, debt litigation increased as a
direct consequence of the growth of New York's economy. Economic growth led to an increased
number of commercial transactions, which meant an increased number of potential disputes-and
potential lawsuits." Rosen, Courts and Commerce, supra note 7, at 150; see also BUSHMAN,
supra note 9, at 136 (relating Connecticut's exponential litigation increases of the eighteenth
century to economic expansion).
Although each author emphasizes the relationship between the rise in the volume of debt
litigation and economic growth and commercialization, each acknowledges that colonial
economic development varied over time and that other factors also affected litigation rates. Both
Mann and Dayton, for example, mention that in 1740, the year of the highest volume of debt
litigation in Connecticut, agricultural prices dropped, which brought debtors to courts in high
numbers. See DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR, supra note 7, at 90. According to Mann, the
decline in farm prices in 1740 led to a "decade of economic distress" which resulted in
abnormally high litigation volumes. See MANN, supra note 7, at 62-66. Rosen addresses the issue
of recession and litigation volume in greater detail, recognizing that high litigation rates were
often attributable to a "fluctuating economic climate," when defendants in debt suits sued down
the "chain of credit, with each person unable to pay his own debts until his own debtors paid
him." Rosen, Courts and Commerce, supra note 7, at 146. According to the modernization theory,
however, these changes reflect only variations from the general trend of an increase in litigation
volume paralleling an expanding economy. See DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR, supra note
7, at 90-91; Rosen, Courts and Commerce, supra note 7, at 150-51.
A second explanation attributes the changes in litigation rates to courts' social function
beyond their role as a source of stability in the economy. One common element of the arguments
of Mann, Dayton, and Rosen is the contention that litigation increased as other, community-
oriented enforcement mechanisms, such as town governments and churches, lost legitimacy and
authority. See DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR, supra note 7, passim; MANN, supra note 7, at
chs. 4, 5; Rosen, Courts and Commerce, supra note 7, at 144; see also DAVID THOMAS KONIG,
LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS: ESSEX COUNTY, 1629-1692, at 188 (1979)
(describing the role of colonial courts in providing social cohesion and equilibrium in
seventeenth-century Massachusetts); cf Hoffer, supra note 7, at 297-98 (arguing that the central
determinant of colonial debt litigation was a plaintiff's sense of honor).
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the volume of debt litigation and the shift to litigation based on more formal
credit instruments during the first half of the eighteenth century.
Some aspects of the modernization theory, however, do not seen, to be
thoroughly worked out, especially with respect to the interpretation of the
legal data. First, as discussed below, economic scholarship raises
considerable doubts about the extent to which New England experienced
substantial economic growth during the first half of the eighteenth century,
which supports Horwitz's view that market activity was suppressed during
this period. Second, according to the modernization theory, the law became
steadily more formal and predictable at the same time that civil litigation
increased exponentially. This relationship is peculiar because under steady
economic conditions, the adoption of more predictable legal rules should
decrease, rather than increase, litigation, and out-of-court settlements
should increase because of greater predictability. 2 It follows that to sustain
the modernization explanation of litigation increase-that economic
advances led to an increase in the volume of credit agreements entered into,
and a proportionate increase in debt defaults-requires a showing of
economic growth and commercialization at levels high enough to account
for an absolute increase in litigation despite a reduction in the litigation rate
because of greater legal predictability. To date, no modernization scholar
has attempted this proof. As a consequence, there are reasons to question
the relationship among each of the features of the modernization
hypothesis--economic growth leading to greater legal predictability and
resulting in exponential increases in litigation.
This Article argues that there are serious methodological and
substantive limitations in the explanation given by colonial legal historians
of the legal system's impact on economic expansion and the emergence of a
market-oriented society. The principal weakness of legal historical
scholarship on the relationship between law and colonial economic
development has been a failure to recognize the legislature's powers over
economic conditions and its essential role in affecting the nature of
contractual relationships, the quantity of litigation, and even the court
system's function in promoting, or limiting, economic growth. This Article
proposes that the legal and economic changes of the first half of the
eighteenth century in New England did not emerge endogenously out of
individuals' obligations, shaped by local conditions and enforced in local
courts. The principal factor driving the legal changes of the first half of the
eighteenth century was the effort by colonial legislatures to expand their
powers and to gain control over the economy by issuing the first paper
12. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
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currencies 3 and by taxing in paper currency. The central purpose of the
Article is to show the interconnection between legislatures' use of currency
policy to expand government power, the types of contractual obligations
entered into on a widespread basis, and the litigation explosions occurring
during the currency crises of the period. Examining these relationships-
among currency policies, the nature of contracting, and litigation trends-
leads to a different assessment of the role of the colonial legal system in the
economy of New England than that of prior scholarship. An emphasis on
currency policy reveals that colonial law should not be characterized by
either the assumption that the most important sources of law emerged
locally, or that the law continually adapted optimally to satisfy preferences
of local communities.
Colonial governments began issuing paper money, in the form of bills
of credit, in the period from 1690 to 1710.14 The seventeenth-century
colonial economy was plagued by an extreme scarcity of a circulating
medium of exchange. Indeed, at various times, the economy was close to
operating on a barter basis. Currency scarcity had tremendous implications
for the nature of government, the forms in which individuals transacted, and
the structure of the society. First, the lack of a circulating currency seriously
limited government power. New England colonial governments in the
seventeenth century, for example, were often required to tax in commodity
currencies, such as corn and wheat, because the citizenry lacked other
currencies with which to satisfy their tax obligations. 5 Taxing in a
commodity imposes a variety of inefficiencies on a government.16 Its effect
was to limit the extent to which government institutions could finance and
realistically expand the scope of their operations.
Second, the scarcity of cash was profoundly important in determining
the types of contractual obligations entered into by individuals. Barter
exchange is difficult. 7 Colonial citizens adopted many mechanisms to
surpass direct barter: First, they used what might be called "money
substitutes," such as commodity money-corn, wheat, or tobacco
13. For the purposes of this Article, "currency" and "money" are defined as devices that
operate as a means of exchange, a mode of payment, and a standard of value. This Article
examines many types of "currency" and "money": gold and silver coins from Europe; public
bills of credit issued by colonial governments; and commodity money and credit devices such as
book accounts and promissory notes (which used other currencies as a standard of value). This
Article focuses on the importance to legal change of the issuance and circulation of bills of credit,
first issued by the Massachusetts government in 1690. These bills of credit, and those of other
colonies, are called "public currency" or "paper money."
14. Massachusetts issued the first paper bills of credit in the colonies in 1690. Connecticut
and New Hampshire issued their first bills of credit in 1709, and Rhode Island in 1710. LESLIE V.
BROCK, THE CURRENCY OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES, 1700-1764: A STUDY IN COLONIAL
FINANCE AND IMPERIAL RELATIONS 18, 35 (1975).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 56-65.
16. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
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functioning as cash. In addition, colonial laborers were often compensated
in kind-such as by the use of "shop notes." 8 Indeed, the prevalence
during this period of slavery and labor relations structured as property
relationships, rather than wage contracts, during this period was very likely
a consequence of the scarcity of cash. A final principal way colonists
surpassed the problems of barter was through the creation of networks of
debt relationships, such as book accounts, which functioned as a system of
tabs, allowing members of a community to buy and sell goods from each
other without using cash. The prevalence of these practices suggests that the
economy should be characterized as generally consisting of "quasi-barter,"
rather than pure barter conditions. Even quasi-barter, however, limited the
potential for economic exchange and constrained individuals to be involved
in local, intracommunity economic relationships.
Finally, quasi-barter conditions had an important effect on the overall
social structure of the society. In relation to the cash economy that was to
develop later, the seventeenth- and early eighteenth- century economy was
an environment of high transaction costs. The more difficult and costly it is
to make exchanges in the market, the more goods will be produced within a
household or a community. 9 As is described in greater detail below, the
forms of transacting colonial citizens developed to surpass pure barter often
led to insularity within small communities. Being constrained to quasi-
barter exchanges therefore greatly suppressed economic activity and
reinforced an economic system based upon intracommunity exchanges and
localism.
The complications of an economy without money have been
overlooked by legal historians. The older school of colonial legal
scholarship-exemplified by Horwitz's account-instead focused on a set
of phenomena that might be better regarded as the effects on the legal
system of a scarcity of sufficient currency. Horwitz, for example,
recognizes the lack of monetary provisions in contractual obligations, but
explains them as deriving from a colonial "premarket" ideology.
Understanding the difficulties of exchange under a barter regime and the
ways in which colonial merchants ameliorated those difficulties, however,
suggests a more materialist explanation of the communitarian aspects of
early colonial society. Intracommunity contractual relationships were
reinforced by economic conditions and were not necessarily driven by
(although in some areas plausibly coincided with) a pre-industrial,
communitarian mindset. New England citizens involved in the market,
however, aggressively advocated the adoption of private and governmental
18. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
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currencies as early as 1682,2" expecting that widespread availability of
currency would lead to economic advance. As a consequence, the evidence
Horwitz describes would change once currency became more widely
available.
The expense of war efforts in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries led the colonial governments for the first time to print paper
money in the form of bills of credit. Thus, after 1710, colonial economies
transformed from being based principally on a mix of barter, money
substitutes, and coin exchanges to operating with widespread use of
government paper money.2' The circulation of paper money had a
tremendous effect both on the power of colonial legislatures and on market
conditions within the colonies. Printing money vastly increased colonial
governments' ability to finance operations. Governments could raise funds
far more quickly by printing and issuing bills, and then by levying taxes
payable in the bills, than by earlier forms of finance. Taxing in bills of
credit was far more efficient than taxing in corn or wheat.
Paper money also had profound effects on credit conditions and the
forms of contractual obligations colonists used. Widespread availability of
cash dramatically lowered the costs of transacting, which increased the
number of exchanges possible and led to greater market development and
specialization. The widespread availability of paper money also changed
the nature of contractual relationships throughout the colonies. It was no
longer necessary to employ barter exchanges or the forms of debt
instruments that had substituted for hard currency. The colonial
legislatures' enactment of the first currency policies both increased
legislative power and promoted commercialization. Expanding government
power and market growth seemingly coincided.
Despite the evident benefits of a stable currency, however, currency
policy in New England was highly uncertain. Each colony's annual
determination of the volume of public currency in circulation reflected a
struggle within colonial assemblies, which faced pressure from part of the
public to print more bills, and conflicting pressure from English and New
England merchants who desired a stable currency of high value to satisfy
English import debts. The colonies, of course, were not autonomous: The
English Board of Trade and Parliament repeatedly attempted to stabilize the
value of colonial currencies, which often increased uncertainty and
20. Andrew McFarland Davis, Introduction to I COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, 1682-
1751, at I (Andrew McFarland Davis comp., 1910) [hereinafter COLONIAL CURRENCY
REPRINTS]. 1682 is the year of publication of a plan describing and advertising the first privately
backed currency instituted in the colonies. The plan was conceived in 1649. [REV. JOHN
WOODBRIDGE], SEVERALS RELATING TO THE FUND (n.p. 1681), reprinted in I COLONIAL
CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra, at 108, 110. This bank is discussed infra notes 147-151 and
accompanying text.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 168-172.
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fluctuations in currency values because of conflicts with colonial policies.
Indeed, in New England, the tensions within the elected, representative
assemblies, and between those assemblies and the English-representatives
of a foreign sovereign promoting a mercantilist agenda-led to policies that
created disastrous uncertainty. Moreover, because colonial bills of credit
passed throughout New England at par, the policies of neighboring
governments at times led to currency instability despite the efforts of
individual colonial governments. The resulting currency policies and the
combined effect of various colonial governments' currency issues led in
New England to periods of extreme depreciation (currency gluts), and
periods of currency scarcity when people were forced to revert to barter
exchange.
Colonial currency policies had a direct effect on trends in litigation and,
more generally, on the court system's impact on economic development.
Periods of currency crisis greatly affected individuals' litigation strategies.
First, high levels of inflation (currency depreciation) had a direct effect on
the value of all debt obligations within the colony.22 Debtors had an
incentive to postpone payment to benefit from declining currency values.23
Fluctuations in the value of currency similarly affected the costs of
litigation which, in the colonial period, principally took the form of
legislatively determined court and lawyers' fees. Court fees impose a cost
on litigation; inflation, not to say high inflation, lowered the costs of
litigating in real terms, reducing those costs. 24 Second, colonial currency
crises generated deep economic recessions, leading creditors to sue to
reclaim debts in advance of other creditors, thereby causing "chains of
debt," in which each person sued his debtors and then his debtors' debtors,
and so on. 2' All of these factors influenced individuals' litigation
strategies-and, therefore, influenced the creation of law as applied by
courts. These factors have been ignored, however, by colonial historians.
The creation of law through individual judicial decisions therefore
cannot be adequately understood without an appreciation of the complex
relationship between currency policies and economic conditions, and the
resulting impact of those conditions on litigation volume. Indeed, in
contrast to the modernization theory, a more thoroughgoing analysis of debt
litigation reveals that the volume of litigation in the colonies did not rise
gradually during the first half of the eighteenth century, as might be
expected if litigation levels were the result of growing commercialization
22. See infra text accompanying notes 186-193.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 222-223.
24. See Claire Priest, Note, Colonial Courts and Secured Credit: Early American
Commercial Litigation and Shays' Rebellion, 108 YALE L.J. 2413, 2424-39 (1999); infra text
accompanying note 338.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 193-194, 224-229.
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and general economic growth. Rather, there were specific periods during
which the volume of litigation rose exponentially, and separate periods
when it sharply declined. The periods of high litigation volume occurred at
times of economic crisis in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and other colonies,
and were triggered by the state of their public currencies.
Close examination of litigation trends reveals a correlation between
currency policies and litigation volume: As this Article shows, the
exacerbation of currency problems in the years 1726 to 1730, 1733 to 1734,
and 1738 to 1741 in New England corresponds to volatile and increasing
litigation volume during those periods. Colonial legal historians have
focused on the years from 1730 to 1750 as the principal period of
increasing legal modernization. This Article shows, in contrast, that
currency scarcity or instability required many engaged in trade to revert to
barter transactions and caused widespread financial hardship and economic
stagnation--exactly the reverse of modernization.
The currency policy approach also suggests a different interpretation of
the judiciary's impact on the economy during the first half of the eighteenth
century. As this Article shows, the legal tender laws in force during the
times of currency crisis in Massachusetts permitted debtors to repay in
paper money the nominal value designated in contracts, despite any
depreciation (reduction in currency value) or appreciation (increase in
currency value) of the bills.26 During periods of extreme depreciation,
debtors defaulted on their debts to delay repayment in the hope that they
would benefit from continued depreciation and would be able to pay in
money of a lesser value. Contemporary accounts indeed suggest that the
rise in uncontested debt cases of the 1730s and 1740s represents not legal
modernization, but debtors' attempts to delay repayment by forcing their
creditors to obtain judgments against them.27 Until the legislature enacted a
law in 1742 requiring that judges index judgments in response to changes in
the value of the bills of credit, the judiciary could play no role in remedying
Massachusetts's economic crises.28 Thus, examination of the currency
events of the 1730s and 1740s suggests a very different conclusion from
modernization theorists' characterization of the eighteenth-century judiciary
as reforming legal process to promote economic advance. Rather, by
enforcing legal tender laws enacted by the colonial assembly,
Massachusetts law did very little to improve, and may have worsened-
however involuntarily-already poor economic conditions.
A lack of understanding of the importance of currency policies in
shaping contractual relations and motivating litigation has led legal scholars
26. See infra text accompanying notes 186-190.
27. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 338.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 306-309.
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to overlook crucial aspects of the interrelation of economic, legal, and
political developments of the colonial period. First, legislative policy is
essential to an understanding of the role of law in promoting or limiting
economic development. Economic conditions within the colonial economy
were importantly determined by political events, including the escalating
tensions between the colonies and England. Indeed, a focus on currency
policies reveals that the prevalence of book accounts-perhaps the most
"local" of transactions-was dependent upon decisions made by
Parliament in England. The direct correlation between currency policies and
litigation shows that a historical approach that emphasizes judicial
responses to relationships between individuals and community value-
systems is an approach that loses sight of the importance of broader
political issues on local events.
Indeed, colonial legal historians have ignored the specific ways in
which the politics of currency policy affected colonial legal developments.
For example, when the Royal Government required the colonies to recall
outstanding bills of credit in the 1730s and 1740s, colonists burdened by the
subsequent recession attempted to remedy the problem by establishing: a
Land Bank and a Silver Bank that issued private currencies. The subsequent
British dismantling of these banks, in order both to respond to the demands
of British creditors and to limit the political autonomy of colonial
governments, led to a general uproar and a minor insurrection in western
Massachusetts. John Adams later claimed that the "act to destroy the Land
Bank scheme raised a greater ferment in this province than the Stamp Act
did."29 Sentiments of this nature have had no role in current colonial legal
history. Yet, the political fervor of the time provides additional support for
one of this Article's central arguments-that politics on a national, as well
as a colony-wide, level was vitally important to local litigation events and
the relation of courts to the economy.
Second, the assumption that judges continually adapted the law to
satisfy local preferences optimally is misguided. The court system's impact
on economic development is far more problematic in light of its
management of the litigation crises occurring during periods of currency
crisis. During skyrocketing inflation, the requirement of the law that debtors
could satisfy their monetary obligations with a payment of the nominal
value-and the unwillingness of judges to amend the doctrine-may have
worsened credit conditions.3" Moreover, the absence of a good system of
priority lending rules in the colonial period led to a higher litigation volume
29. 4 JOHN ADAMS, Novanglus: Or, A History of the Dispute with America, from Its Origin,
in 1754, to the Present Time, in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 3, 49 (Charles Francis Adams ed.,
Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851) (emphasis added).
30. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the "nominalism" doctrine, see
infra text accompanying notes 360-363.
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than would otherwise have been the case.3' Each of these features of the
court system requires further scrutiny.
Part I of this Article examines economic conditions in Massachusetts32
preceding the issuance of government paper money and shows how the lack
of a widely available currency shaped contractual relations and commercial
litigation. Part II describes the nature of private and public support for the
issuance of government paper money and how dependence upon that paper
money affected Massachusetts's litigation volume. Part III examines the
currency crises of the 1730s and early 1740s. Part IV demonstrates the
empirical correlation between currency policies and litigation volume
revealed by data from the Plymouth, Massachusetts, County Court of
Common Pleas. Part V then reassesses the role of the court system in
promoting economic growth during the first half of the eighteenth century
in New England.
I. THE EFFECTS OF CURRENCY SCARCITY ON MARKETS AND THE LAW
To understand the links between monetary and litigation crises in
colonial times, it is necessary to understand the nature of the colonial
economy before the issuance of paper money and how quasi-barter
conditions suppressed commercial relations. This Part analyzes the ways in
which early New England's economic conditions were reflected in the
prevailing economic practices, contractual arrangements, and judicial
remedies of a society in which little hard currency was available for use in
transactions. Section L.A examines generally the aspects of barter
economies that suppress commerce. Section I.B discusses the ways that
economic practices in colonial New England reflected an environment in
which money was scarce. It analyzes the types of trading practices used to
increase the number of possible exchanges and, more relevant to litigation,
the importance and prevalence of borrowing practices when hard currency
was not available. Section I.C describes how judicial remedies in
commercial litigation reflected an environment of scarce cash. Finally,
3 1. See infra note 366 and accompanying text.
32. Bruce Mann's and Comeha Dayton's works focus on Connecticut during the first half of
the eighteenth century. This Article examines the currency policies in Massachusetts during the
period from 1710 to 1742. The determinants of litigation in Massachusetts are likely to be very
similar to those affecting litigation in other New England colonies (though political events
differed throughout the colonies). The economies of Connecticut and other New England colonies
were closely linked commercially with Massachusetts, because Boston was the principal port of
export. Though each colony determined its own currency policy, bills of credit of the New
England colonies were accepted at par as a medium of exchange throughout. See infra note 172.
This Article focuses on a currency crisis instigated by currency policies imposed by England on
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, but Connecticut's economy was so closely linked with that of
Massachusetts that Connecticut's currency (and as this Article argues, its litigation levels as well)
would have been affected similarly, though perhaps not exactly simultaneously.
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Section I.D examines the costs of reliance on endogenous money
substitutes and the systemic effects of a lower volume of exchange and of
undeveloped markets on economic and cultural conditions. Section I.D also
analyzes economics scholarship on colonial economic growth rates,
suggesting the real effects of monetary scarcity on economic activity. Then,
Part II shows how economic crises causing reversion to barter led to periods
of dramatically increasing litigation volume.
A. Barter, the Cost of Transacting, and Market Development
It is unlikely that any economy, other than the truly primitive, has ever
operated purely on barter. This Section analyzes the difficulties of pure
barter in order to clarify the problems facing colonial citizens who
participated in the market economy. The following Sections, then, describe
in greater detail how colonial governments responded to this monetary
scarcity and how colonial citizens surpassed the constraints of pure barter.
Monetary conditions directly affect the costs of transacting. In the
aggregate, through multiplied costs imposed on individual transactions,
monetary conditions greatly influence the degree of specialization and the
development of markets. Pure barter creates essentially two impediments to
economic activity that have been emphasized in the economic literature: the
need for a "double coincidence of wants," and information problems
associated with an economy without money prices. Money is commonly
defined in the economic literature as any item that serves as a medium of
exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value.33 The existence of money,
whether in the form of fiat money,34 commodity money, or enforceable debt
obligations, immediately solves many of the problems associated with
barter and advances a process of change toward a developed market
economy.
The first way in which pure barter suppresses economic exchange is
defined in the economic literature as the need for a "double coincidence of
wants" -that exchanges can occur only when individuals want to exchange
the precise goods they possess and can agree on the value, quantity,
and time to make the exchange." There are three components of
33. See, e.g., Bennett T. McCallum & Marvin S. Goodfriend, Demand for Money:
Theoretical Studies, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: MONEY 117 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989).
34. Fiat money is money that has no intrinsic value, such as paper money. In contrast, specie
is currency with intrinsic value, such as gold, which can be exchanged whether in the form of coin
or melted down.
35. See, e.g., W. STANLEY JEVONS, MONEY AND THE MECHANISM OF EXCHANGE (London,
D. Appleton 1875); Abhijit V. Banerjee & Eric S. Maskin, A Walrasian Theory of Money and
Barter, Il1 Q.J. ECON. 955, 956 (1996); Ross M. Starr, The Structure of Exchange in Barter and
Monetary Economies, 86 Q.J. ECON. 290, 290 (1972). According to Jevons, "There may be many
people wanting, and many possessed those things wanted; but to allow an act of barter, there must
be a double coincidence, which will rarely happen." JEVONS, supra, at 3.
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the double coincidence problem. One component might be called
"incommensurability": The goods of one of the potential parties to a
transaction cannot be divided to match the value of the goods of the other
by quantity or according to value. As an obvious example, the value of a
pig may be equal to more than five, but less than six, live laying hens. The
existence of money, particularly in small denominations, solves this
problem by permitting payment according to the precise value of each
good. Under barter, on the other hand, many exchanges will not occur or
will be subject to additional costs of exchange because there is no way to
compensate more precisely for value or quantity.
Another component of the double coincidence problem might be called
the "incompatibility of wants": One person may want to trade his or her
pig for hens, but may find only a person with no hens but who is willing to
take the pig in exchange for cloth or wood. This incompatibility may not
defeat the transaction, but it will only go forward if the owner of the pig is
willing to act as a middleman and believes a subsequent deal can be made
trading cloth or wood for hens.36 In a fully developed economy, money
eliminates this problem; in a thin economy, such as colonial New England,
money reduces it.
A final double coincidence problem involves "synchronization. 37
Parties may want to make an exchange, but may not have the exact goods
desired by the other at the exact time the other wants to make the exchange.
Money, in any form, solves this problem since money can be held (saved)
for future use or, in the case of enforceable debt obligations, promised for
the future, allowing parties themselves to control the timing of consumptive
exchanges.
The second difficulty emphasized in economics that tends to suppress
trade under conditions of pure barter is the high cost of attaining
information3" about goods or labor. Unlike under a monetary economy,
where a price establishes a good's value in relation to all other goods, under
barter, the value of the goods in an exchange is conditioned by what is
being exchanged-no general value is established. Knowledge concerning
the value of a good depends upon a community's ability to disseminate
36. Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer argue that a lack of a medium of exchange leads to
use of "transaction chains" (multiple-stage transactions) to reduce the marginal costs of
exchanging. Karl Brunner & Allan H. Meltzer, The Uses of Money: Money in the Theory of an
Exchange Economy, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 784, 788 (1971).
37. Id. at 785 & n.4.
38. The term "information" is used in a general sense to mean any facts relevant to the value
of the product. The "information problem" in undeveloped markets refers to, for example,
problems conveying the value of inherent features of the product or its use, problems of spreading
information about the relative values of particular goods (for example, prices in Boston or prices
in neighboring rural towns), and information problems regarding supply and demand (for
example, knowledge that another boat is arriving with similar goods or that the boat was
shipwrecked).
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information about previous exchanges of that good; thus, the marginal cost
of acquiring information about goods is reduced according to the frequency
with which a group exchanges those goods.39 Uncertainty about value limits
incentives to improve the quality-and thus increase the marginal value-
of goods. In an undeveloped market, the person in possession of a good
with uncommon features may know its value, but may have no way of
proving the value to others and obtaining its true value in an exchange.4"
A barter economy with thin markets can be characterized as one in
which transaction costs are extremely, perhaps in many cases prohibitively,
high. The double coincidence problem and the lack of price information
impose a "cost" on each transaction. The aggregate costs of individual
transactions in a society directly influence the development of markets and
the volume of contractual relations. Higher transaction costs lead to less
specialization and reduce the benefits of comparative advantage. The more
difficult and costly it is to make exchanges in the market, the more goods
will be produced within a household or community. Indeed, just as Ronald
Coase explained with regard to the existence of firms, households and
communities will produce on a self-subsistence basis wherever the
additional costs of trading on the market exceed the diseconomies of
internal household or community production.41 Household subsistence
production, however, limits the degree to which individuals can channel
their energies into specialized tasks because of the diverse work required to
produce the full set of necessary foods and goods. Phrased differently, the
prevalence of subsistence production reflects the limitations of the ability of
markets to benefit from specialization. Indeed, as emphasized by Adam
Smith in The Wealth of Nations, the division of labor is limited by the
extent of the market, and the extent of the market is constrained by the costs
of exchange.4 2
39. Brunner & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 786.
40. Brunner and Meltzer argue that the principal problem of barter is "the uneven distribution
of information." Id.
41. According to Coase:
The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a
cost of using the price mechanism.... [A] firm will tend to expand until the costs of
organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying
out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of
organizing in another firm.
R.H. COASE, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 38,44 (1988).
42. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 21 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1976) (1776). In 1729, Benjamin Franklin
described how currency allows market development and specialization, particularly focusing on
the importance of currency to the development of a larger population of wage laborers, who
would work for money rather than laboring for their own subsistence. Coin scarcity in New
England, he argued, led to difficulties in recruiting wage laborers because the value of their labor
often exceeded the amount a laborer wanted to receive in subsistence goods. According to
Franklin, "A Plentiful Currency will encourage great Numbers of Labouring and Handicrafts
Men to come and Settle in the Country, by the same Reason that a Want of it will discourage and
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The level of transaction costs, therefore, directly affects market activity
and the volume of contractual relations in a society. In addition, profit-
seeking activity is more limited in an economy with high transaction costs.
In a barter economy, the potential for "profits" in each transaction is
limited by the ability to trade the excess of goods acquired beyond one's
needs (the profits) for more desirable goods through the market. The limited
profit-making ability in barter similarly constrains the extent of borrowing
and lending. Receiving goods as payment for debts is feasible chiefly where
there exists a market for those goods. The higher the transaction costs, the
lower the profits gained from obtaining goods that must be sold. Thus, the
level of credit available can be predicted to be far lower in an economy with
high transaction costs, such as barter, than in a fully monetized economy
with a stable currency.43 As is shown below, the unavailability of gold and
silver coins for typical domestic transactions led colonists to adopt money
substitutes that alleviated the problems of barter and encouraged greater
commercialization. The next Section describes transactional adjustments to
monetary scarcity more systematically.
B. Public and Private Responses to Currency Scarcity in Colonial
Massachusetts Prior to the Issuance of Public Currency
Before the widespread circulation of government paper money,
Massachusetts had what might be regarded as a mixed coin/barter economy.
During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, silver and gold coins
circulated throughout the colonies, but they were scarce and valued too
highly to be used in most domestic transactions."
drive them out." [BENJAMIN FRANKLIN], A MODEST ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
NECESSITY OF A PAPER CURRENCY (Philadelphia, n.p. 1729), reprinted in 2 COLONIAL
CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 335, 339. Wage laborers were viewed as necessary for
production of cash crops-and, thus, for an extension of market production. Wage laborers are
one example of specialization resulting from greater currency availability, but it was believed that
currency would lead to market development and specialization over a broader scope.
43. The fact that transaction costs are generally lower in a monetized economy does not
preclude the possibility of incidents when direct exchanges for goods are preferable to cash
exchanges. Infra note 179.
44. When Massachusetts issued its first paper money, the most common coins in circulation
were the four forms of Spanish "pieces of eight": the Peru (or light piece) and the heavy pieces-
the Mexico, pillar, and Seville. BROCK, supra note 14, at 5 & nn.2 & 7. Coins that appear in cases
of the Suffolk County Court, 1671-1680, are pieces of eight (Spanish), gilders, and stivers in
wampum value (Dutch), wampum (see below), French livres, markes and nobles (German), the
coins of Barbados, and English Sterling. Chafee, supra note 10, at xvii, lxxvi; see also Frederick
K. Beutel, Colonial Sources of the Negotiable Instruments Law of the United States, 34 ILL. L.
REV. Nw. U. 137, 139-40 & n.29 (1939) (listing other colonial currencies). The first legal
currency in Massachusetts was wampum, a polished shell long used as a medium of exchange by
Native Americans, which was made legal tender in 1643. See Wampampeag (1643), THE
GENERAL LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS COLONY 154 (rev. ed., Samuel Green
1672) [hereinafter GENERAL LAWS], reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS
(Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1889). Wampum served well as a currency when traders were able
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Two features of colonial political and economic life increased the value
of gold and silver. First, European governments in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries embraced the mercantilist belief that policies adopted
to prohibit the export and encourage the import of coins would provide a
more readily available medium of exchange and easier finance of
government expenditures (through taxation of coins). On these grounds, the
English Parliament prohibited all export of English Sterling to the colonies
as of 1695."5 During the same period, Portugal prohibited exportation of
gold and silver and Spain levied a three-percent tax on all gold and silver
exports.46 Because of the high demand for currency, gold and silver coins of
many nations circulated internationally despite the prohibitions, but the
relative scarcity that resulted from these policies increased the coins' value,
as Adam Smith observed, by "the expence of smuggling."47
Balance of trade is a second reason for the high value of coins in the
New England colonies. Imports from England exceeded New England's
exports, and coins were generally required as balance-of-trade payments to
English creditors.48 Gold and silver coins were most commonly used in
to discern its quality accurately. According to Curtis Nettels, the highest quality wampum was
used exclusively in trade between discriminating Native Americans and colonial traders. In
contrast, poor quality wampum flooded the markets of New England towns and was passed off
into church coffers and to tax collectors. In Massachusetts, the flooding of the market with low
quality wampum led to such high levels of inflation that its legal tender status was canceled in
1661. Id. (noting date of repeal); CURTIS PUTNAM NETTELS, THE MONEY SUPPLY OF THE
AMERICAN COLONIES BEFORE 1720, at 211-12 (1934) (describing the impetus behind repeal);
ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A HISTORY OF THE DOLLAR 6-7 (1957) (same).
45. JOSEPH ALBERT ERNST, MONEY AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1755-1775: A STUDY IN
THE CURRENCY ACT OF 1764 AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REVOLUTION 20 (1973);
NETTELS, supra note 44, at 162; NUSSBAUM, supra note 44, at 7.
46. 2 SMITH, supra note 42, at 17.
47. Id.
48. BROCK, supra note 14, at 3, 30; ERNST, supra note 45, at 20; BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS
AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 14 (1957); NETTELS, supra note 44, at 162-78; NUSSBAUM, supra
note 44, at 7, 31; see also JOHN J. MCCUSKER, MONEY AND EXCHANGE IN EUROPE AND
AMERICA, 1600-1775, at 116-17 (1978) (describing the regularity with which colonists reached
the "specie export point" -the point at which the cost of paying debts to English creditors in
London bills of exchange became higher than that of exporting specie directly, which led to an
outflow of specie). This view has been challenged. E.g., Roger W. Weiss, The Issue of Paper
Money in the American Colonies, 1720-1774, 30 J. ECON. HIST. 770 (1970). Weiss argues that the
"balance of trade" explanation of currency scarcity in the colonies is inadequate because England
suffered from a similar scarcity of coins during the same period, though England had a favorable
balance of trade generally. Id. at 773-74. In addition, Weiss argues that, if the problem were a
shortage, there would have been deflation-a general price decline-to compensate. Id. at 773,
775. My own view is that Weiss's second argument, which follows a commonly accepted quantity
theory of money, may wrongly assume that the colonies were a "closed economy" with respect to
circulating coins. In a closed economy, one wouid expect the price level to reflect the quantity of
money in circulation. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the market for gold
and silver coins was highly international; it included Europe, the Caribbean Islands, and South
America. The New England colonies, which represented merely a small portion of the overall
market, were therefore likely to be price-takers with respect to the price of coins. Put differently,




international transactions. Nonetheless, coins circulated with sufficient
frequency that transactions were generally recorded by a monetary
standard-in Sterling denominations-even when no money exchanged
hands. The use of pounds, shillings, and pence as units of account remedied
a principal problem of barter, the lack of a price mechanism, permitting
substantial circulation of information about prices and market conditions
throughout the colonies.
The early history of colonial coinage was largely influenced by
conflicts between the policy decisions of colonial governments, which
wanted to remedy the lack of currency, and the English government, which
was not willing to cede control over monetary policy to the colonial
governments, hoping to provide security for English loans to the colonies.
In the seventeenth century, colonial assemblies attempted to remedy the
scarcity of coins by adopting policies that overvalued Spanish pieces of
eight and other foreign coins (in relation to Sterling) in order to attract these
monies into their respective colonies.49 As an example, in 1652 the
Massachusetts government began reminting coins of other nations-
creating pinetree shillings consisting of the "bullion, plate, and spanish
coyn" that people brought in to be melted down and recoined-rewarding
with profit those who participated in the recoining.5 Massachusetts
simultaneously passed a law, like those of England and Portugal,
prohibiting the export of money and permitting the confiscation of all
money attempted to be exported as well as of all visible property used in an
export attempt. Massachusetts appointed "Searchers" to examine and
search the persons, packages, and ships of all those leaving the colony.5
Such laws were largely unsuccessful in the long run, however, in part
because other colonies enacted similar laws, diminishing through
competition the effectiveness of any single colony's efforts.52
These Acts were repealed under pressure from the English government,
in part because of the concern that colonial mints might adopt policies that
49. NETTELS, supra note 44, at 231-234.
50. Money (1652), GENERAL LAWS 117, 117, reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 44; NETrELS, supra note 44, at 170-71, 236-37.
51. Money (1652), GENERAL LAWS 117, 118, reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 44. This law resulted in at least one judicial decision. Stanberry &
Harris's Money (Jan. 26, 1675), in RECORDS OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT 1671-1680: PART
I, supra note 10, at 559. The court determined that it was not proved that Stanberry and Harris
were trying to take money out of the colony, and ordered their money returned to them. Id.
According to Nettels, Massachusetts's ban on exportation of pinetree shillings was not effective.
NETTELS, supra note 44, at 171.
52. BROCK, supra note 14, at 233; MCCUSKER, supra note 48, at 118-19. Following the
quantity theory, Brock argues that these measures could have had only temporary effects because
an influx of coins would lead to a rise in prices to reflect the actual value of the coins. E.g.,
BROCK, supra note 14, at 9.
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would encourage the exportation of silver from England to America. 53 The
Massachusetts mint was shut down by the English in 1684. 4 A
proclamation issued by the English Privy Council in 1704, followed by a
Parliamentary Act in 1708, required a standardization of the value of
currencies in relation to Sterling-that is, a uniform exchange rate-
throughout the North American colonies. This Act would have eliminated
colonial governments' ability to draw coins from other colonies, but the
colonial governments refused, or were unable, to enforce it.5
Colonial governments also attempted to remedy the problem of
monetary scarcity by designating particular commodities as money for the
purposes of payment of public debts.56 Commodity money was most
prevalent in those colonies that specialized in exporting particular staple
crops. Virginia and Maryland, for example, relied almost exclusively on
tobacco-their principal staple crop-as currency.57 New England had no
equivalent staple crop but, at various times, designated farm products such
as beef, wheat, pork, corn, flax, and hemp-typically called "country
pay" -as commodity money.58 The success of a commodity money
depended upon the good's lack of perishability and the stability of supply
and demand for the good. Colonial governments, for example, accepted
taxes paid in tobacco or corn because it was a product many people grew,
with a relatively steady demand and, therefore, a secure resale market.59
53. See NETTELS, supra note 44, at 173. For a more detailed discussion of colonial
governments' attempts to attract gold and silver coins and the efforts to standardize the value of
coins in relation to Sterling by the English Board of Trade and Parliament, see generally BROCK,
supra note 14, at 130-67. In 1682, Massachusetts again responded to the scarcity of coins by
enacting a law making Spanish pieces-of-eight legal tender. According to the Massachusetts
General Court, the law was passed "As an expedient to keep Money in the Countrey," because
"Commerce and Trade is very much obstructed" by the scarcity of coins. Pieces of Eight (1682),
SEVERAL LAWS MADE AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL COURT, Oct. 11, 1682, at 94,
reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 44, at 294.
54. NET rELS, supra note 44, at 174 & n.47, 236-37.
55. The 1708 Act for Ascertaining the Rates of Foreign Coins in Her Majesty's Plantations in
America limited the value of a piece of eight to six shillings. ERNST, supra note 45, at 23.
Contemporary accounts suggest, however, that the Act was not effective: Subsequent Royal
Instructions claim that the Act "has not been observed as it ought to have been in many of his
Majesty's colonies and plantations in America." Coinage Act and Instructions on Currency To Be
Observed (1740), reprinted in I LEONARD WOODS LABAREE, ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH
COLONIAL GOVERNORS, 1670-1776, at 214 (1935); see also BROCK, supra note 14, at 148-67
(discussing the ineffectiveness of the act).
56. Gold and silver are "commodities" in that they are used for consumptive purposes
beyond money. For the purposes of this Article, however, the term "commodity money" refers to
nonmetallic commodities used for both consumptive and monetary purposes. For a review of
various forms of commodity money used throughout the American colonies, see NETTELS, supra
note 44, at 202-28.
57. Id. at 208.
58. Id.
59. E.g., Charges Publick (1646), GENERAL LAWS 22, 24-25, reprinted in THE COLONIAL
LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 44 (permitting taxes to be paid in corn). On colonists'
complaints regarding the inefficiency of taxing in corn, see infra note 174.
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Colonial governments, however, had tremendous problems in ensuring
that minimum standards of quality were maintained. Producers of
commodity money had an incentive to pass off the worst crop of tobacco or
the worst corn to tax collectors or to unsuspecting creditors. Indeed, the
Massachusetts government's 1643 experiment to vest wampum, a polished
shell used as a medium of exchange by Native Americans, with the status of
legal tender failed after the citizenry began paying taxes in poor-quality
wampum.60 In later years, colonial governments that authorized commodity
money typically hired officers to determine whether or not crops met
certain minimal standards before certifying them to be used as money.6 By
1730, Virginia had developed the most sophisticated inspection system of
commodity money in the colonies in the process of establishing a tobacco
note currency.62 Such systems were more difficult to establish in New
England, which lacked a single, dominant staple crop.63 Although the New
England colonies permitted locally produced goods to be used to pay taxes,
commodity money never satisfied the demand for a medium of exchange as
it had in Virginia.' Indeed, four years after it first issued paper money,
Massachusetts enacted a law forbidding the use of commodity money in
payment of taxes.65
These various efforts-in retrospect-failed to create a sufficient
monetary base to allow any colony to operate on a basis closely resembling
cash exchange. In response to the uncertain availability of money, colonial
traders developed a unique set of transactional practices, generally of two
60. See supra note 44.
61. See, e.g., NETrELS, supra note 44, at 212-14.
62. Individuals brought their tobacco to public warehouses, where government officials
destroyed tobacco not making the grade, and issued "tobacco notes," based on the estimated
value of the tobacco, which were used in all public and private payments and which circulated as
the principal medium of exchange. A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN
LAWYERS: CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680-1810, at 96-100 (1981); JAMES H.
SOLTOW, THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF WILLIAMSBURG 112-15 (1965).
63. Commodity money was, however, extremely important to Connecticut's economy, and
the colony established systems of valuing the goods for tax purposes. In 1654, for example, the
colony of New Haven enacted a law providing that:
[In] every plantation ... there shall be a viewer of come, that in case of differrence may
judg, whether it be well dressed and merchantable or no, which man is to be chosen by
each plantation, and shall bee under oath to judg faithfully when called to it, and is to
be paide for his time spent and paines therein by him whose come is faulty, or who
unnecessarily occasions the trouble.
2 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OR JURISDICTION OF NEW HAVEN, FROM MAY, 1653, TO THE UNION
98, 154 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., Hartford, Case, Lockwood, and Co. 1858). In 1694, this system
was extended throughout Connecticut to value both pork and grain. 2 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF
THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 224 (J. Hammond Trumbull ed., Hartford, F.A. Brown 1852); see
NETTELS, supra note 44, at 212.
64. See SOLTOW, supra note 62, at 114.
65. See NETTELS, supra note 44, at 209. Massachusetts eventually reversed its stance on
accepting goods as taxes during periods of severe monetary scarcity subsequent to the circulation
of paper money. Infra note 233, 272 and accompanying text.
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types, that can be defined as "money substitutes": privately negotiated
commodity money and enforceable debt obligations.66
To understand the colonial economy, it is necessary to understand how
goods and services were exchanged to take advantage of specialization and
comparative advantage. Borrowing, either in relations of mutual
indebtedness, or in unilateral agreements, was the standard way economic
transactions occurred, whether in daily transactions within the context of a
small town, or in large-scale deals such as those arranging for imports from
the Caribbean or England. As explained below, the vast majority of civil
lawsuits in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries related to problems
arising out of creditor-debtor relations under these borrowing systems,
which were adapted to the scarcity of money.67
The transactional practices using what have been referred to here as
"money substitutes" have been interpreted in contrasting terms by Morton
Horwitz and the modernization theorists. Both Horwitz and the
modernization theorists characterize the lending schemes prevailing before
the first government paper monies as signaling a communitarian, premarket
value system in which the normative basis for exchanges and contractual
arrangements was community stability and fairness, rather than commercial
advancement and profit-seeking. The weakness of this interpretation,
however, is its failure fully to appreciate the problem of currency scarcity
within the colonial economy in the seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries. While seventeenth-century lending practices may coincide with
cultural values reflecting more primitive market conditions,66 these
practices may also indicate the limitations placed on people who sought
profits and who desired economic advance, but who were constrained by
the lack of currency to intracommunity lending practices. Horwitz's theory
that colonists maintained a "title theory of exchange," in which goods were
neither viewed as fungible nor thought of in terms of monetary values,
suffers from a similar weakness. While it might be the case that the lack of
currency reduced the extent to which goods were conceived of in monetary
terms, the frequency with which contractual arrangements involved
goods-rather than money-can also be explained as a value-neutral
adaptation to an environment with scarce cash.
The first colonial money substitute was privately negotiated commodity
money.6 9 Although publicly sanctioned commodity money was not as
66. For the purposes of this Article, the term "money substitutes" describes practices that arc
adopted to serve the purposes of money, but are not the issuance or minting of a currency by
private or public institutions. The colonial money substitutes described here served as a medium
of exchange and a store of value, but not a unit of account.
67. Infra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
68. Infra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
69. See W.T. BAXTER, THE HOUSE OF HANCOCK: BUSINESS IN BOSTON, 1724-1775, at 21
(1945). For an excellent review of the practices that developed to alleviate the problems of the
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prevalent in New England as in the South, New Englanders routinely used
commodities as a medium of exchange in private contracts. Examining the
Hancock records, for example, W.T. Baxter found many examples of times
when basic staple goods, such as a particular type of fish, were continually
exchanged back and forth between people involved in trade.7" These fish
assumed the role of money and represent the "small change" of the
transaction. Similarly, farmers typically used "country pay" to pay back
debts to lenders. The problems of publicly sanctioned commodity money
were avoided within the private sector, because the designation of what
would serve as commodity money and the value of particular shipments
were negotiated with each transaction."
Colonial merchants also used commodity money in their practice of
dealing in "assortments" of goods, accepting payment in a wide variety of
goods and services and then trading the goods off for the highest value.
According to Bernard Bailyn:
To be a merchant in Boston in 1660 meant to be engaged,
wholesale and retail, in the exchange of a great variety of goods, to
be ready to accept payment in all sorts of unexpected commodities
and currencies .... Versatility was one of the keys to success; to
specialize was to decline.7
Baxter, who examined the papers of the Hancock business, similarly found:
[G]oods that were exchanged seem at times to have been selected
in the oddest way. Their variety and unexpectedness are often
startling. Thus, for instance, Henchman repaid a carpenter for
repair-work not only with books, ... but also with a gun, cider,
barrels of beef, pencils, candles, hogs, molasses, and wood.... [A]
transaction involving imposing quantities of merchandise may be
closely followed by the purchase of a trifle such as a few penny-
worth of cloves; identical kind [sic] of goods are transferred
colonial economy, see id. at ch. 2, which describes the practices of the Hancock family business in
the eighteenth century.
70. See id. at 23.
71 As mentioned, pounds, shillings, and pence, in colonial values, were accepted as the
common units of account. Thus, it was unnecessary for commodities to be priced in terms of
every commodity money. Goods that functioned as commodity money were themselves priced in
terms of pounds, shillings, and pence. Economists argue that the possibility of private commodity
money means that the technical difficulties of barter cannot be the only reason for a government-
issued, widely circulating currency. Commodity money can, in many cases, be more stable than
public currency. See, e.g., Banerjee & Maskin, supra note 35, passim; cf Starr, supra note 35, at
291.
72. BERNARD BAILYN, THE NEW ENGLAND MERCHANTS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
100 (3d prtg. 1982).
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backwards and forwards between the same merchants; and ... the
names of third parties appear frequently.73
Although Baxter views these transactions as arbitrary, exchanging a
wide variety of goods-and exchanging goods for goods of disparate
types-can be seen as methods of approximating precise compensation in a
context of cash scarcity.
A second money substitute preceding the circulation of paper money
was widespread borrowing by means of legally enforceable promises. The
basic money supply is most commonly defined as including items that can
be used directly in transactions, such as paper money, gold and silver coins,
other commodity money, and checking accounts (today referred to as M),
plus assets that can be liquidated relatively quickly, such as savings account
deposits, mutual fund investments, and stock holdings (referred to as M). 74
Colonial debt obligations, which were either payable on demand or by a
specified date, and which could be liquidated (although not without a
lawsuit) were an important component of what one might describe as the
colonial M2.
The most common borrowing practice before the widespread
circulation of paper money was the "book account" system, a mechanism
recognized in the courts as a means of recording indebtedness between
traders or within a market community.75 Individuals kept "book" records
(like a tab) of goods others took on credit, recording debts in pounds,
shillings, and pence, although no money was exchanged. The system
worked as people in a community established accounts with each other,
taking goods and services on credit, and gradually reciprocating with
different goods and services over time. When a sufficient number in a town
permitted debts on book, people were able to make daily "purchases"
depending on their needs, even without the benefit of a common currency.
Cases from the Inferior Court of Common Pleas in Plymouth,
Massachusetts,76 for example, demonstrate that book accounts were used
for transactions ranging from "sundry goods," to the balance due for
"boots and shoes," 77 for that "remaining due for a yoke of a young
73. BAXTER, supra note 69, at 18-19 (citation omitted).
74. For a discussion of the components of the money supply see, for example, PAUL A.
SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, EcONOMiCS 227-30 (13th ed. 1989).
75. See BAXTER, supra note 69, at 17-21.
76. The Inferior Court of Common Pleas had original jurisdiction over all civil suits except
petty matters (under 40 shillings) which were heard before a single justice of the peace, and cases
in which the Crown was plaintiff. The court gave de novo trials in appeals of decisions of the
justices of the peace. The court met quarterly in the town of Plymouth. NELSON, DISPUTE AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 22-23.
77. Howland v. Hatch, Common Pleas (June 1725), in 5 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, 1686-
1859, at 191-92 No. 25 (David Thomas Konig ed., 1978) [hereinafter PLYMOUTH COURT
RECORDS].
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oxen," 78 to a sum of money "to Ballance for English Hay," 79 to "time,
travel and assistance," 8 or for "Shoes, Drink, Entertainment, and
Wares," 81 to "work done at the furnace in Pembroke and a canoe sold,"812 to
"one freight of Lumber from Rochester to Chilmark, in the Sloop
Adventure." 83 Like trading in commodity money, book account transactions
(with pounds, shillings, and pence as units of account) served the purposes
of coins or paper money because they eliminated the need for direct
exchanges of goods as in barter.
Book accounts also permitted more precise compensation than when
goods were directly bartered. Cases from the Plymouth Inferior Court of
Common Pleas, for example, demonstrate that book accounts often
recorded the balance owed one party or another after an exchange. A case
heard in May 1730, for example, was a suit for a book account debt on the
grounds that the plaintiff and defendant "Exchanged Mares and in
Consideration whereof the then [Plaintiff's] Mare which he Delivered to the
[Defendant] was Beter than the mare which the [Plaintiff] Received of the
Defendant." ' A 1722 case similarly derived from balance "due upon
Exchange of Oxen." 5 Book accounts therefore facilitated barter exchanges
that otherwise might not have occurred because they enabled precise
compensation in exchange.
Book account records of mutual indebtedness were typically settled
over the course of many years. The Massachusetts government tried to
establish a statute of limitations for book account debts at various times, but
its efforts failed.86 The success of the book account system derived from the
ability of people to enter long courses of dealing, variously borrowing and
lending to each other over time. Book accounts were also used for
arrangements by which those needing goods or money (when available)
would unilaterally take credit from wealthier merchants and traders. When
78. Knowlton v. Donham, Common Pleas (Dec. 1725), in id. at 196 No. 3.
79. Holbroke v. Hyland, Common Pleas (Mar. 1733), in id. at 436 No. 38.
80. Little v. Browne, Common Pleas (Mar. 1718), in id. at 78 No. 19.
81. Foord v. White, Common Pleas (July 1718), in id. at 83 No. 13.
82. Despard v. Little, Common Pleas (July 1718), in id. at 82 No. 1.
83. Cowing v. Clarke, Common Pleas (Dec. 1725), in id. at 196 No. 8.
84. Richmond v. Cavender, Common Pleas (May 1730), in id. at 332 No. 1.
85. Cushing v. James, Common Pleas (June 1722), in id. at 140 No. 3.
86. In 1669, Massachusetts passed a law setting the statute of limitations for book account
debts at three years. Debts by Book (n.d.), GENERAL LAWS 39, 39-40, reprinted in THE
COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 44. In 1672, however, when the govemment
was supposed to begin enforcing the law, "[u]pon a general complaint, that the said Law will
prove to the real detriment of very many of our inhabitants, and the utter undoing of some if a
greater number of years be not allowed to shut up Accompts [accounts]" debtors were given three
more years before the law would be enforced. See Book-Debts (1672), SEVERAL LAWS AND
ORDERS MADE AT THE GENERAL COURT, May 15, 1672, at 4, reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS
OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 44, at 204. In 1675, however, the deadline was extended two
more years, and in 1677, three more years. Finally, in 1679, the law was repealed. See id. at 219,
253,266.
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farmers, for example, took imported goods on credit, creditors might
maintain book accounts, recording repayments of the debts in goods the
farmers produced, such as grain, meat, or services.87 Debtors entering this
type of relationship often found themselves bound to one creditor for long
periods of time.
More formal credit instruments such as conditional bonds,88 bills
obligatory,89 and promissory notes were also used as money substitutes.
Although there were no checking accounts before the existence of banks,
conditional bonds, bills, and promissory notes were colonial analogues.
Like checks, bills and promissory notes drew off of accumulated reserves
and could be used directly in transactions. For example, a trader with an
accumulated reserve of, say, gunpowder could store the gunpowder in a
87. Farmers' repayments of this nature, like taxes paid in farm produce, were termed
"country pay."
88. Bonds were written, sealed instruments by which a person agreed to pay a sum of money
on a particular date unless a condition-generally, delivery of goods or services-was performed
according to specification. For a description of the legal features of bonds, see MANN, supra note
7, at 28-29; and Chafee, supra note 10, at li-liii. See also Beutel, supra note 44, at 142-43
(discussing the assignability and negotiability of bonds and bills in the colonial period). The issue
of bonds has gained prominence in legal historical scholarship because the method by which
damages for breach were determined disproved the widely held view among legal historians that
colonial law differed from English law because of its lack of equity. According to Roscoe Pound,
for example, the Puritan community had "always been a consistent and thorough-going opponent
of equity." Roscoe Pound, Puritanism and the Common Law, 45 AM. L. REv. 811, 825 (1911).
This conception was challenged by Zechariah Chafee and others who demonstrated that, unlike in
England, colonial courts "chancered" bonds with regularity. Chafee, supra note 10, at I-lii.
Chancering bonds meant that the plaintiff was awarded the value of the condition that was to be
performed, plus, in some cases (by the judge's discretion), damages suffered by nonperformance
plus interest, rather than the full amount of the bond. Id. at lii. Although Morton Horwitz concedes
that bonds were chancered at times, he argues that bonds were popular because they were a means
of avoiding judicial equitable inquiry into the faimess of the exchange. See HORWlTZ, supra note
1, at 167-68. In my review of the Plymouth County Court Records from 1720 to 1755, 1 found that
judges " chancered" the bonds in all bond cases. See 5-6 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, supra note
77.
89. Bills obligatory and promissory notes were written promises to perform a condition or to
pay an amount of money by a specified date. Unlike book accounts, bills and notes were specific
with respect to the form and time of payment. They were made assignable in Massachusetts in
1647 and in Connecticut in 1650. See Beutel, supra note 44, at 141.
Bills obligatory should be differentiated from bills of exchange. In Europe, bills of exchange
typically were issued by factorage houses to merchants as a way for them to avoid transporting
and exchanging currencies. When a merchant wanted to buy goods abroad, he could pay a
factorage house to issue a bill of exchange and use it as payment. The receiver could then take the
bills to a local factorage house, which could redeem it from the original factorage house or issue it
to someone trading in its country of issue. Larry Neal, The Finance of Business During the
Industrial Revolution, in I THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN SINCE 1700, at 151, 157-63
(Roderick Floud & Donald McCloskey eds., 1994). Bills of exchange were rarely litigated in the
New England colonies, possibly because of the lack of major factorage houses and the
unfavorable balance of trade. In England, although not in the colonies, promissory notes differed
from bills because they were not assignable, meaning that the original issuer of the note (the IOU)
was responsible for redeeming it. This tended to make promissory notes a device used within a
close community, where holders could monitor the ability of the original debtor to redeem the




warehouse and issue a promissory note or bill payable in the reserves.9"
Similarly, prominent merchants often allowed their customers to issue bills
and notes for sums of money based on their customers' credits on the
merchants' balance sheets." When a warehouse operator or merchant kept
only a fraction of his customers' balances on reserve, he increased the total
money supply, as banks do today.92
What distinguishes bonds, bills, and promissory notes from modem
checks is that they were frequently assigned and negotiated, and they
circulated within a community as a currency.93 Their circulation was likely
to extend only as far as the reputation of the payor. Their value depended
upon the extent to which the holder of the note was able to monitor the
debtor to ensure that he or she would pay the debt at the date of liquidation.
Thus, the basic money supply was increased by the use of assignable notes,
bonds, and bills but, as with book accounts, these devices functioned within
the context of relatively small communities.
Colonial law diverged from English law by treating written obligations
promising payment in commodities and services similarly to written
obligations promising monetary payments. 4 Indeed, the Massachusetts
General Court enacted the Payments statute, which vested power in the
parties themselves to determine the form in which such obligations would
be repaid. As amended in 1670, the Act declared that: "[H]enceforth all
Contracts, Agreements, Engagements or Covenants for any specie
90. See BAXTER, supra note 69, at 28.
91. Thus, in the colonial period, some prominent merchants performed the lending function
of banks by permitting their customers to offer bills and notes based on their balances, through
direct loans, and by acting as a clearinghouse for their customers, transferring assets from one
account to another based on the bills and notes they issued. See BAXTER, supra note 69, at 29-32,
204-08; VIRGINIA D. HARRINGTON, THE NEW YORK MERCHANT ON THE EVE OF THE
REVOLUTION 114-16 (1935).
92. Banks increase M, by lending amounts many multiples greater than the reserves they
maintain to satisfy them.
93. They were made assignable in Massachusetts in 1647 and in Connecticut in 1650. See
Beutel, supra note 44, at 141 & nn.40-41. These credit instruments could be used in transactions,
and thus can be defined as M, for all but the final holder, who actually had to liquidate the debt.
Today, of course, checks are literally negotiable, though infrequently negotiated because of the
superiority of government-issued fiat money.
94. See id. at 142-49. According to Beutel,
commodity paper and money paper were treated alike throughout the colonies. There
was no distinction either as to negotiability or assignability between these two types of
paper. This constituted the most important development of colonial law of negotiable
instruments, and it is fair to say that the colonial courts did not demand that an
instrument to be negotiable must be payable in money.
Id. at 144-45 (citation omitted); see also Chafee, supra note 10, at lxxv-lxxxi ("As might be
expected from the statute, title Payments, judgments as well as contracts were frequently payable
in merchandise." (citation omitted)). This custom remained the law into the nineteenth century.
See, e.g., Clark v. King, 2 Mass. 471, 471 (1 Tyng 524, 524) (1807); Perkins v. Parker, 1 Mass.
89, 89 (1 Will. 117, 117) (1804).
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whatsoever, shall be paid in the same specie95 Bargained for; Any Law,
Usage or Custome to the contrary notwithstanding." 
9 6
In light of this statute, bills and notes were frequently made payable
either in goods or a combination of goods and money, or one party was
given the choice to pay in goods or money.97 The Plymouth Court Records,
for example, include a case on a two-month note for £17.1 "in Moneys or a
Cow that the Plaintiff Should Chose out of Six... and the Rest to be payed
in good Barr lron" ;98 on a bond dated February 20, 1732 for "Sixteen Cord
of oake wood" ;99 on a note for "£10 in money and £6 in salt" ;1" on a bill
dated February 28, 1725 for £13 in "Cole at the Furnance in
Pembroke... at Twenty Shillings a Load 96 Bush[els] to a Load at the Pitt
or 80 at the workes" ;101 and on an "Instrument in Writeing under... Hand
and Seal" for nineteen tons of "Good Iron Oar at the Bed redy dugg up." 10
2
Thus, in the face of the limitations imposed by chronic monetary scarcity,
colonial traders devised informal and formal contractual mechanisms to
advance beyond barter, laying the foundations of a commercial society.
C. Colonial Judicial Remedies Before Widespread Public Currency
Circulation
In the years preceding widespread circulation of paper money, colonial
commercial law adapted to the scarcity of cash. The colonial court dockets
were dominated by debt-collection cases based on book accounts,
promissory notes, and bonds. William Nelson's empirical study of the
Plymouth County Courts found that, in the period from 1725 to 1774, 74%
of all cases heard in the Inferior Court were suits to reclaim debts. 3 Bruce
95. Specie did not refer simply to coinage, but to any good used as a means of payment.
96. Payments (1654), GENERAL LAWS 120, 120-21, reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 44 (footnote added). The original wording of the Act was similar,
but allowed substitution with other goods (with additional damages) under certain circumstances:
[A]II Contracts and Engagements for Money, Corn, Chattel or Fish, shall be satisfied in
kinde according to Covenant, or in default of the very kinde contracted for, in one of
the said kindes; Provided that in such cases where payment in kinde is not made
according to Covenant, all just damages shall be satisfied (together with the Debt) for
not paying in kinde according to bargain; And in no case shall any Creditor be forced to
take any other Commodities for satisfaction of his debt ....
Id. at 120, 120-21.
97. Beutel, supra note 44, at 142-46; Chafee, supra note 10, at lxxiv-lxxvi.
98. Weston v. Chipman, Common Pleas (Mar. 1736), in 5 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS,
supra note 77, at 566 No. 23.
99. Josselyn v. Palmer, Common Pleas (Mar. 1734), in id. at 480 No. 2.
100. Mallus v. Kanney, Common Pleas (Sept. 1729), in id. at 293 No. 25.
101. Little v. Bushup, Common Pleas (Mar. 1730), in id. at 320 No. 77.
102. Little v. Jackson, Common Pleas (Mar. 1736), in id. at 579 No. 125.
103. The Inferior Court heard all civil cases except those requesting damages under forty
shillings, which were decided by Justices of the Peace. See NELSON, AMERICANIZATION, supra
note 5, at 15-16. Deborah Rosen argues that suits for nonpayment of moneys owed were "the
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Mann found that, in 1700, 82.9% of debt cases in the Hartford County
Court were book account cases; the remainder were promissory note and
bond cases. 4
The colonial legal system also responded to prevailing economic
conditions with flexibility regarding judicial remedies. In part because of
the scarcity of coins, specific performance and in-kind compensation were
the predominant remedies for breach. Massachusetts courts were guided by
the Payments statute, described above, meaning that judges and juries
awarded the "same specie Bargained for; Any Law, Usage or Custome to
the contrary notwithstanding." lO5 Where specific performance was
impossible, however, courts required compensation to be paid in goods,
which directly reflected the nature of the exchanges taking place-those of
goods for other goods, rather than cash-based transactions. 6 Legal scholars
such as Morton Horwitz who have overlooked the conditions of monetary
scarcity plaguing the colonial economy, have characterized specific
performance and in-kind damages as evidence of a reluctance among
colonists to conceptualize the world in monetary terms."7 Closer
examination of the sources reveals that colonists did in fact conceptualize
quintessential legal injury" of the eighteenth century. See Rosen, Courts and Commerce, supra
note 7, at 140.
104. See MANN, supra note 7, at 171 tbl.l.
105. See Payments (1670), GENERAL LAWS 121, 121, reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 44, at 120-21.
106. For a few of the hundreds of examples of nonmonetary compensation, see the following
remedies provided by different Massachusetts courts (note that money payments are offered as an
alternative): A 1724 suit in the Plymouth County Court resulted from an agreement to exchange a
greyhound for a "merchantable pair of cartwheels of five foot high with good Iron Hoops."
Turner v. Darling, Common Pleas (Sept. 1724), in 5 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, supra note 77,
at 175 No. 28. Turner argued that he delivered the greyhound; the court awarded him "the
cartwheels or £3, and £3.5s.6d costs." ld In a 1733 case on a promissory note for £37.16s.ld. to
be paid "Either In Grain At the Marquit price or In bills of Good publick Credit," the jury
awarded the plaintiff £37.16s.ld. "in grain or in bills of credit." Shepherd v. Clerke, Common
Pleas (Dec. 1733), in id. at 470 No. 32; see also Thomas v. Williams, Common Pleas (Mar. 1737),
in 6 id. at 30 No. 35 (£100, "2/3 to be paid in 'Money' and 1/3 in goods"); Lamb v. Thomas
(August 19, 1690), in COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS (1639-1702): THE
PYNCHON COURT RECORD 325, 326 No. 211 (Joseph H. Smith, ed. 1961) [hereinafter PYNCHON
RECORD] ("a barrel of Tar or 13 s[hillings]"); King v. Mooreley (Feb. 18, 1690), in id. at 326,
326 No. 211 (" .5s now in come which he says is ready: and .4s in worke betweene this and
Midsummer next"); Pettey v. Cooper (Feb. 18, 1688) in id. at 321, 321 No. 206 ("one Pound, 12s
2d due in Porke"); Atherton v. Lockwood (Oct. 27, 1674), in RECORDS OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY
COURT 1671-1680: PART I, supra note 10, at 512, 512-13 ("a good Mercators draft or Fifty one
Shillings in mony"); Ball v. Righee (Oct. 27, 1674), in id. at 500, 500 ("thirty five pounds to bee
paide in mony & green hides"). The Plymouth County Court Records include a 1686 case in
which weekly child support payments were to be made "in money or corn." See Case of Mary
Sutton, Common Pleas (Sept. 1686), in I PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, supra note 77, at 190.
Judicial remedies also adhered to the type of currency stated in the bargain. Thus when William
Fling sued William Dyre for failing to pay him £3 in "Lawfull Money of our Island of Jamaica"
due for "Two Barrels of Makrel" sold to the defendant in Kingston, the jury awarded Fling
£2.17s.6d. "in Jamaica money." Fling v. Dyre, Common Pleas (May 1731), in 5 id. at 381 No. 22.
107. See HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 162-63.
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goods in monetary terms, but monetary scarcity made barter and, thus, in-
kind damages awards a necessity.
The Payments rule and the prevalence of in-kind compensation did not
prevent litigation over the form of remedy for breach. Many credit
agreements left the choice of the form of repayment to one of the parties,
possibly because of the difficulty of knowing in advance what money or
commodities would be available to the promisor at the time of performance.
The lack of specificity, however, was an obvious source of subsequent
litigation. Similarly, in early New England, the scarcity of money and thin
market conditions led judges at times to require creditors to accept the
goods that debtors were able to pay, although those goods were not
stipulated in the agreement and possibly not desired by the creditor. Judges,
at times, therefore acted as barter agents. In Pope v. Stebbings, °5 for
example, Pope argued that Stebbings owed him nine shillings and six
pence, to be paid in wheat, and Stebbings, supported by testimony of two
witnesses, argued that his attempt to deliver 0.2 bushels of Indian com and
1.5 bushels of rye was full payment of the debt."° The judge decided that
"Pope should have taken said pay and is now to take up therewith, and pay
Costs of Court." ' " This case, and others like it, reveal a feature of the way
in which barter conditions affected commercial litigation: Remedies had
adapted to the scarcity of cash and uncertainty about whether and when an
individual would be in possession of specific goods."'
108. Pope v. Stebbings (Sept. 23, 1680), in PYNCHON RECORD, supra note 106, at 294 No.
173.
109. Id.
110. Id. Judges, however, did not always require individuals to accept any goods in the
possession of the debtor. On the same day, Pope brought another case in which he argued that
Rust promised to pay him five shillings for work "making tuggs... of cedar to serve instead of
Cork for a net." Id. (citing Pope v. Rust (Sept. 23, 1680)). Rust tried to repay him with other
various goods that Pope rejected. This time the judge held for Pope, deciding that "only the small
Bass fish" that Rust gave to Pope should count against the award. Id.
111. Variation in market price or in value of currency led some to take advantage of option
contracts. For example, in French v. Tyng, a 1673 Suffolk County Court case, Tyng had promised
to deliver logwood, breached the promise (selling the logwood at a price greater than the contract
price) and had offered to give the contract amount back in money because "hee Could make more
of his Logwood, then the Sume expressed" although he later changed his mind, deciding to repay
in the wood. The court decided for the plaintiffs, holding that Tyng owed money. French v. Tyng
(July 29, 1673), in RECORDS OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT 1671-1680: PART I, supra note
10, at 285-87. In Batt v. Wells, however, the Suffolk County Court held that money would serve
as a default when no form of compensation was specified. Batt, the creditor, won an award for
over £8 in money and Wells appealed. The question on appeal was whether the £8, for which no
agreement was made, should be paid in money or goods or labor (Batt had paid Wells in goods).
The Court of Assistants confirmed the former judgment granting money to Batt and granted Batt
additional costs (no reasoning is given). Batt v. Wells (July 27, 1675), in 30 PUBLICATIONS OF
THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS, RECORDS OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT 1671-
1680: PART II, at 614-17 (1933); cf Skirvan v. Willis, 4 H. & McH. 483 (Md. 1728) (holding that
a holder of a judgment in tobacco was not allowed to collect its money value).
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D. Assessing the Costs of Monetary Scarcity
1. The Limitations of Money Substitutes
Aggregate transaction costs are likely to be higher in a society reliant
on commodity money and endogenous private currencies such as assignable
debt obligations than in a society reliant on a stable, widely available, and
universally accepted currency, such as gold and silver coins or fiat money.
Colonial commodity monies served the functions of cash, but they imposed
costs that could be alleviated through use of a stable paper money. First,
commodity monies had to be constantly regulated for value. Second, their
value fluctuated with supply and demand conditions, often determined in
international markets. Third, those who accepted commodity money as
payment had to bear the costs of resale, which would be determined by the
market conditions for the good." 2 Each of these costs also applied to
governments' efforts to tax in commodity money.
The costs of using book accounts were of a different nature. First,
although the book account system represented a substantial advance over
pure barter, it reduced, but did not eliminate, the need for a coincidence of
wants. To obtain a book account debt, a person had to offer to repay the
debt in terms acceptable to the creditor. The scarcity of coins meant that in
cases where two parties did not believe that the coincidence of wants would
occur sometime in the future, the transaction would fail. Second, giving
goods on credit could be highly risky with strangers or in an environment
with high levels of migration. Collecting debts owed to people dispersed
throughout a colony was extremely costly and ineffective. Book accounts
were successful instead in environments in which individuals could develop
reputations, often where individuals had longstanding relationships. Thus,
reliance on book accounts confined commercial transactions to relatively
insular communities where information about borrowers' characters,
economic successes, and uses of loans were readily available.13 Although
112. Gold and silver worked well as commodity monies because these problems were
minimized. Their supply was relatively stable and thus they did not suffer extreme fluctuations in
value during most periods. They were also easy to resell in the marketplace.
113. Within the recent economic literature, credit relationships in developing economies are
commonly analyzed in terms of information asymmetries. Lenders can more successfully prevent
loan default when they can separate high-risk from low-risk borrowers. To do so requires
information about the character and competence of the borrower and information about use of the
loan after they enter loan agreements. According to this literature, there are several ways in which
the problem of asymmetric information can be resolved. One is through information collection or
monitoring: Monitoring involves both initial screening to exclude debtors with bad reputations
and credit records, and oversight of the use of the loan. When a lender does not have reliable
information about the borrower, however, he or she must rely on other devices. First, borrowers
and lenders can generate information through repeated interaction, such as a borrower repeatedly
borrowing from the same lender to develop a reputation. Second, lenders may offer only a short-
term loan. Third, lenders can require that borrowers securitize their loans, either with individual
2001] 1335
The Yale Law Journal
current legal scholarship characterizes the trust required in the book account
system as an extension of colonists' community-oriented consciousness, the
causality likely ran the other way. Relations of trust and a community-
oriented consciousness are perhaps more convincingly viewed as a response
to currency scarcity and as representing efforts to overcome it in order to
promote exchange.
Like book accounts, private assignable debt obligations were also
attended by costs related to the need for security that the debt would be
repaid. Regardless of denomination, the value of a promissory note is equal
to the reliability of the promise. Bills of exchange were successful
throughout Europe and among colonial merchants because they were issued
by prestigious European factorage houses whose reputation over a wide
geographic range kept the value of the bills high."l4 There were no exactly
equivalent institutions in the New England colonies, although notes were
often drawn on credit balances held by prominent merchants who were
known throughout a wide community. Notes issued by less prominent
people, however, were more uncertain and, like book accounts, were likely
to serve as debt only within smaller communities. Debtors were typically
required to find reliable cosigners (sureties) to secure loans. In the
alternative, a note holder might attempt to monitor the economic activities
of the note issuer directly, which was more feasible when the note issuer
and note holder lived within the same community." 5 Thus, the volume of
notes and bills in circulation was limited by the costs of finding cosigners
and the geographic reach of individuals' reputations.
The colonial economy, thus, must be characterized as one of thin,
dispersed markets. As described in Section I.A, the extent of specialization
and comparative advantage in a society is largely determined by the
aggregate costs of transacting and by the extent of the market. Although
developed markets existed in colonial New England, principally in coastal
towns, colonists commonly engaged in subsistence agricultural production
with little market involvement. According to Richard Bushman, in early
collateral, or by finding someone with assets to cosign the loan. See, e.g., Ernst Baltensperger,
Credit, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: MONEY, supra note 33, at 100; Timothy W. Guinnane,
Cooperatives as Information Machines: German Agricultural Credit Cooperatives, 1883-1914, 61
J. ECON. HIST. (forthcoming June 2001); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets,
4 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 351, 352 (1990); see also DEBRAJ RAY, DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS 559-61 (1998) (describing a case study of methods used by moneylenders in villages
surrounding Chambar, Pakistan, to ensure high rates of loan repayment).
Book account creditors often relied on information efficiencies made available by a context
of relatively insular communities. They typically required no collateral or cosigning, and allowed
debts to remain outstanding for many years.
114. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE 41-43
(2d ed. 1993); Neal, supra note 89, at 157-63.
115. For an empirical analysis of loan terms and the geographic proximity of creditor to
debtor in small German towns, see Guinnane, supra note 113.
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Connecticut, "[a] family had to buy a musket, a pot, and salt," I6 producing
all other necessities themselves. Where markets are relatively dispersed or
nonintegrated, there are high costs to the circulation of market information
and, as a consequence, there is likely to be substantial price
differentiation." 1
7
The colonial economy was limited in several other ways because of
high transaction costs and thin markets. Thin, nonintegrated markets
increase the potential for market power and, thus, opportunities for price
discrimination. Barter increases the costs of arbitrage. In thin markets, a
seller is better able to obtain what a specific buyer is willing to pay, rather
than value based on general societal demand for the good. As a
consequence, a seller under barter is in a far better position to price-
discriminate: to offer goods at different prices to different individuals.
Captain John Blackwell, a Massachusetts pamphlet writer and promoter of
private banks, made this point in 1687, three years before public-currency
issuance: " [T]he experimented inconveniencies of Common Barter by
Commodities: In which way, unlesse both the parties dealing had like
occasion reciprocally of each other's, the lesse necessitous over-reached the
greater, by imposing ye Price of both: to his owne Advantage, and the
others detriment, which was not equall." I 8
Price convergence for a good occurs when its value is established by
general demand and not differentiated according to separate individual
preferences. Price discrimination is not always socially harmful: Charging
prices based on individual preferences can allow sellers to profit from those
116. BUSHMAN, supra note 9, at 26. People living in towns, of course, were more likely to
purchase goods produced by others. Thus, there is an important influence of the movement from
barter to cash on urbanization, a subject beyond the scope of this Article.
117. Obviously, in a competitive market, the prices of homogenous goods will converge
toward uniformity. In a study of farm labor markets in Massachusetts from 1750 to 1855,
Winifred Rothenberg shows an increase in compensation with the development of markets in
proportion to the precise value of the skill performed. Rothenberg analyzed 3285 entries of task-
specific per diem wage observations for day labor taken from ninety account books from sixty-
five towns in New England (fifty-two in Massachusetts). She categorized tasks into two groups:
higher-paid and lower-paid. Over the course of the period from 1750 to 1855, she found a
substantial increase in differentiation between higher- and lower-paid tasks, suggesting that, with
the development of markets, laborers began to be paid more precisely according to the value of
the skill that they performed. According to Rothenberg,
This widening stratification ... is itself evidence of an increasingly efficient market in
which wages respond, with greater sensitivity over time, to seasonal urgencies in the
demand for specialized labor, to tasks with differential skill components, to the impact
on the elasticity of labor supply of job opportunities off the farm, and to shifts in
demand for crop-specific tasks ....
Winifred B. Rothenberg, The Emergence of Farm Labor Markets and the Transformation of the
Rural Economy: Massachusetts, 1750-1855,48 J. ECON. HIST. 537, 540-41 (1988).
118. [JOHN BLACKWELL], A DISCOURSE IN EXPLANATION OF THE BANK OF CREDIT (n.p.
1687) [hereinafter DISCOURSE], reprinted in I COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at
120, 122. Andrew McFarland Davis, who compiled the Colonial Currency Reprints, attributes
authorship of this pamphlet to Blackwell on the basis of the handwriting.
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who can pay and charge lower prices to the poor. But it can also result in
the reverse: lower prices to buyers possessing information and higher prices
to the less-informed. Price discrimination is made possible not entirely by a
lack of currency, but by a lack of competitive markets in which prices are
set according to general demand." 9 The problems of nonintegrated markets
and market power in early modern economies may have been the practical
impetus for community-wide restraints on profiteering such as the
enforcement of "just prices" and prohibitions on usurious practices,
commonly enforced in Massachusetts Bay preceding currency issuance.
The development of markets eliminates the need to reduce information
deficits by government price-setting.
Although these various impediments of thin markets might simply be
viewed as a form of increased costs, many have claimed that they are
sufficient to create a separate "barter culture," qualitatively different from
a cash-market culture because of a reduced level of interest in profit-
seeking activity. 2 ° Early New England residents claimed that conditions of
monetary scarcity had debilitating effects personally as well as on the
economy. According to one early Massachusetts resident, a poor market
119. For a discussion of enforcement of just prices in colonial New England see, for example,
BAILYN, supra note 72, at 41. The connection between price discrimination in barter and the need
for government regulation of prices was recognized by at least one commentator in colonial
Massachusetts. In Blackwell's 1687 pamphlet, quoted above, he argued that government-
determined prices would be a solution to the problem:
The Inconveniences of the way of Barter might have been much obviated, By a
frequent setting a just & equall value of the Price of all commodities, by publique
authority, according as the plenty or scarceity of them should require, and the market
had ruled: But, there being no such common standard, Money hath obteyned & been
admitted as the best ballance of Trade, both by wise & un-wise. ... [but] 't is now so
hard to come by, for the carrying on of trade, to answer the vastness of men's attempts
& aymes of increase in Merchandize, as that it's suspected to be insufficient in this age
of the world ....
DISCOURSE, supra note 118, reprinted in I COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at
122-23.
120. There is substantial scholarly disagreement on the "mentality" of barter economies.
Rothenberg describes signs of advancements from barter, such as book accounts and multiple
credit transactions, as "testify[ing] like a thumb in the dike" to the presence of the market and "to
its 'latent threat' . . . to effect transforming change." Rothenberg, supra note 117, at 539.
Henretta, in contrast, argues,
[T]he predominance of subsistence or semi-subsistence productive units among the
yeoman farming families of the northern colonies was not only the result of geographic
or economic factors-the ready access to a reliable, expanding market. These men and
women were enmeshed also in a web of social relationships and cultural expectations
that inhibited the free play of market forces.
JAMES A. HENRETTA, Families and Farms: Mentalit6 in Preindustrial America, in THE ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM: COLLECTED ESSAYS 71, 97-98 (1991). See generally Paul Lewis, In
Buying We Trust, The Foundation of U.S. Consumerism Was Laid in the 18th Century, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 1998, at B7 (describing a recent trend in historical scholarship that characterizes
colonists as embracing consumerism).
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"tends to enervate and abate the Vigour and Zeal of the Farmer, renders
him indolent, takes off the Edge of Industry." 121
Some believed that increased profit-making incentives created by
currency circulation would change the cultural norms of the poor. John
Blackwell, who attempted to institute a private currency in 1687, claimed
that currency would have a socially transformative effect, arguing that
circulation of money "helps to civillize the Ruder Sort of people, &
incourages others to follow their example in industry & civillity." 122 This
Article does not attempt to resolve the barter culture debate. It is evident,
however, that colonial economic conditions did not extinguish
entrepreneurial energies. Despite monetary scarcity, colonists developed
mechanisms that enabled transaction and commercial organization far
beyond that possible under pure barter.
2. Economics Scholarship on Colonial Economic Growth
Did quasi-barter conditions affect economic growth levels? The
response is important to a theory of the relation of law to economic
advance. As described above, the central empirical evidence supporting the
modernization theory consists of the volume of debt cases in colonial courts
over the first half of the eighteenth century: Rising levels of debt litigation
are characterized as a signal of economic expansion. Litigation data
themselves, of course, do not directly indicate economic progress. The link
between increases in litigation and economic growth, instead, is merely
assumed. Thus, Mann describes greater use of credit instruments as better
suited to the "expanding economy of eighteenth-century Connecticut." 1
23
Dayton emphasizes the eighteenth-century "boom" and characterizes the
period from 1710 to 1750 as "the most expansive decades of New
England's preindustrial history." 124 Rosen, similarly, bases her conclusions
on the assumption of "substantial commercial expansion." 125
Closer attention to economics scholarship, however, raises considerable
doubt about the characterization of this period as one of substantial
economic growth. In a review of current economic literature, James A.
Henretta concludes that the growth rate in per capita income in the New
121. BUSHMAN, supra note 9, at 26-27 (quoting JARED ELIOT, ESSAYS UPON FIELD
HUSBANDRY IN NEW ENGLAND AND OTHER PAPERS, 1748-1762, at 187 (Harry J. Carman &
Rexford G. Tugwell eds., 1934)).
122. DISCOURSE, supra note 118, reprinted in I COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note
20, at 130.
123. MANN, supra note 7, at 37.
124. DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR, supra note 7, at 90, 94.
125. Rosen, Courts and Commerce, supra note 7, at 142.
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England colonies averaged no more than 0.2% to 0.5% a year.126 Alice H.
Jones describes the relative stagnancy of New England during the
eighteenth century as opposed to the seventeenth century. 27 More
particularly, McCusker and Menard measure per capita consumption,
showing that average annual per capita exports from Great Britain to the
colonies set in constant terms hardly changed over the period from 1699 to
1774.28 Empirical data from more local studies further confirm a low
growth rate during the first half of the eighteenth century in colonial New
England. John Waters finds that in Guilford, Connecticut, the mean ratable
wealth per resident male taxpayer declined from 1716 to 17 4 9 .129 Terry
Anderson examines data on wealth and productivity in Hampshire County,
Massachusetts, and concludes that "the one bleak period in [America's]
growth history was the first eighty years of the eighteenth century....
[E]stimates of productivity in New England agriculture suggest that the
growth rate may well have been negative." 130
While the statistics seem generally inconsistent with the assumption
that the period was one of modernization and economic expansion, per
capita figures must be considered in light of high rates of population growth
126. JAMES A. HENRETrA, Wealth and Social Structure, in THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
CAPITALISM: COLLECTED ESSAYS, supra note 120, at 148, 167 (finding that, although there is
variation between economists' studies, all current scholarship places per capita growth rates in the
New England colonies within the range of 0.2% to 0.5%). Based on their evaluation of
Massachusetts and Connecticut probate records, for example, Gloria L. Main and Jackson T. Main
argue that total estate value in pounds constant per free white male had an average annual growth
rate of between 0.35% and 0.5% in the period from 1650 to 1774. Gloria L. Main & Jackson T.
Main, Economic Growth and the Standard of Living in Southern New England, 1640-1774, 48 J.
ECON. HIST. 27, 35 (1988) (using two different indices to find results of 0.35% and 0.5%). Others
have calculated similar growth rates for the American colonies as a whole. JAMES F. SHEPHERD &
GARY M. WALTON, SHIPPING, MARITIME TRADE, AND THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF
COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA 30 (1972) (finding a rate of "well under I per cent"); GARY M.
WALTON & HUGH ROCKOFF, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 98 (6th ed. 1990)
(calculating a rate of slightly below 0.5%); Ralph L. Andreano, Introduction to NEW VIEWS ON
AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A SELECTIVE ANTHOLOGY OF RECENT WORK 41, 50-51
(Ralph L. Andreano ed., 1965) (finding a rate of 0 to 0.5%). Alice Hanson Jones argues that the
colonies' per capita nonhuman wealth increased 0.3% per year during the period from 1650 to
1725, 0.4% during the period from 1725 to 1750, and 0.5% during the period from 1750 to 1774.
ALICE HANSON JONES, WEALTH OF A NATION TO BE: THE AMERICAN COLONIES ON THE EVE OF
THE REVOLUTION 305 (1980),
127. See JONES, supra note 126, at 304.
128. They found that average annual per capita exports in constant terms were: E0.9, 1699-
1704; £0.8, 1718-1723; £1.0, 1747-1751; and £1.2, 1767-1774 (average annual per capita exports
to New England were £0.9, 1699-1704; £0.8, 1718-1723; £0.8, 1747-1751, and £1.0, 1767-1774).
JOHN J. MCCUSKER & RUSSELL R. MENARD, THE ECONOMY OF BRITISH AMERICA, 1607-1789,
at 280 tbl. 13.1 (1985).
129. Waters found that the mean ratable wealth per resident male taxpayer was £66.9 in 1716,
£61.3 in 1732, £72.4 in 1740, and £62.7 in 1749. John J. Waters, Patrimony, Succession, and
Social Stability: Guilford, Connecticut in the Eighteenth Century, 10 PERSP. AM. HIST. 131, 159
(1976).
130. See Terry L. Anderson, Economic Growth in Colonial New England: "Statistical
Renaissance, " 39 J. ECON. HIST. 243, 256 (1979); see also HENRETrA, supra note 126, at 166-68
& tbl.l (referring to the Anderson and Waters studies).
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during the colonial period.'3 ' McCusker and Menard estimate that New
England's population grew at an average of 2.4% per year over the period
from 1660 to 1780. 32 Thus, assuming per capita growth rates of 0.2% and
0.5%, respectively, total (not per capita) economic growth averaged
between 3.08% and 4.1% per year. 133 These average total economic growth
figures are not inconsiderable for a developing economy.
13 4
Economic scholarship suggests, however, that most colonial economic
growth did not occur during the period from 1700 to 1750, the period of
alleged legal modernization. As mentioned, the figures presented above are
averages for the entire colonial period. McCusker and Menard argue that
most American colonial economic growth occurred during two "spurts":
the first occurring in the decades after initial settlement in each region, and
the second occurring from the 1740s until the Revolution.'35 The period of
alleged legal formalization occurred between these spurts, a time
characterized by McCusker and Menard as an "era of stagnation." 
13 6
Jackson Turner Main's study of colonial Connecticut varies slightly: Main
emphasizes that there were several growth spurts and recessions, but
similarly concludes that, "the level of wealth on the eve of the Revolution
differed very little from that in 1700." '7 Shepherd and Walton, who study
the colonial maritime industry, conclude that "the weight of opinion and
evidence places average annual growth rates in colonial America at
relatively low levels," 138 with the New England colonies at the bottom.139
131. Population growth distorts he correlation between per capita wealth and economic
expansion because newly added members of a society will generally have lower than average
incomes (for example, immigrants and newborns). When population growth rates are high,
substantial economic growth can occur despite a low increase in per capita growth levels. See
generally HENRETrA, supra note 126, at 169-76 (discussing the problem of assessing increases in
wealth in light of population growth in the northern and southern colonies). Although it is beyond
the scope of this Article to discuss the issue in detail, population growth rates can also affect
economic growth in a developing economy with a sparse population by allowing the release of
labor from subsistence farming. See also ESTER BOSERUP, THE CONDITIONS OF AGRICULTURAL
GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURAL CHANGE UNDER POPULATION PRESSURE 63-64
(1965) (arguing that rapid population growth stimulated the eighteenth-century European
agricultural revolution).
132. McCUSKER & MENARD, supra note 128, at 217.
133. Total economic growth is derived from per capita growth and population growth
statistics by the following formula: G, = ((G, + I)I(G, + 1)) - I, where G, is economic growth
per capita, G, is total economic growth, and G, is population growth. I am grateful to Timothy
Guinnane for clarifying these relationships.
134. The economic historian Nick Crafts, for example, found lower growth rates for England
during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Nick Crafts, The Industrial Revolution, in I
THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN SINCE 1700, supra note 89, at 44, 47 tbl.3.3 (finding growth
rates of 0.6% to 1.9% during the period from 1700 to 1831); see also Robert Allen, Agriculture
During the Industrial Revolution, in id, at 96, 100-03 & fig.5.1 (reviewing literature on growth
rates during England's agricultural and industrial revolutions).
135. MCCUSKER & MENARD, supra note 128, at 60.
136. Id.
137. JACKSON TURNER MAIN, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY IN COLONIAL CONNECTICUT 115
(1985).
138. SHEPHERD & WALTON, supra note 126, at 30.
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The issuance of paper money created a potential for greater market
development, specialization, and economic growth. Government regulation
of the money supply, however, led to a new dependence on currency
policies for economic stability. As is shown below, currency scarcity and
currency gluts throughout the first half of the eighteenth century required
colonists to revert to money substitutes and even, at times, to barter. During
those periods, colonists revisited the problems they had experienced
throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, although with
more at stake.
II. PUBLIC PAPER MONEY ISSUANCE AND ITS EFFECT ON
LITIGATION PATTERNS
The notion that a government-issued fiat currency, with legal tender
status, could successfully satisfy the need for a medium of exchange as well
as finance government operations was entirely foreign to the early colonial
mindset. Until 1690, no European or colonial government had issued such a
currency. 4 ' The decision by the Massachusetts government to issue paper
bills of credit in 1690, and the further decision to vest the bills with legal
tender status in 17124 ' therefore, perhaps unknowingly, initiated a
widespread financial revolution. The expenses of the wars against France,
for example, drove England to found the Bank of England and to expand its
government debt issues in 1694.42 In subsequent years, without protest
from England, other colonies quickly adopted the Massachusetts system:
South Carolina in 1703; Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and
New York in 1709; Rhode Island in 1710; and North Carolina in 712.143
These paper currencies fundamentally transformed the nature of economic
exchange and debt litigation in Massachusetts and other colonies.
One cause of the transformation was the colonists' voluntary use of the
new colonial government paper money as a medium of exchange. The
existence of a more widely available currency created the potential for a
move from reliance on routine borrowing to greater use of cash exchanges
and thus engendered further market development, specialization, and capital
accumulation. Government currency issuance and circulation, however, led
to a second, "involuntary," transformation of economic and legal relations:
139. JONES, supra note 126, at 308 ("The South was outstandingly the richest region and
New England the poorest, in aggregate wealth, when the value of slaves is included.").
140. See EDWIN J. PERKINS, THE ECONOMY OF COLONIAL AMERICA 168 (2d ed. 1988).
141. See infra text accompanying note 173.
142. See KINDLEBERGER, supra note 114, at 55, 77; NETrELS, supra note 44, at 168-69.
Unlike the bills of credit issued in the colonies, however, Bank of England bills were never
declared legal tender for the payment of private debts. See PERKINS, supra note 140, at 168.
143. See NETTELS, supra note 44, at 253.
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Reliance on paper money led to a new dependency on government policies
for economic stability.
The ability to control currency policy gave the colonial governments-
and the English government, through its management of colonial
governments' policies-unprecedented power over economic conditions
and the stability of contractual promises."' As is shown below, throughout
the first half of the eighteenth century, the currency policies adopted in
Massachusetts were the outcome of charged conflicts between
the Massachusetts House of Representatives and the English government,
and were highly unstable. There were periods of currency scarcity
(currency appreciation/price deflation) and currency gluts (currency
depreciation/price inflation), each of which had a direct effect on the value
of outstanding contractual promises and instigated litigation crises.
This Part examines the early history of Massachusetts's paper money
policies to explain the relationship between currency policy and legal
development. Section I.A describes contemporary views about the need for
greater currency. Section II.B explains the initial shift in colonial currency
policy and its effects on the supply of gold and silver. Section JI.C
describes the effect of government control over the money supply on
contractual relations. Section II.C also addresses the relationship between
changes in currency valuation and litigation. Following this analysis, the
next Part explains the historical development of Massachusetts's paper
money policies, with particular focus on the relationships between currency
crisis and litigation during three periods of currency volatility in the 1720s
and 1730s.
A. The Demand for Greater Currency
Throughout the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, many
colonial citizens advocated increasing the money supply through fiat
(nonmetallic) money in order to stimulate economic exchange, increase
credit availability, lower reliance on borrowing, 145 and reduce the volume of
litigation. Colonists actively debated, however, whether private or public
institutions would be better able to supply a sound medium of exchange. As
described earlier, the principal governmental means of expanding the
144. Although beyond the scope of this Article, these new powers and the conflicts they
engendered between colonial and Royal governments had an important role in the escalation of
tensions that led to the Revolution. See ERNST, supra note 45, passim.
145. More precisely, many colonists believed that a cash-based economy would change the
nature of credit and borrowing: Borrowing would no longer be necessary for many daily
transactions, such as purchasing low-cost goods, but different forms of borrowing would increase.
The increased profit-making ability of more stable markets combined with the existence of
accumulated cash reserves (particularly with a banking system) was expected to lead to an
environment with increased credit. See infra text accompanying notes 196-197.
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money supply known in the seventeenth century was to overvalue coins for
the purpose of drawing them in from abroad or from other colonies.'46
Toward the end of the seventeenth century, private institutions were viewed
as possibly a better means of resolving the problem of currency scarcity. In
1686, for example, a group of merchants in Boston attempted to establish a
bank that would issue bills for use as a medium of exchange secured by
personal property and land. Captain John Blackwell, one of the principal
promoters of the bank, argued that the bank was necessary "for the present
supply of the great scarceity of money here, for carrying on the Ordinary
commerce amongst Traders; who, unlesse speedily releived by this
medium, will, in all probabillity, be suddainly exposed to breaking and utter
Ruine." 14 The bank would have issued bills equal to half the value of an
individual's collateral. 4 ' The projectors hoped that with the issuance of
private currencies, "[o]ur owne Native Commodities will thus become
improved to a sufficiencie for our owne use (at least) & thereby afford a
comfortable subsistence to many ingenious and industrious persons
amongst us." "' This group carried the project through to the point of
printing bills, but abandoned it. Although the reasons for the bank's failure
are unknown,' the most plausible is a mercantilist explanation: In 1687,
Governor Andros spoke against the proposal as unfavorable to England's
trade, and the bank closed soon after a pamphlet was published in 1688
reiterating Andros's views. 5'
Because of the inability of the 1686 bank or other private institutions to
gain popular confidence sufficient to supplement the currency supply,
currency advocates pressured the Massachusetts government to begin
printing paper money. Cotton Mather, a principal advocate of colonial
paper money, argued that only bills printed by the colonial government
146. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
147. DISCOURSE, supra note 118, reprinted in I COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note
20, at 124. According to Blackwell, "[Money] is now so hard to come by, for the carrying on of
trade, to answer the vastness of men's attempts & aymes of increase in Merchandize, as that it's
suspected to be insufficient in this age of the world: And that hath put divers persons & countreys
upon contrivances, how to supply that deficiencic, by other Mediums." Id. at 123.
148. Blackwell argued that bank notes would be secure because the hank would "be managed
in Partnership, by private hands, persons of knowne integrity, prudence and estates: all which will
become thereby lyable to answer the injury, damage or Losse to any, by their undertaking." Id. at
124.
149. Id. at 144.
150. See I ANDREW MCFARLAND DAVIS, CURRENCY AND BANKING IN THE PROVINCE OF
THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 7 (1901).
151. See A SUPPLEMENT OR APPENDIX TO THE TREATISE ENTITULED, A MODEL FOR
ERECTING A BANK OF CREDIT, &C, OR, AN ACCOUNT OF SOME OF THE MANY PREJUDICES THAT
WILL INEVITABLY ENSUE, As WELL TO HIS MAJESTY AS TO His SUBJECTS BY ENHANSING THE
VALUE OF SPANISH COYNS &C. ABOVE HIs MAJESTIES (London, Thomas Cockeril 1688),
reprinted in I COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 181; Davis, supra note 20, at
16-19.
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would solve the problem of constant exportation of coins to England.
According to Mather:
[T]hey cannot Keep Silver in the Country .. . while the European
Trade continues, and that is like to be as long as we are a people.
Silver in New-England is like the water of a swift Running River,
always coming, and as fast going away .... This our Running Cash
is an abiding Cash: for no man will carry it to another Country,
where it will not pass; but rather use it here ... and then only the
Growths of the Country will be carried off, and that will be no
Damage but rather an Advantage to us.'
Mather argued that a government paper money would be more stable than
private currencies because government officials could manage the
currency's stability by means of the government's fiscal powers. Mather
characterized public bills of credit as contracts between individuals and the
citizenry as a whole. He questioned whether, just as the public is better off
by endowing judges with the authority to enforce contracts, all would be
better off allowing the government to remedy the need for a medium of
exchange by entering debt "contracts" with its citizenry. According to
Mather, "can... one Magistrate give force to. . . Contracts, and cannot All
our Government do the same." '53 As is shown below, colonial governments
were highly interested in issuing paper currencies and were soon to accept
Mather' s broader idea.
B. The Structure of Colonial Paper Money Policies
A year after great successes against the French during King William's
War, Massachusetts, New York, and Connecticut sent men to take Quebec,
while other troops were sent to attack Montreal simultaneously.'5 4 The
Quebec expedition met with severe misfortune: Supplies due from England
never came, and the troops supposed to attack Montreal returned early,
152. [COTroN MATHER], SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BILLS OF CREDIT Now PASSING
IN NEW-ENGLAND (Boston, n.p. 1691) [hereinafter SOME CONSIDERATIONS], reprinted in I
COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 189, 193. Although the pamphlet was
circulated anonymously, Andrew McFarland Davis, who compiled the Colonial Currency
Reprints, states that the late J. Hammond Trumbull attributed authorship to Mather. I COLONIAL
CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 196. Cotton Mather strongly advocated the printing of
public bills to increase the amount of credit in Massachusetts. According to Mather, "If this
[public bills] be made Currant, the Credit of the Colony will rise to the utmost height of it's
ability on all Extraordinary Emergencies; . .. and if the Merchants cannot Buy as well as Sell for
Credit, how shall they carry on their Trades?" SOME CONSIDERATIONS, supra, reprinted in I
COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 193.
153. Id. at 191.
154. 1 THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 336-37 (Lawrence Shaw Mayo ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1936) (1764).
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leaving the New England and New York troops to face the entire Canadian
army.' 55 Several hundred men were killed by the French and by an outbreak
of smallpox, and the rest retreated to Boston. Massachusetts had made no
plans to pay the soldiers, expecting that they would be compensated
through their own pillage.
The returning soldiers, according to Thomas Hutchinson, were "upon
the point of mutiny for want of their wages." 116 The scarcity of specie in the
colony prevented the government from quickly raising the money. The
General Court instead issued its first paper money, £7000' 57 in "bills of
credit" -essentially IOUs-to quell the soldiers' revolt.15 The Court
announced that bills of credit would be accepted in payment of a tax levied
for the next year, so as to give the bills value, and provide security, without
requiring a specie reserve."'
The government's promise to redeem the bills, however, appears not to
have generated market confidence. The bills of credit had so little initial
acceptance that the soldiers were able to assign them for only a fraction of
their stated value. According to Thomas Hutchinson, "the notes would not
command money, nor any commodity at money price," and the soldiers
"were great sufferers, and could get no more than twelve or fourteen
shillings in the pound." 160 To improve the value of the notes, the
government changed its policy to give a five-percent tax discount to those
who paid their taxes in bills (as opposed to redeeming them later for funds
accumulated by the tax)."' The value of the bills changed dramatically and,
according to Hutchinson, by the time the general tax approached, the bills
"became better than money." Confident that the bills of credit would retain
their value, the General Court authorized a larger issue of bills in 1691 and
155. id. at 337-38.
156. Id. at 340.
157. The Massachusetts public bills of credit were denominated in pounds, shillings, and
pence, although they were entirely distinct from English Sterling.
158. See BROCK, supra note 14, at 18. The 1690 order of the General Court is reprinted in I
DAVIS, supra note 150, at 10-1I.
159. A contemporary pamphlet argued that government bills of credit were equivalent to
silver coin:
What is the use of Coyned Silver? but to furnish a man with Credit, that he may obtain
from his Neighbours those Commodities, which he hath occasion for? The Country in
General Court, have Recognized or Acknowledged, a Debt of so many thousand pounds
unto them that have been the servants of the Publick. The Credit conveyed by the Bills
now Circulates from one hand to another as mens dealings are, until the Publick Taxes
call for it. It is then brought in to the Treasurers hands, from which it goes not out
again. Now the Conveniences which the servants of the Publick, have had by them,
have honestly paid the Countries Debts; and what could coyned Silver have done more?
SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ADDRESSED UNTO THE WORSHIPFUL ELISHA HUTCHINSON
ESQ. (Boston, n.p. 1691), quoted in I DAVIS, supra note 150, at 13-14.
160. 1 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 341.
161. See BROCK, supra note 14, at 22.
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according to Hutchinson, "I[t]he charges of government were paid in this
manner from year to year." 162
After 1690, the Massachusetts government began to issue paper money
annually in the form of bills of credit to pay public debts. The government
typically printed bills of credit and paid them directly to people to whom it
owed money, primarily those on salary, those engaged in public works
projects, and soldiers. As with the first bills of 1690, the statutes
authorizing the bills' issuance included provisions for taxes to be imposed
in specific future years when the bills could be either used in payment of
taxes or redeemed with general funds. 163 The value of the bills thus derived
from the fact that they could be used to pay taxes or would be redeemed by
the government for hard money after a designated date.' 64
In 1714, complaints of currency scarcity led the government to adopt a
second mechanism that distributed bills of credit more widely. The
government began issuing large quantities of bills to loan out at interest.
The government loaned £50,000 in bills in 1714 and £100,000 in 1716.65
The system was formalized in 1721, when the government began lending
money through loan offices established in towns throughout the colony. 166
The security of the loan office bills derived from the fact that they could be
used to pay off the principal of the loans (they would be accepted at par
value, then destroyed) or redeemed by means of general funds after a
designated date. 167 The taxation provisions and loan agreements for the two
forms of paper money issues proved to be the principal mechanism by
which the government controlled the quantity of currency in circulation.
Monetary policy united with taxation policy.
The issuance and circulation of government paper money had
unintended consequences: Contemporary accounts universally agree that, as
the number of bills in circulation grew, silver and gold coins were exported
162. 1 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 341 & n.*.
163. See, e.g., An Act for Making the Former Bills of Credit To Pass Currant in Future
Payments (1692), reprinted in WRIGHT & POTTER, I THE ACTS AND RESOLVES PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 35-36 (1869); see also BROCK, supra note
14, at 18-19 (describing tax provisions associated with specific emissions of bills of credit); I
DAVIS, supra note 150, at 88-89 (same).
164. See BROCK, supra note 14, at 26-28. Although in the first few years the government
redeemed the bills within a year of when they were issued, beginning in 1702 the bills were left
outstanding for longer periods in response to colonists' complaints of currency scarcity. See
NETrELS, supra note 44, at 257-58 n.3 1.
165. BROCK, supra note 14, at 23.
166. NETTELS, supra note 44, at 257-58 n.31; Bruce D. Smith, Money and Inflation in
Colonial Massachusetts, 8 FED. RES. BANK MINN. Q. REV. 1, 4 (1984). The government required
that the loans be secured by mortgages on land or on gold or silver plate, that they not exceed one
half the value of the asset mortgaged, and that they be paid back in a set number of years. See
Smith, supra, at 4.
167. See BROCK, supra note 14, at 28.
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in even greater volume and were rarely seen or used in commerce. 68 By
1713 to 1715, bills of credit became the most widely used medium of
exchange throughout the New England colonies.' 69 According to Thomas
Hutchinson, by 1710, "silver and gold were entirely banished.... [and] the
price of everything bought or sold was no longer compared therewith, but
with the paper bills, or rather with meer ideal pounds, shillings and
pence." 170 The most plausible reason for this transition is that the existence
of the bills of credit reduced the demand for silver and gold in domestic
transactions in comparison to their demand in trade with foreign creditors,
leading to increased exports of coin.17'
Thereafter, bills of each of the New England colonies commonly
circulated at par throughout neighboring colonies. 7 ' In 1712, in response,
the Massachusetts government enacted a law prohibiting execution on the
168. Ronald Michener, Fixed Exchange Rates and the Quantity Theory in Colonial America,
in EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF VELOCITY, REAL EXCHANGE RATES, UNEMPLOYMENT AND
PRODUCTIVITY 233, 293-94 (Karl Brunner & Allan H. Meltzer eds., Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy No. 27. 1987).
169. See I DAVIS, supra note 150, at 20-21. The Connecticut government encouraged the
transition to wider use of paper money by passing a law forbidding payment of taxes in country
pay in 1710, the year it first issued public bills. See HENRY BRONSON, A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT
OF CONNECTICUT CURRENCY, CONTINENTAL MONEY, AND THE FINANCES OF THE REVOLUTION
37 (photo. reprint n.d.) (New Haven, Thomas Stafford 1865).
170. 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 154.
171. The export of gold and silver coins due to the circulation of paper money can be
characterized as a variation of Gresham's Law-that cheap money drives out dear money.
Gresham's Law explains the effect of a fixed exchange rate between two currencies. As the real
values of the currencies change in relation to their nominal values, the market will dump the
overvalued currency and hoard the undervalued. According to Gresham's Law, then, currencies of
different value can coexist as long as they are interchangeable without a fixed exchange rate. See
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1867-1960, at 27 & n.16 (1963). Massachusetts did not establish a fixed exchange rate
between its bills of credit and gold and silver coins and, therefore, the export of gold and silver
upon the circulation of paper money is not an example of Gresham's Law defined strictly. The
essence of Gresham's Law, however, is that the relative values of currencies will determine where
and when they circulate. The wider availability of bills of credit after 1710 decreased the demand
for gold and silver coins in domestic transactions. Gold and silver became more exclusively used
in international trade, because foreign creditors typically were reluctant to accept Massachusetts's
bills.
172. See BROCK, supra note 14, at 35-36; MCCUSKER, supra note 48, at 131-37; Bruce D.
Smith, American Colonial Monetary Regimes: The Failure of the Quantity Theory and Some
Evidence in Favour of an Alternate View, 18 CAN. J. ECON. 531, 543 & n.9 (1985). After 1719,
Connecticut taxes could be paid in the bills of credit of Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, New
York, or Rhode Island. BRONSON, supra note 169, at 37-38. According to William Douglass, who
wrote an important pamphlet on New England currencies in 1740, people of Connecticut
[gave] a Currency to the publick Bills of their Brethren, in the neighbouring Colonies
of New England.
This promiscuous Currency in the four Governments of New England, that is, one
Colony giving a Currency to the enormous Paper Credit Emissions of one of the other
Colonies, has the same Effect as if that Colony did emit Bills of its own.
WILLIAM DOUGLASS, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE CURRENCIES OF THE BRITISH
PLANTATIONS IN AMERICA (Boston, S. Kneeland & T. Green 1740), reprinted in 3 COLONIAL
CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 307, 319-20.
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property of or imprisonment of any debtor who paid his debt in good bills
of credit, unless the debtor expressly contracted to pay in a different
medium. 3 This statute, in essence, invested colonial bills with the status of
legal tender. As is shown below, the wider use of this form of cash made
contractual agreements and, in turn, litigation levels, susceptible to
government policies regulating the volume of currency in circulation.
C. The Legal and Economic Effects of Government Control over
Monetary Stability
The power to issue currency vastly increases the influence of the state
over economic affairs. The unprecedented power the government can wield
through control of the paper money supply derives from several sources.
The Massachusetts government had always tried to control the money
supply through regulation of commodity money and by means of policies to
overvalue coins to draw them into the colony. But these measures had little
effect in comparison to the power to print money directly. Since a higher
volume of currency in circulation made government taxation far easier to
administer, the power to issue currency greatly increased colonial
governments' ability to profit from taxation. Under the older regime of
scarce coins and money substitutes, in contrast, the power to tax was
technically limited because the benefit of collecting taxes in commodities
was reduced by the high costs of commodity transportation and resale:
Collecting taxes in government bills was far easier and less costly than
collecting in corn or wheat.'74 By means of paper money issues and tax
levies, the government could finance far larger operations than before.'75
173. See An Act To Prevent the Oppression of Debtors (1712), reprinted in I THE ACTS AND
RESOLVES PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, supra note 163, at
700-01.
174. Taxing in corn was relatively inefficient because of transportation costs. The problem of
taxation in an environment where money was scarce was well-known by those advocating a
publicly issued currency. According to a 1691 commentator,
If you Require the Taxes in Corn at an overvalue, with I know not what Abatements if
they bring in Mony; ... And then if the Government pay the charges of Conveyance
from Remoter-parts, and bear all Damages afterwards, what will it amount to when all
Charges and Damages are allowed; perhaps scarce two shillings to the Government, of
five shillings from the Country; and when will the publick Debts be paid? or when will
be an end of Taxing? Certainly ... the Tendency of it is only to render the Government
odious by a great noise of Taxes ....
SOME CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 152, reprinted in I COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra
note 20, at 192. In 1684, according to the Massachusetts General Court, because of the "great
Charges for Transportation of Pay to Boston," Massachusetts amended its taxation policy so that
local towns would serve as a clearinghouse-paying out corn when the government owed money,
and receiving corn from taxpayers. SEVERAL ORDERS AND LAWS MADE AT THE SECOND
SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL COURT, Oct. 15, 1684, reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 44, at 325.
175. Currency issuance can also have a socially transformative effect. Taxes paid to the
government must represent something like "profits" or "savings" -that is, returns net of
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Finally, government paper money was widely adopted by colonists as a
device to reduce the costs of transacting. Colonial governments' control
over the volume of currency in circulation thus magnified the governments'
influence over economic affairs such that fluctuating currency policies as a
result of a variety of political pressures frequently destabilized the colonial
economy.
This Section analyzes the implications of reliance on paper money for
contractual relations and litigation. Subsection II.C. 1 describes how
government currency issuance affected the money supply, Subsection II.C.2
analyzes how colonial governments controlled the value and stability of
paper money, and Subsection II.C.3 examines the effects of monetary
policy on contractual relations. Finally, Subsection H.C.4 analyzes the
relationship between currency policies and litigation.
1. The Effect of Currency Issuance on the Colonial Money Supply
The increased influence of the government over economic conditions
derives from the transformation in the money supply attendant to the
widespread issuance of government currency. The government's
widespread circulation of paper money led to three principal changes in the
colonial money supply, which might be called the "interest rate effect," the
"currency substitution effect," and the "contract value effect." The term
"interest rate effect" refers to two possible changes in the interest rate with
an increase in the volume of currency. First, the "price" of borrowing
currency decreases initially as the government reduces the scarcity of liquid
money through currency issues.'76 Greater currency availability and lower
interest rates therefore initially led to a greater volume of credit and
productive investment. Government issuance of currency in large enough
quantities to cause currency depreciation, however, leads to a
corresponding increase in interest rates: Creditors will adjust interest rates
to compensate for the losses they expected to suffer from depreciation.
The second principal change in the colonial money supply attendant to
the issuance of paper money derives from what might be called the
"currency substitution effect." Colonists chose to use paper money in
transactions as a lower-cost alternative to coins and money substitutes.
household consumption. Taxation in government-issued currency requires people to engage in the
market economy, because people have to earn currency to pay their taxes. A policy of currency
issuance and tax levies limits individuals' ability to live autonomously, outside the sphere of
market relations. For a discussion of the transformative power of government currency circulation
in a modem context, see Paul Bohannan, The Impact of Money on an African Subsistence
Economy, 19 J. ECON. HIST. 491 (1959), which discusses government currency circulation in
twentieth-century Nigeria.
176. McCUSKER & MENARD, supra note 128, at 336 (discussing, in particular, how
Massachusetts's loan-office issues of bills of credit reduced interest rates).
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Responding to colonists' latent demand for money, the Massachusetts
government issued bills in small denominations to serve as the "small
change" needed for routine transactions.'77 Greater availability of currency
led to a substitution away from the use of book accounts and commodity
money. Bills of credit served as cash and debt obligations increasingly took
the form of formal credit instruments requiring repayment in money.'78 The
currency substitution effect was also likely to have led to increased
commercialization, specialization, and market development. Greater
availability of cash reduced the need for the coincidence of wants, vastly
increasing the potential for exchanges.'79
The third change in the money supply attendant to widespread issuance
of paper money may be called the "contract value effect." A government's
control over the value of paper money gives it an unprecedented power to
determine the value of individual contracts. The policies of Massachusetts
and other colonial governments that changed the value of paper money, for
example, changed the value of outstanding book accounts, bills, bonds and
notes that were payable in paper money, and led to more breaches of
177. See John R. Hanson 11, Small Notes in the American Colonies, 17 EXPLORATIONS EcON.
HIST. 411, 411 (1980). Hanson defines a "small note" as one of twenty shillings (E1) or less. In
1690, Massachusetts issued bills of credit in denominations of 2s., 2s.6d., 5s., 10s., 20s., 60s.,
100s., and 200s. In 1713, Is. and ls.6d. and, in 1722, Id., 2d., and 3d., were added. Id. at 415.
178. Bruce Mann's data from the Hartford County Court reveal a decline in book accounts
coincident with the issuance of paper money. The data show that the percentage of book account
cases decreased from 82.9% in 1700, to 65.5% in 1710, to 29.7% in 1720, hovering at between
17% and 21% in the period between 1730 and 1750. See MANN, supra note 7, at 171 & tbl.l.
179. The availability of paper money does not preclude the possibility that, at times, direct
exchanges of goods may be preferable to cash exchanges. Barter is typically preferable as a lower
cost means of transacting than cash exchanges during both severe price deflation (currency
appreciation, liquidity shock) and severe price inflation (currency depreciation). In Part III, I show
that, during periods of currency crisis in Massachusetts, colonists reverted to barter as either
severe currency depreciation or appreciation made the government's bills of credit undesirable as
a medium of exchange. For further discussion of the choice to revert to barter in a monetized
economy, see Jirg Niehans, Money and Barter in General Equilibrium with Transactions Costs,
61 AM. ECON. REv. 773 (1971); Ronaleen R. Roha & Marc L. Schulhof, How Bartering Saves
Cash, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., Feb. 1996, at 103, 103-04; and Canice Prendergast & Lars
Stole, Barter, Liquidity & Market Segmentation (Oct. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
According to Ronald Michener, an economist and historian of colonial currencies, the New
England bills of credit replaced specie in quantities approximating one-for-one and, therefore, the
issuance of these bills of credit did not lead to greater monetization of the economy. For his
analysis of the impact of the issuance of bills of credit on specie flows in Massachusetts, see
Michener, supra note 168, at 288-94. Legal historians including Bruce Mann and myself have
concluded that colonial governments' issuance of bills of credit led to greater monetization of the
economy because the legal records reveal a tremendous increase in the numbers of cases based on
promissory notes coinciding with the introduction of paper money. Promissory notes are written
obligations to pay a sum of money on a specified date. The move away from book account cases
to promissory note cases immediately after the transition to exclusive use of paper currency
suggests that more money was in circulation. Further work is required in determining the precise
nature of promissory notes at the time, however, to understand fully how extensive the
monetization was.
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contract and litigation. These relationships are complex and are the subject
of the remainder of this Part.
2. Colonial Monetary Policy and the Potentialfor Currency Crises
The value and stability of a currency are determined by a complex
interplay between government policies regulating the supply of currency,
the extent of private "creation" of money (commodity money, promissory
notes, credit, etc.) and currency demand, driven by economic conditions
and public expectations. Economists have generally accepted the notion
that, in the long run, currency policies may change the volume of nominal
currency and, thus the nominal value of goods, but will have little effect on
the supply of "real" money, that is, the inherent, not nominal, value of
goods and services in an economy. 8° When governments or private sources
increase currency volume at levels beyond the rate of true economic
growth, for example, the value of currency will decline (currency will
depreciate or prices will inflate) because the volume of real money will be
unchanged.' Similarly, governments can cause currency appreciation or
price deflation by issuing currency at quantities less than the rate of
economic growth. Reduced currency volume may cause short-term
economic shocks, such as recessions, but in the long run, only prices will
decline, because the volume of real money measuring the real value of
goods and services in an economy will remain unchanged. In theory, then,
governments can create short-term economic benefits and harms through
inflation or deflation, but, in the long run, crises will be abated through
price and interest rate adjustments. s2 These principles of money supply
apply to the colonial period as much as they do to today's economy. As is
180. See Charles W. Calomiris, Institutional Failure, Monetary Scarcity, and the
Depreciation of the Continental, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 47, 48 (1988) ("Most economists believe the
supply of real money in the long run is an endogenous variable, determined independently of the
nominal money supply .. "). As a simple example, if in real value terms, a cow is worth ten
pigs, at an initial currency level, the price of a cow may be $10 and a pig $1; if the volume of
currency doubles, the price of a cow will rise to $20 and a pig to $2; the inherent comparative
value does not change.
181. According to Milton Friedman,
[ljnflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and
can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output.
Many phenomena can produce temporary fluctuations in the rate of inflation, but they
can have lasting effects only insofar as they affect the rate of monetary growth.
MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF 49 (1992); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, OPTIMUM
QUANTITY THEORY OF MONEY AND OTHER ESSAYS (1969) (describing the quantity theory in
greater detail).
182. Robert Lucas, for example, states that the "two central implications of the quantity
theory of money.. . [are] that a given change in the rate of change in the quantity of money
induces (i) an equal change in the rate of price inflation; and (ii) an equal change in nominal rates
of interest." Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Two Illustrations of the Quantity Theory of Money, 70 AM.
ECON. REV. 1005,1005 (1980).
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shown below, what is distinctive about the colonial period is that the
volume of currency was so low that periods of currency scarcity disrupted
basic economic activity, compelling resort to barter with its many attendant
problems.
The conventional quantity theory of money described above-
explaining the relationships between the volume of currency in circulation,
currency value (depreciation or appreciation, price inflation or deflation),
and interest rate adjustment-is a basic tenet of monetary economics. It is
consistent, moreover, with the theory that government actions that change
consumer expectations about the value of currency, other than simply by
regulating the volume of currency, can also lead to increases or decreases in
currency value. General expectations about currency values were
principally affected by the colonial governments' definition and application
of the terms of redemption of the bills of credit.
Colonial governments, of course, set forth in the initial offering the
redemption terms that established the value of the bills of credit. At
offering, the real value of the bills was the present value of redemption. As
described above, for some issues, the bills' value derived from the
government's promise to accept them for tax payments (or redemption in a
particular year); for other issues, the bills' value was the government's
promise to accept them as payments against loans. Still, the public's
perception of the subsequent enforcement of those agreements-by taxation
or through enforcement of the loan agreements-was a principal
determinant of the value of the bills. When the public believed they would
be retired according to schedule, they remained (for purposes of exchange
rates) at the present value of the redemption price. When the public was
uncertain about government monetary redemption policy, however, the bills
depreciated. An anonymous 1721 pamphlet explained:
[A Man] gives Credit to these Bills; the Country by an Act
promises to take them again, at such a time, but do not; Surely, this
lessens the Mans Credit of them: I will not, (saith he) Sell so much
Silver, or Gold, or Goods, or Houses, or Lands, for the Paper Bills,
as I did before."83
Periods of currency depreciation-when bills were not redeemed-
were similar in effect to periods of price inflation (circulation of currency
beyond economic growth).184 Similarly, the government's spontaneous
183. THE SECOND PART OF SOUTH-SEA STOCK BEING AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF
PROVINCE BILLS OR BILLS OF CREDIT (Boston, D. Henchman 1721) [hereinafter SECOND PART],
reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 302, 314.
184. See Smith, supra note 172, at 549.
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decision to retire certain bills could increase the bills' value, leading to
currency appreciation or price deflation.'85
185. In the economics literature, discussion of the relative importance of the volume of
currency in circulation and the enforcement of a government's redemption promises has been
characterized as a debate between the "quantity" or "classical" theory of money and the
"backing theory" or "anticlassical" position. Proponents of the backing theory argue that the
most important determinant of the value of currency is the backing of that currency provided by
the government and that, as with stock issues and other private liabilities, when a public currency
is fully backed, its value is not strongly determined by the quantity in circulation. Calomiris,
supra note 180, at 49; Smith, supra note 172, at 533-34; Smith, supra note 166, at 1-2; Bruce D.
Smith, The Relationship Between Money and Prices: Some Historical Evidence Reconsidered, 12
FED. RES. BANK MINN. Q. REv. 18, 18-19 (1988); Bruce D. Smith, Some Colonial Evidence on
Two Theories of Money: Maryland and the Carolinas, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1178, 1187-88 (1985)
[hereinafter Smith, Two Theories of Money]. The proponents of the backing theory argue that it
has two principal advantages over the quantity theory. First, the backing theory provides a better
explanation of currency and price data. Bruce Smith, its principal proponent, performed several
empirical studies of inflationary trends during the colonial period (including an examination of
Massachusetts in the period from 1710 to 1750, described in Part III). Smith demonstrated that the
volume of bills of credit in circulation was often less determinative of inflation than the refusal of
colonial governments to retire the bills of credit according to stated policies. In his study of
Maryland and the Carolinas, for example, Smith found that the Carolinas experienced rapid
depreciation of currency value during periods of little change in currency volume, but in which
governments failed to retire their bills. Smith, Two Theories of Money, supra, at 1188-99 & tbis. 1-
2. In contrast, Maryland was able to increase and decrease dramatically its supply of bills of credit
with relatively little effect on the value of the bills, because it consistently backed its currency. Id.
at 1199-1208 & tbl.4. Ronald Michener has criticized Smith for emphasizing colonial paper
monies that the government promised to redeem in specie on a particular date and therefore that
functioned more like bonds than "money." Michener, supra note 168, at 242-45. Michener's view
is that the stability of a colonial currency was principally affected by whether the colony had a de
facto fixed exchange rate. In colonies where merchants adhered to a fixed exchange rate with
specie by custom, the governments' bills of credit were relatively stable in value. According to
Michener, however, because specie was entirely absent in New England between 1710 and 1750,
there was no such customary fixed exchange rate, and the bills of credit depreciated when they
were issued in large volumes. Id. at 237.
A second reason why some economists have favored the backing theory, however, is that it
supports colonists' own views about currency scarcity. According to the quantity theory, currency
cannot be "scarce" in the long run. A reduction in the volume of currency leads eventually to a
general price decline, with no effect on the real money supply. According to the backing theory,
however, the value of currency is not likely to decline below the present value of its redemption
price. A decrease in the volume of fully backed currency, for example, will not lead to a
proportional price decline and interest rate increase, meaning that it is possible for there to be a
suboptimal volume of currency in circulation. For example, according to the economist Charles
Calomiris:
If government policy can costlessly increase the long-run level of consumer surplus
enjoyed by moneyholders, then the failure to implement that optimal policy makes
money unnecessarily scarce.... [C]omplaints of monetary scarcity and calls for
government actions to increase the supply of paper money were often reasonable
exhortations for institutional reform, rather than merely attempts to extinguish specie
debt with depreciated paper, or evidence of unsophisticated economic analysis.
Calomiris, supra note 180, at 48-49. Of course, it is very difficult to measure the quantity of
money in circulation precisely. Indeed, Smith and the backing theory proponents have been
criticized for examining only bills of credit and ignoring flows of gold and silver coins and the
creation of private money (credit, bills, notes, etc.). Bennett T. McCallum, Money and Prices in
Colonial America: A New Test of Competing Theories, 100 J. POL. ECON. 143 (1992); Ron
Michener, Backing Theories and the Currencies of Eighteenth-Century America: A Comment, 48
J. EcON. HIST. 682 (1988).
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As the next Part describes, the government, faced with political
pressures not to redeem the bills on schedule, often ignored the initial
redemption terms. During the 1730s, the period that is the focus of this
Article, the government's failure to adhere to its redemption schedule was
the principal determinant of fluctuations in the value of the colonial bills of
credit. As is shown below, the public's expectation that the bills would not
be redeemed (in other words, that there was no real security for the bills'
value) lowered the value of the bills regardless of the demand for currency.
Indeed, traders reverted to barter when the bills in circulation depreciated
quickly and had no cognizable value.
3. Currency Policies, the Common Law, and Contractual Relations
Government policies affecting the value of currency in circulation also
directly affect the value of existing contractual obligations when terms are
fixed. During an inflationary period-when currency depreciates-those
obliged to make monetary payments in the future in some set, nominal
amount may pay their debts in reduced amounts in real terms. Those
receiving salaries in fixed nominal terms, for example, receive less in real
terms when they are paid in depreciated currency. Conversely, in times of
currency scarcity, when the value of currency appreciates, the real value of
debts increases. Debtors pay more in real money than they had agreed;
those on fixed salaries receive more than they had anticipated.
There are two necessary conditions for currency policies to affect all
contract values systematically in these ways. First, whether depreciating or
appreciating, currency must be designated by law to be legal tender for the
purpose of repayment of debts. If the currency is legal tender, creditors are
obliged by law to accept it in satisfaction of a debt. In contrast, if a currency
is not legal tender, a creditor need not accept it; thus, debtors cannot gain
from depreciation and must satisfy the debts in agreed-upon terms.
Massachusetts enacted the first statute designating bills of credit as legal
tender in 1712.1 6
Second, if currency policies are to affect economic obligations, judges
must apply the doctrine of "nominalism." Nominalism simply means that
payment of the nominal value of a debt satisfies one's legal obligation: That
Presenting the quantity theory and the backing theory as contrary positions, however,
oversimplifies the quantity theory. The quantity theory does not preclude the possibility that
expectations about government policy will affect the real value of a currency. Milton Friedman,
Quantity Theory of Money, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: MONEY, supra note 33, at 26-30; see also
Scott Sumner, Colonial Currency and the Quantity Theory of Money: A Critique of Smith's
Interpretation, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 139, 141 (1993) (criticizing Smith for not recognizing that,
under the modem version of the quantity theory, "anticipations of future changes in the money
supply may lead to large changes in real currency demand").
186. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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is, that judges do not adjust debt amounts to account for changes in the
value of the debts in real terms. The nominalist principle has been a
consistent feature of the common law since 1605, when The Case of Mixed
Money"7 established the sovereign power of the Crown to designate the
form and the value of currency serving as legal tender. 88 Although colonial
judges and juries were not bound by all common-law rules, it is fairly clear
that the nominalist doctrine was applied throughout the currency crises of
the 1730s and early 1740s, until the doctrine was overturned by statute in
1742.89 In a 1743 pamphlet, one writer claimed there never "had been any
Instance of more than the nominal Sum of the Bills express'd in the
Condition... ever being paid, or demanded in a Court of Judicature 'till
1742." 9o As is shown below, nominalism and legal tender rules propelled
parties to use legal process to gain from changing currency values.
Even judges applying the nominalism doctrine, however, respected
written private agreements to adjust debt obligations in response to
changing currency values. A 1730 case, for example, enforced a provision
in a contract stating that the debt was to be repaid "Either in Silver Money
at Sixteen Shillings per oz. or in Good Bills of Creditt on this Province at
the Election of [the plaintiff]." ' It is somewhat curious that these types of
agreements were not more widespread. Thomas Hutchinson stated that
debts on specialties-debts under seal-were adjusted for depreciation and
that those cases represented one-eleventh of the entire caseload.'92 As is
shown below, one explanation for why they were not used more frequently
was that the government routinely expressed a commitment to maintaining
the value of the bills of credit. Furthermore, there was little money in
circulation other than bills of credit in which to pay debts.
187. 2 State Trials 114; 80 Eng. Rep. 507 (P.C. 1605).
188. KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION 39-40 (1982); see also F.A. MANN, THE
LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 80-175 (4th ed. 1982) (examining the history and effects of judicial
application of the nominalism principle in Britain). According to Mann, "[I1n England the
unimpaired control of nominalism has never been doubted. English law lacks all equipment that,
in the case of liquidated sums, could lead to a revision or adjustment of the substance of the
obligation." MANN, supra, at 107.
189. See infra notes 306-309 and accompanying text.
190. AN ENQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF THE BILLS OF CREDIT OF THE PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS-BAY IN NEW ENGLAND IN A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN IN BOSTON TO A
MERCHANT IN LONDON (n.p. 1743), reprinted in 4 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note
20, at 149, 185 [hereinafter ENQUIRY]; see also PERKINS, supra note 140, at 174-78 (discussing
the colonial problem of debt payment in depreciated currency).
191. Sever v. Segar, Common Pleas (Mar. 1731), in 5 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, supra
note 77, at 370 No. 74. Similarly, the Hancock families' business records include a 1742 reference
to a lease that provided that the rent would be adjusted "in respect of the rise or fall of Money."
BAXTER, supra note 69, at 33 (quoting the lease).
192. 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 335 (" [A]lthough debts on specialties had allowance
made in judgments of court for depreciation of the bills, yet on simple contracts, of which there
were ten to one specialty, no allowance was made.").
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4. Currency Policies and Individuals' Litigation Strategies
As described above, Massachusetts courts required that debtors pay
only the nominal sums owed in their contracts, no matter how extreme the
subsequent changes in currency value throughout the period from 1712 to
1742. Such a policy has substantial implications for litigation. Once the
terms of a contract are established, debtors are likely to respond to changes
in currency value by using the legal process to affect the timing and thus the
value of their payments. As litigation is a mechanism to enforce contracts,
creditors are likely to respond to debtors' actions by choosing when to sue.
As is shown below, both inflation and deflation are likely to lead to greater
litigation.
There are two basic types of contracts involving payment of money:
contracts to pay money, that is, debt contracts; and contracts for some
performance to be compensated by money at a future time, such as
contracts for labor or to deliver goods. Both the actions of the person owing
the money or the performance and the responses of the party to whom the
money or services are owed are likely to be affected by changes in currency
value when terms are fixed. With respect to monetary loans, it is in the
short-term interest of debtors to use the timing of repayment to benefit or
recoup losses from currency value changes. When currency values are
declining (depreciation or price inflation), for example, debtors have an
incentive to delay payment while the value of the debt decreases, as prices
inflate. Creditors, in response, will sue to reclaim the debt so as not to lose
value of the contract over time. In this case, litigation is a likely outcome.
When currency values are increasing, debtors are likely to pay their
debts as quickly as possible to avoid the increases in the real value of the
debts. If a debtor prepays, obviously, there will be no litigation. Increasing
contract values may, however, lead to default and litigation of a different
sort. An increase in contract values is equivalent in effect to an increase in
the interest rate: When currency appreciates, debtors have to pay more in
real money than they received. Economists generally accept the proposition
that a rise in the interest rate decreases the likelihood that debtors will be
able to profit from low-risk investments and thus creates a moral hazard
problem, encouraging debtors to invest in high-risk investments, which
leads to an increase in the rate of default.193 When debtors default, of
course, creditors are likely to sue to reclaim money owed them. Creditors
may benefit because the value of that money is higher. Because increases in
currency value are similar in effect to increasing the interest rate for all
outstanding debt contracts, however, it is possible for increases in currency
193. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of
Quality on Price, 25 J. ECON. LIT. 1 (1987).
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value to increase general default levels, which would represent a loss to
many creditors. Indeed, during periods of severe currency scarcity, there
can be "chains of debt" when those who owe money, but cannot pay, must
sue those who owe them to pay back their debts, raising the general level of
litigation."
With respect to contracts for the future performance of services (such as
wage contracts) or to deliver goods, the performing party is likely to
respond to changes in the value of currency by deciding whether or not to
withhold labor or delivery. When currency depreciates, the value of the
performance increases in relation to the value of money. The party will
breach when the value of performance exceeds the value of the
compensation.'95 A laborer, for example, is likely to breach an employment
agreement when his or her labor is greater in value than his or her
contracted wage. In the case of breach by the performing party, the
disappointed recipients are likely to sue to enforce the contract. In contrast,
when currency appreciates, the performing party is likely to adhere to the
contract to gain the benefits of increasing compensation, while the paying
party may breach.
Many colonial citizens had initially believed that either a private or
government-issued paper currency would reduce overall litigation levels.
There were two principal arguments for why the transition to the cash
economy would reduce lawsuits. First, colonists imagined that economic
advances resulting from the transition to a cash economy would reduce the
number of debt obligations each individual required in the course of his or
her business activities and daily life. A decreased number of debt
obligations, it was argued, would decrease the extent to which debts for
very minor transactions would result in court action. Captain Blackwell, the
promoter of a private currency, for example, argued in 1687 that with the
issuance of money, "[a]ll sorts of persons become inabled to live
handsomly, and out of Debt: and that prevents multiplicity of Lawsuites,
charges, and troubles to the Government." 196
Second, colonial citizens argued that an increase in credit availability
resulting from the widespread availability of a ready currency would allow
debtors with assets to acquire credit in times of emergency, so that they
could perform on their existing debts and avoid a lawsuit and execution on
194. See Rosen, Courts and Commerce, supra note 7, at 146; see also Jonathan M. Chu, Debt
Litigation and Shays' Rebellion, in IN DEBT TO SHAYS, THE BICENTENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN
REBELLION 82-83 (Robert A. Gross ed., 1993) (describing how deflation and recession
accelerated the calling in of promissory notes by creditors in Massachusetts in 1785, leading to
Shays' Rebellion).
195. See Alan Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflations, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1976).
196. DISCOURSE, supra note 118, reprinted in I COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note
20, at 130.
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their property. According to an anonymously written 1714 pamphlet, with
greater issuance of currency and the existence of a bank,
the Landed man might ... borrow Credit without any fear of a
sudden or surprizing demand, to the prejudice of his Affairs, might
Stock his Farm, and be less able to lessen his Principal, as his
Product would enable him; it would be a certain resort for men to
borrow Credit on any Emergency. 197
Unfortunately, as is shown below, the instability of colonial currency
policies meant that the opposite was the case: Currency gluts and currency
scarcity led to widespread economic stagnation that, in turn, propelled high
levels of litigation, which swamped court dockets.
III. CURRENCY POLICIES IN MASSACHUSETrS, 1710-1750
This Part presents a history of currency policies in Massachusetts from
1710 through 1750. The proponents of the modernization hypothesis
characterize the period from 1710 to 1740 as the period during which New
England judges adapted the law in response to, and as a stimulus for,
greater economic growth and commercialization. This was, however, a
period during which currency policies were highly unstable. Indeed,
Baxter's analysis of the Hancock records led him to conclude that "from
the beginning of Thomas [Hancock's] career (1717) until at least 1750, the
currency with which he had to carry on his business was in a state of
chaos." ' According to Baxter, "a well-ordered monetary system was still
a rare blessing in any part of the world... [but] the financial muddling of
Massachusetts and her neighbors was remarkable even for the age." 199
Currency policies in Massachusetts were unstable because they were
developed and enacted amidst constant political struggles within the
colonial government. The colonial assembly responded to popular
complaints of an insufficient volume of currency in circulation both by
ignoring the provisions to retire bills of credit through taxes at designated
times, and by circulating new issues of the bills. The English Board of
Trade, in contrast, responded largely to English creditors, who lost money
when colonial currencies depreciated, by insisting that the Governor
197. A LETTER, FROM ONE IN BOSTON, TO HIS FRIEND IN THE COUNTRY (Boston, n.p. 1714),
reprinted in I COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 263, 286.
198. BAXTER, supra note 69, at 12 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 11. Later Baxter states that the state of currency during the first half of the
eighteenth century required businesses to be run in a manner closely similar to those of "medieval
merchants" who suffered from similar problems. According to Baxter, with respect to currency
issues, "Thomas [Hancock] was... much closer to the twelfth than to the twentieth century." Id.
at 16.
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maintain stringent currency policies. The Massachusetts assembly was
influenced by the Governor's demands, but in large part ignored them. The
resulting policies generated highly unstable currency values, with a trend
towards increasing currency depreciation. Section II.A examines how
Massachusetts's early currency policies affected economic and legal
conditions in the period from 1710 to 1725. Section I1I.B then examines in
greater detail the currency events of 1726 to 1742, which resulted in the
highest litigation volume of the first half of the eighteenth century.
A. Expanding the Money Supply, 1710-1725
As described earlier, Massachusetts's bills of credit coexisted with gold
and silver coins throughout the first two decades of their circulation, from
1690 to 1710.200 During this period, the volume of bills issued was small
and the value of the bills remained relatively stable.20' During the period
from 1713 to 1714, despite the greater circulation of the paper money, °2 the
citizens of New England experienced dramatic monetary scarcity. Bills of
credit constituted the exclusive currency in New England-gold and silver
coins were no longer available at all-but the bills of credit were not
sufficiently voluminous to satisfy the demand for a medium of exchange.
At this time, the New England colonies' currency problems became a
central political issue, and would remain so throughout the first half of the
century.
There was substantial controversy over how to remedy the problem of
inadequate currency. In 1714, several Massachusetts investors, led by
Elisha Cooke, Jr., and John Colman, presented a plan to the government to
create a private bank, backed by land, that would issue £300,000 in paper
money to be used as a circulating medium."0 3 Others maintained that the
only solution was to cease issuing paper money and return to a hard-money
standard.2" Still others believed that the government could resolve currency
200. 1 DAVIS, supra note 150, at 107; JOSEPH B. FELT, AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF
MASSACHUSETTS CURRENCY 63 (Boston, Perkins & Marvin 1839).
201. See I DAVIS, supra note 150, at 107; FELT, supra note 200, at 63.
202. In 1711, the government lent £50,000 in bills of credit to a group of Boston merchants to
furnish supplies to the Hill and Walker military expedition against Quebec (which was part of
Queen Anne's War, 1702-1713). This loan was sufficient in volume to lead to an exportation of
all specie. See 1 DAVIS, supra note 150, at 54. On the exportation of coins, see supra notes 169-
171 and accompanying text.
203. See GARY B. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 81-82 (1979); George Athan
Billias, The Massachusetts Land Bankers of 1740, 61 U. ME. BULL. 1, 3-5 (1959).
204. FELT, supra note 200, at 64. In 1718, for example, Governor Shute declared that "We
shall never be upon a firm and lasting foundation, 'til we recover and return to silver and gold, the
only true species of money." I DAVIS, supra note 150, at 61. An anonymous 1721 pamphlet
advocated a return to hard currency. SECOND PART, supra note 183, reprinted in 2 COLONIAL
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scarcity by issuing more bills and by delaying redemption of the bills in
circulation. According to the historian Gary B. Nash, the proposal for the
private land bank was rejected by popular vote at a Boston town meeting
that drew the highest volume of attendance in Boston's history.20 1
The Massachusetts government subsequently adopted three principal
measures to remedy currency scarcity. First, it continued to issue more bills
of credit. In response to the town-meeting vote, for example, the
government issued £50,000 in 1714 and £100,000 in 1716, which it lent
directly to individual citizens at an annual interest rate of five percent.06
Second, the government extended the duration that bills of particular issues
would remain outstanding prior to retirement. The government's first
issues, from 1690 to 1703, were to be retired after one year.20 7 Bills issued
between 1704 and 1706 were to be retired within two years.20 8 Beginning in
1707, however, the government progressively extended the period from
issuance to retirement.2" By 1722, the government designated an issue of
£6000 to be retired thirteen years later.210
Finally, for the first time in 1715, the Massachusetts government
declined to impose the taxes required to retire bills according to schedule.211
Although the bills of credit were generally retired on schedule before
CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 303-32. The hard-money position gained increasing
support during the 1730s. 1 DAVIS, supra note 150, at 84-85.
205. NASH, supra note 203, at 82; see also Billias, supra note 203, at 3-5 (describing John
Colman's petition for a private bank and its rejection by the government).
206. See, e.g., An Act for the Making and Emitting the Sum of Fifty Thousand Pounds in
Bills of Credit on This Province, in Such Manner as in the Said Act Is Hereafter Expressed
(1714), reprinted in I THE ACTS AND RESOLVES PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OF THE PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETrS BAY, supra note 163, at 750-51. The government alleged that "the publick bills
of credit on this province ... are now grown very scarce, and few of them passing in proportion to
the great demand of the same." Id.
207. NETrELS, supra note 44, at 257 n.3 1.
208. 1 DAVIS, supra note 150, at 89.
209. The 1707 bills were to be retired after three years; part of the 1709 bills were to be
retired after five years; the 1711 bills, after six years; and the 1712 bills, after twelve years. id.
210. Id. With respect to currency issues lent to private investors, the government was less
flexible about the repayment schedule. When the government, for example, issued £50,000 to a
group of merchants to supply the Hill-Walker expedition against Quebec in 1711, it required that
the issue be redeemed within two years. In that particular case, however, the redemption was
made possible by grants of bills of exchange payable in Sterling given to the government by
British agents. NETrELS, supra note 44, at 258 n.3 1.
211. Davis writes:
In June 1715, the representatives asserted that the trade of the province was greatly
obstructed by the exportation of coin; that the only medium of exchange then passing
was bills of credit; that so few of these were in circulation that it would occasion
trouble to call in the bills which by the terms of the resolves under which they were
issued should by right be called in that year; as a remedy for the trouble they proposed
that a part only of these bills should be called in.
I DAVIS, supra note 150, at 55.
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1721,212 after 1721, they were frequently not retired on schedule. Similarly,
loan repayment agreements were often not enforced.1 3
Despite these various measures, the volume of currency in circulation
still failed to satisfy the need for a medium of exchange. Indeed, the
Massachusetts currency experience in the first half of the eighteenth century
appears to present a paradox. Although the volume of government paper
money in circulation increased, the advantages of the widespread currency
circulation were at times entirely defeated: Massachusetts's currency
consistently depreciated, and there were periods when money was so scarce
that there was a general reversion to barter exchanges.214
How could this happen? The most plausible explanation is that the
uncertainty generated by the government's unstable currency policies
overwhelmed the otherwise mechanical effect of an increase in the volume
of currency. The government's failure to retire bills according to schedule
increased the number of bills in circulation, but undermined market
expectation of the bills' nominal value. Because the provisions for taxation
and redemption established the bills' security and value, the government's
failure to retire the bills on schedule led to a steady market decline in the
Massachusetts bills' value in relation to English Sterling and Spanish pieces
of eight. Similarly, lengthening the duration that bills would remain
outstanding also led to depreciation because the return on the investment in
the bill-redemption or use of the bills to pay taxes-could be realized only
years into the future."15 Thus, despite the government's efforts to increase
the nominal value of currency, the volume of real money (money adjusted
for currency value) remained unchanged or declined. Figures 1 and 2 show
these relationships. Figure 1 displays an estimate of the volume of currency
per capita for New England from 1719 to 1749.216 Note that these are
estimates for all of New England. Figure 1 generally confirms the
212. BROCK, supra note 14, at 31.
213. Theodore Thayer, The Land-Bank System in the American Colonies, 13 J. ECON. HIST.
145, 157 (1953).
214. E.g., MONEY THE SINEWS OF TRADE: THE STATE OF THE PROVINCE OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS-BAY CONSIDERED, WITH RESPECT TO ITS TRADE FOR WANT OF A MEDIUM OF
EXCHANGE WHEREWITH TO MANAGE IT (Boston, S. Kneeland & T. Green 1731), reprinted in 2
COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 431, 432 (predicting a return to barter); [JOHN
WISE], A WORD OF COMFORT TO A MELANCHOLY COUNTRY (Boston, n.p. 1721) [hereinafter A
WORD OF COMFORT], reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 158,
165-66 (describing reliance on barter during the crisis of 1720); To the Author of the Weekly
Rehearsal (Mar. 4, 1734), in 3 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 61, 67-68
(discussing barter during the crisis of 1733); references provided infra note 224 (same). See infra
note 267 for references to the widespread reversion to barter during the crisis of 1738-1741.
215. Colonists holding bills that could only be redeemed after five or six years also faced the
risk that subsequent colonial assemblies might not honor the redemption promises made with each
issue of bills.
216. McCallum calculated the total number of bills of credit in New England (including the
Merchant's Notes of 1733, described infra text accompanying notes 253-258) in terms of English
Sterling, and divided by per capita figures taken from the U.S. Census Historical Statistics.
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contemporary accounts of reversion to barter. After 1712, per capita bill of
credit holdings reached the lowest points in 1720, 1730, and 1737-1742. I
discuss later the significance of the substantial increase in money supply
after 1745.
FIGURE 1. BILLS OF CREDIT PER CAPITA: NEw ENGLAND, 1709-1749
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Source: Bennett T. McCallum, Money and Prices in Colonial America: A New
Test of Competing Theories, 100 J. POL. EcON. 143, 150 tbl.2 (1992).
Next, Figure 2 shows the depreciation of Massachusetts bills in relation
to English Sterling over the same period. Figure 2 presents Massachusetts
data alone and so does not exactly correspond to Figure 1, though the
experience was similar. Figure 2 shows the value of £100 Sterling in
Massachusetts currency by year. As is evident from Figure 2, while in 1700
the Massachusetts pound traded slightly above par (£133 Mass. = £100
Sterling), the period from 1720 to 1735 was a time of steady depreciation:
The value of Massachusetts bills of credit declined by more than half.
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Depreciation rapidly accelerated after 1735 to equal 7.9 times par in
1749.217
FIGURE 2. DEPRECIATION OF MASSACHUSETTS BILLS
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Source: JOHN J. MCCUSKER, MONEY AND EXCHANGE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA,
1600-1775, at 139-41 tbl.3.1 (1978).
Figures 1 and 2 substantially challenge the steady economic growth
hypothesis of the modernization theorists. Quite in contrast to this
hypothesis, they suggest that currency problems are the fundamental reason
behind the low economic growth estimates of the period made by economic
historians, mentioned earlier." 8 New England and Massachusetts, in
particular, were plagued by unstable and inadequate currency, requiring
217. The increasing depreciation during the period from 1735 to 1750 is discussed in the next
Section. The Sterling exchange rate does not precisely reflect changes in the Massachusetts
currency value because exchange rates are also affected by the balance of payments and
international economic and monetary conditions. But the constant depreciation of Massachusetts's
bills of credit against English Sterling is strongly suggestive of the declining value of the bills of
credit.
218. Supra note 126 and accompanying text (estimating 0.5% per capita annual growth).
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frequent resort to barter between 1713 and 1714, between 1720 and 1721,
between 1726 and 1727, and between 1738 and 1741. As explained in Part
I, resort to barter is the antithesis of economic prosperity. And the currency
that was available to Massachusetts citizens was steadily declining in real
value, with an accelerating decline after 1735-suggesting, again, the
opposite of steady economic growth toward modernization.
As described earlier, the volume of litigation is affected by unstable
currency policies. Depreciation in particular affects debt litigation when
bills of credit are designated as legal tender and when judges apply the
doctrine of nominalism. Bills of credit were given status as legal tender in
1712, when Massachusetts residents became exclusively reliant on them as
a medium of exchange. 2 9 Government officials believed that treating bills
of credit as legal tender would reduce depreciation,2 ° and the 1712 law was
followed by successive acts until 1741.221 Figure 2 shows they were
mistaken. In a context of steadily depreciating currency as shown in
Figure 2, debtors benefit by delaying repayment as long as possible.
Although creditors advocated remedial legislation against the nominalist
approach, there arose popular protest against the proposition of paying
more than the nominal amount agreed upon, and the General Court never
succeeded in passing (or never chose to pass) legislation protecting
creditors until 1742.222 The result was that many debtors defaulted on their
debts, knowing that, by the time a damage award was imposed against
them, the debt would decrease in value. William Douglass observed in a
1740 pamphlet: "People run in Debt, endeavour after a long Credit, and
refuse paying their Debts when due; because while Bills are continually
depreciating, the longer the Debt is outstanding, they pay their Creditors
with a less and less Value, than was contracted for." 23 Creditors, as a
consequence, had to file suit to collect the debt.
There were also times, however, when currency scarcity led to
increased litigation of a different sort. When money was so scarce that there
was widespread reversion to barter exchanges, there were unusually high
default rates, as debtors became unable to repay their debts because of the
lack of money. The years from 1720 to 1721 were a time of particular
monetary scarcity in New England.224 In 1721, for example, a pamphlet by
219. Supra note 173 and accompanying text.
220. FELT, supra note 200, at 64 (citing Massachusetts Provincial Records of November
1712).
221. Id. at 100. On the 1742 change in policy, see infra text accompanying notes 306-309.
222. FELT, supra note 200, at 101.
223. DOUGLASS, supra note 172, reprinted in 3 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note
20, at 336.
224. In 1720, for example, an anonymous pamphlet deplored "the distressing Circumstances
we are fallen into" because of a "want of a sufficient Medium to carry on the Trade."
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John Wise, a private currency advocate, described how scarcity of currency
led to reversion to barter and general economic stagnation.
As for the Money Medium we have none at all, its quite Exhausted;
and the Bills which have supplyed its Place, they are grown very
scarce, which is evident by the Loud Complaints of Town and
Country....
... [T]o Exchange all sorts of Commodities without a suitable
Medium will destroy Trade, and render it impracticable, as to any
great Good, or Clear Profit that will insue upon it to such a People.
For that the Inconveniencies that will attend a Common Barter
without a Medium are innumerable and intollerable.225
The chronic lack of currency and steady depreciation led to further efforts
to issue currencies through private banks, all of which were suppressed by
the government. John Colman, for example, gained notoriety advocating his
land bank proposal again during this time. In 1720, he wrote a pamphlet
criticizing the government's currency policies, which led to his arrest and
trial for disturbing the peace.226 Colman believed that the lack of currency
was creating unacceptable hardship throughout the colony. According to
Colman's pamphlet,
The Medium of Exchange, the only thing which gives life to
Business, Employs the Poor, Feeds the Hungry, and Cloaths the
Naked, is so Exhausted; that in a little time we shall not have
wherewith to Buy our Daily Bread, much less to pay our Debts or
Taxes.227
Colman emphasized the preponderance of lawsuits instituted during times
of currency hardship. Colman's focus was not the harm to creditors caused
by currency depreciation, but rather the prevalence of lawsuits that operate
unfairly on debtors in an environment of currency shortage. According to
Colman, currency scarcity leads to lawsuits because people are no longer
able to pay their debts or liquidate their assets at fair prices. Creditors,
typically facing similar problems themselves, attempt to claim what money
TRADE BY THEM, reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 44.
According to this pamphlet, economic problems increased because, "since the Invention of
Money, that method [barter] has been much laid aside; and Money has been Universally Received
& Improved as the... Medium for carrying on of Trade, between Persons & Countries." Id. at
48.
225. A WORD OF COMFORT, supra note 214, reprinted in 2 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS,
supra note 20, at 165-66.
226. Billias, supra note 203, at 5-6. See generally I DAVIS, supra note 150, at 66-69
(discussing the advocacy of private banks in the 1720s).
227. JOHN COLMAN, THE DISTRESSED STATE OF THE TOWN OF BOSTON CONSIDERED
(Boston, Nicholas Boone, Benjamin Gray & John Edwards 1720), reprinted in I COLONIAL
CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 397, 398.
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they can. Colman also protested the fines collected by judges and lawyers,
which he calls a "dead loss" to the society. According to Colman:
We find already the miserable Effects of the want of a Medium in
these Instances; besides a Torrent of other mischiefs breaking in
upon us, viz.
The vast Number of Law Suits occasioned thereby, the Courts
are open, and every Term, four or five hundred Writs (and perhaps
more) given out against good honest Housekeepers, who are as
willing to pay their Debts as their Creditors would be, and have
wherewith to Pay, but can't Raise Money, unless they will Sell
their Houses at half Value, which they have been Working hard for,
it may be these Twenty years, and so turn their Families into the
Streets; and this because they are obliged to Work for half, nay,
some for two thirds Goods, and their Creditors will take nothing but
Money; and so they are Squeezed and Oppress'd, to Maintain a few
Lawyers, and other Officers of the Courts, who grow Rich on the
Ruins of their Neighbours, while great part of the Town can hardly
get Bread to satisfie Nature; Nay, to my astonishment, I am
informed, that there a thousand Writs made out to this April Court,
in this one County, which is a scandal to the Land, to have it
spoken. And then, I am perswaded that the Charges of the Courts in
this County is Six Thousand Pounds per Annum; and this pays no
Debt, but is a dead Loss to People, and brings them farther in Debt,
and makes them the less able to support either Church or State. 28
Other commentators emphasized that currency scarcity provides
opportunities for creditors to abuse debtors:
Among the innumerable exorbitant Mischiefs which arise from the
want of some proper Medium of Exchange .... [is] a Multiplicity
of Law-Suits, to the enriching a few luxuriant Cut-throats, and
reducing many honest, frugal, industrious Familys to Beggary, and
many more to the very precipice of Ruin, unless speedy Relief
intervene. 29
The next Section looks at the currency history of Massachusetts during
the period from 1726 to 1751 in more detail.
228. Id. at 398-99. Colman was arrested upon publication of this pamphlet.
229. NEw NEWS FROM ROBINSON CRUSO'S ISLAND (n.p. 1720), reprinted in 2 COLONIAL
CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 127, 129.
2001] 1367
The Yale Law Journal
B. The Currency Crises of the 1720s and 1730s and Their Resolution
As shown in Figure 2, Massachusetts's currency steadily depreciated
after 1720. Historical accounts suggest that, although economic conditions
were poor throughout, there were three distinct currency "crises," in each
of which citizens were forced to resort to barter: 1726 to 1727, 1733 to
1734, and, in particular, the period from 1738 to 1741. This Section reviews
that history.230 The subsequent Part shows the effects of these currency
crises on litigation in Plymouth County, Massachusetts.
In 1726, a credit crisis in England propelled English creditors to
pressure New England merchants to pay all overdue accounts.231 The New
England merchants with debts to England, in turn, pressured their debtors to
pay outstanding debts and thereby increased the general demand for bills of
credit. The currency shortage was exacerbated by the fact that a substantial
portion of a £100,000 issue of 1716 that was circulated by means of loans
to individuals became due in May of 1727.232 Currency scarcity became so
extreme that the Massachusetts General Court authorized payment of taxes
in commodity money on a colony-wide basis in 1727. Colonial citizens
were permitted to pay in any of twenty-three types of goods.233
To remedy the currency shortage, the colonial assembly adopted a
lenient approach toward redeeming outstanding currency issues and
authorized further issues in large volumes. The assembly, for example,
failed to require total redemption of the bills loaned out in 1716 .2' Then, in
1728, the government issued £60,000 in bills of credit, circulated by means
of loans through the town loan offices, as well as £48,000 in bills to cover
government operational expenses and salaries. 235 Despite the severe
currency scarcity of just a year before, leaving the 1716 bills outstanding
and issuing new bills in 1728 caused a depreciation of the currency.
Creditors, perhaps for the first time, began to fear intensely that currency
depreciation would allow debtors to pay less in real terms than they had
contracted to pay. The depreciation of the currency also meant that court
fees were reduced in real terms. Reduced court fees gave debtors a greater
incentive to delay payment and to allow creditors to sue and obtain a
judgment against them before paying their debts.
230. I am grateful to Ronald Michener for his comments and suggestions relating to the
chronology presented in this Section.
231. Joseph A. Ernst, "The Labourers Have Been the Greatest Sufferers": The Truck System
in Early Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in MERCHANT CREDIT AND LABOUR STRATEGIES IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 16, 19 (Rosemary E. Ommer ed., 1990).
232. 1 DAVIS, supra note 150, at 107. As of 1726, there was £358,140 total in Massachusetts
bills of credit in circulation. BROCK, supra note 14, at 591 tbl.2.
233. 1 DAVIS, supra note 150, at 108.
234. Id. at 107.
235. Id. at 106.
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Then in 1730, Jonathan Belcher236 was appointed Governor of
Massachusetts with directions to reform Massachusetts's currency for the
benefit of English creditors. The English Board of Trade almost
immediately sent him a Royal Instruction to retire all bills of credit in the
colony over an eleven-year period. All bills of credit currently circulating
were to "be called in and sunk according to the periods and provisions of
the respective acts by which they were issued."237 No more than £30,000 in
bills were to be issued in any year, and no bills were to remain outstanding
after 1741 .238 After 1741, Massachusetts was to return to the use of gold and
silver coins. The Instructions also required that every act passed by the
assembly authorizing the issuance of any bills of credit beyond £30,000
include a suspending clause.239 Suspending clauses "suspended" the
operation of an act until it received approval and confirmation in England,
in this case, by the Board of Trade.
The 1730 Instruction represented a radical change in policy. To comply
with the Instruction would have required the Massachusetts government to
tax its entire money supply out of circulation over the eleven-year period.
In 1730, £335,323 in bills of credit was circulating within the colony, 4" and
the government was consistently issuing more than £30,000 per year to pay
operational expenses. Thus, the Instruction imagined a £300,000 tax along
with a permanent budget cut.
The Board of Trade had merely advisory powers in the colonies, and its
Instructions were routinely ignored.24" ' The Board did, however, have the
power to threaten governors with dismissal. Belcher, therefore, was under
pressure to implement the Board's policies, and he vehemently urged the
House of Representatives in this direction. Although the extent to which the
Instructions would be honored was unclear, their tenor and dimension
created great uncertainty in Massachusetts.
Initially, it was widely believed that they would be strictly enforced.
According to the author of an anonymous pamphlet:
236. Jonathan Belcher was born in Massachusetts, graduated from Harvard in 1699, and had
a long political career in the colony. He won election to the Council in 1718 and sat again in 1722,
1723, and 1726. He served as the Massachusetts special agent in London from 1728 to 1730,
where he developed a belief in the importance of stabilizing the value of the colonial bills of
credit. ROBERT ZEMSKY, MERCHANTS, FARMERS, AND RIVER GODS: AN ESSAY ON
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN POLITICS 102-03 (1971).
237. Call in Certain Bills of Credit (1730), reprinted in I LABAREE, supra note 55, at 220.
See generally I DAVIS, supra note 150, at 111-51 (describing the Royal Instructions and
subsequent attempts to enforce their provisions in the period from 1730 to 1741).
238. Massachusetts Restricted to £30,000 Currency (1730), reprinted in I LABAREE, supra
note 55, at 220-21.
239. See id. at 221.
240. BROCK, supra note 14, at 591 tbl.2.
241. EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-89, at 11 (3d ed. 1992).
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[The Instructions] seem'd to afford a promising Prospect, among
other Regulations of the Bills, that the great Quantity of 'em then
outstanding beyond their stated Periods would be soon drawn in,
and those Bills, whose Periods were not yet arriv'd, would be duly
call'd in and sunk upon their Arrival; and that now an End would
be put to the several Mischiefs, which had been occasion'd by the
late Law, which made the Bills a Tender ... 242
The Board of Trade and Governor aside, however, Representatives felt an
opposite pressure to allow more bills to remain outstanding. Indeed, the
immediate effect of the Instructions was to initiate a prolonged battle
between the colonial assembly and the Governor over the extent to which
they should be enforced.243 The assembly petitioned the Privy Council in
England in 1731, and again in 1732, for retraction of the Instructions, and
introduced supply bills (resembling a budget) requiring more than £30,000
in new bills of credit to be issued.2" The Governor, meanwhile, continued
to insist that the Instructions be followed. These political battles led to a
perplexing result: For almost three years the treasury was shut down and
there were few new currency issues. More specifically, in the three years
after Belcher's arrival, only £19,000 in bills of credit were issued for
general expenses, and £13,900 to pay the salaries of the Governor and
assembly members.245
The assembly, however, had control over appropriations and refused to
retire many of the outstanding bills of credit through taxation. According to
Hutchinson, instead of taxing or redeeming the bills according to dates
established at issuance, the House "suffered one year after another to pass
with light taxes and laid heavy burdens upon distant years .... 24' Not
redeeming the bills of credit according to the schedule established when
they were issued immediately lowered their value. It also reduced the value
of all other bills of credit in circulation because it generated uncertainty as
to whether the government would retire bills on schedule in the future. The
failure of the government in 1731, 1732, and 1733 to issue substantial
quantities of new bills, combined with the decision to leave in circulation
242. ENQUIRY, supra note 190, reprinted in 4 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note
20, at 160.
243. These tensions are discussed in 1 DAVIS, supra note 150, at 116-21.
244. Id. at 115-17.
245. Id. at 116.
246. 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 287. Hutchinson explained the context of the 1733
monetary problems as follows:
In 1733 there was a general complaint throughout the four governments of New-
England of the unusual scarcity of money. There was as large a sum current in bills of
credit as ever, but the bills having depreciated they answered the purposes of money to
much less in proportion. The Massachusetts and New-Hampshire [governments] were
clogged with royal instructions.
Id. at 288-89.
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bills scheduled to be retired, led to severe currency scarcity and tightened
credit conditions247 as well as severe currency depreciation248 in 1733 and in
the beginning of 1734.
Adherence to the Royal Instructions, however, became even more
complicated by problems caused by Rhode Island's currency policies.
Because Rhode Island was not subject to similar Instructions, it was able to
issue bills of credit far beyond its need. 249 Rhode Island bills flooded into
Massachusetts.250 Many in Massachusetts argued that enforcement of the
Instructions would simply cause greater reliance on Rhode Island bills and
have no positive effect on Massachusetts's currency. Indeed, many believed
that the Instructions were causing Massachusetts residents to subsidize
Rhode Island's spending: Rhode Island's government used its bills of credit
to finance its operations and to loan to its residents, but the diffusion of the
bills throughout New England externalized the costs of Rhode Island's
currency depreciation. In addition, Rhode Island's currency expansion
allowed its residents to lend money to Massachusetts residents at a profit.
According to an anonymous 1736 pamphlet, "the Interest of their [Rhode
Island's] Money out on Loan pays the whole Charge of the Government,
247. Samuel Mather's 1734 letter to the Weekly Journal, for example, explained that currency
scarcity led initially to an increase in credit agreements, but that sustained scarcity led to default
on those agreements. According to Mather,
Every one knows that Money is necessary for the carrying on of Trade: And common
Experience has convinced us of this Government that where Money fails we cannot
well buy. T'is true Credit may supply the Defect of it to some small Degree for a little
while. But what is Credit? It is only the Expectation of Money within some certain
limited time: If therefore the Money is not to be had at the end of the term prefixed,
What must become of the Credit? It must necessarily and inevitably sink: Nor will ever
so many Acts at all avail to Support it.
[Samuel Mather], To the Publisher of the Weekly Journal (Feb. 4, 1734), reprinted in 3 COLONIAL
CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 21, 21-22.
248. Mather's letter also deplored the depreciating state of Massachusetts currency resulting
from the Government's failure to call in the bills of credit according to schedule:
The fatal Effects of the Depreciation of our present nominal Money ... are many:
These are some of them, that the Prices of Things are by means of this at the utmost
Disorder & Confusion; that the Landlord and Creditor are defrauded of what they
contracted for and is their just Due, because their Tenants and Debtors Pay
considerably less Silver than what was at the time of Bargaining agreed for; that many
Widows and Orphans, whose Revenues were competent and equal to their Support, can
now scarcely subsist with them; that the poor Country Ministers have not the Salaries
which by Contract is their Due; that the Day Labourer has not his full Wages; and, in
fine, that many Officers in the Service of the Government have scanty and miserable
Allowances in Comparison with what they had formerly: These are a few of the
innumerable Mischiefs, which have fallen out in this Government thro' the Want of a
good Regulation and an invariable Establishment of Money; Or, in one Word, because
we have no lawful Money among us.
Id. at 24-25. Many pamphlets from this time refer to the harm that depreciating currency caused to
those on salary, such as government officials, ministers and widows, who survived on fixed-sum
estates. See I DAVIS, supra note 150, at 91-95.
249. 1 DAVIS, supra note 150, at 123.
250. See 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 289.
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while we [Massachusetts] are loaded with Taxes."' 25 1 According to
Hutchinson, the influx of Rhode Island bills meant that, even though
Massachusetts residents were paying back their "debts" each year that bills
were recalled, they still could not import any more silver to use in trade
with the British.252
The currency uncertainty increased when, in 1733, a group of
prominent merchants in Massachusetts formed a bank and issued £110,000
in promissory notes redeemable over a ten-year period in silver at a fixed
rate of nineteen shillings per ounce.253 The bank's founders hoped that the
notes, called "Merchant's Notes," would provide an alternative to Rhode
Island's bills 254 and "prevent the Oppression which almost ever
accompanies a Trade by Barter," 255 which they feared would be the result
of the current impass at the treasury, and of future compliance with the
Instructions. The Merchant's Notes did not, however, stabilize the
Massachusetts money supply. Because they were redeemable in silver at a
fixed rate, they were hoarded as a protection against inflation, and
Massachusetts notes were dumped by Merchant's Note holders.256
Then, according to Hutchinson, "[a]bout the same time" as the
issuance of the Merchant's Notes, the impass at the Treasury was resolved.
Belcher and the colonial assembly authorized the issuance of bills of credit
to pay the general operational expenses from the years 1731, 1732, and
2571733 at one time. 5 The combined effect of the government's failure to
retire bills of credit on schedule, the influx of Rhode Island bills, the
increases in the money supply attributable to the Merchant's Notes, and the
new issue of three years of government debts, was to begin a cycle of
steadily increasing depreciation. According to Hutchinson, "every creditor
was defrauded of about one third of his just dues." "
As shown in Figure 2, the problem of depreciation became worse after
1735. In 1736, Thomas Hutchinson deemed this depreciation close to theft;
all people on salary and all who had entered contracts were losing money,
251. THE MELANCHOLY STATE OF THIS PROVINCE CONSIDERED, IN A LETrER, FROM A
GENTLEMAN IN BOSTON TO His FRIEND IN THE COUNTRY (n.p. 1736) [hereinafter THE
MELANCHOLY STATE], reprinted in 3 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 135,
145.
252. 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 289.
253. See NASH, supra note 203, at 138.
254. The group agreed not to use Rhode Island bills or accept them in payment, although the
agreement was breached within a short time. See 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 289.
255. To the Author of the Weekly Rehearsal, supra note 214, reprinted in 3 COLONIAL
CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 67; see also Extract of a Letter to a Gentleman in a
Neighboring Government, Concerning the New Notes of Hand (Jan. 14, 1734), in 3 COLONIAL
CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 3, 3-15 (describing the reasoning behind the Merchant's
Notes).
256. See NASH, supra note 203, at 139.
257. 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 289.
258. ,d.
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particularly because of the government's lack of an effective response to
the problem of Rhode Island bills. Hutchinson argued that "every Person
who has debts out of a long standing, has lost more by the falling of the
Money, than the ordinary profits in Trade will countervail." According to
Hutchinson:
[T]he Government is the Guarantee that all just & legal Contracts
shall be perform'd; but with us they are daily broken, & necessarily
will be so, whilst our Money continues in its present fluctuating
Circumstances.259
The most serious currency crisis of the first half of the eighteenth
century, however, occurred during the period from 1738 to 1741. In 1737,
Governor Belcher was reprimanded by the Board of Trade for assenting to
three acts within the space of seven months that authorized the reissuance
of more than £106,000 in bills of credit that were to have been retired. 6 '
Belcher was informed that his position as Governor was at risk if he failed
to comply with Instructions to recall the bills. 26' The Board of Trade also
insisted again that every act authorizing currency issues beyond £30,000
include a suspending clause, to ensure that the Board would be able to deny
approval for all large currency issues. 262 This reprimand marks a turning
point: The Board of Trade made it clear that it would demand compliance
with what was now a 1742 deadline to redeem all outstanding bills. This
meant that between 1738 and 1742 over £200,000 in bills would have to be
retired through taxation. 63
Still pressured by the assembly, Belcher's solution was to limit the
issues of bills of credit to £30,000 a year, but to increase the value of the
bills in real terms. In 1737 and 1738, the government issued what were
named "New Tenour" bills. They were of higher value than the "old
tenour" bills because the government promised to redeem them in gold and
silver in 1742.2" The purpose of the New Tenour bills was to create a more
stable circulating medium. The government, however, mistakenly
undervalued them in relation to gold and silver and they were immediately
259. A LETTER TO A MEMBER OF TIE HONOURABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON THE
PRESENT STATE OF THE BILLS OF CREDIT (Boston, n.p. 1736), in 3 COLONIAL CURRENCY
REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 150, 160-61.
260. See Observe Instructions Restricting Bills of Credit (1737), reprinted in I LABAREE,
supra note 55, at 221-22.
261. Id. at 222.
262. Id.
263. ZEMSKY, supra note 236, at 115.
264. Letter from William Shirley to the Lords of Trade (Jan. 24, 1742), in I
CORRESPONDENCE OF WILLIAM SHIRLEY, GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS AND MILITARY
COMMANDER IN AMERICA, 1731-1760, at 95-96 (Charles Henry Lincoln ed., AMS Press 1973)
(1912).
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hoarded. William Shirley, who replaced Belcher as Governor of
Massachusetts in 1741, later informed the Lords of Trade:
These Bills, which were the only Bills of Credit in the province
redeemable with Silver and Gold, were at the very time of their
Emission depreciated above 33 P Cent. both in publick and private
payments by means of some Mistakes in the before mentioned
Acts... insomuch that before the end of the year 1739 private
persons began to hoard 'em up for the Advantage of exchanging
'em at the Treasury, after December 1742 ....265
In 1738, the economic "crisis" caused by the changes in the currency
policies began. Bills of credit began to be retired through taxation in large
quantities. This heavy taxation continued for the next four years.
Hutchinson commented that "the last year, 1741, had more laid upon it than
any of the four or five preceding years . . and.., it was deemed an
insupportable burden."26 The New Tenour bills were "hoarded up" and
out of general use. Reversion to barter became inescapable.
2 67
Even the influx of Rhode Island bills appears to have been inadequate.
According to one commentator: "But so great is the Want of Money among
us, that as bad as these Rhode-Island Bills are, [those who have outstanding
bonds in Massachusetts Bills], would gladly accept these Rhode-Island
Bills in Lieu of them, but can't get their Pay in any Sort of Bills.""26 A
second account, however, suggests that the bills of credit in circulation did
not solve the currency problem because they were so depreciated and their
value so unstable. William Douglass, a physician and a prominent anti-
paper-money polemicist, wrote in 1738:
The principal Design of a Currency or Medium of Trade, is to avoid
the Inconveniencies of Barter: Paper Currency in large Quantities
does not answer this End; because of its Fluctuation, or rather
progressive less Value; which obliges the Merchant at length to
return to Barter again, as being safe and better.269
265. Id.
266. 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 287.
267. See, e.g., RICHARD FRY, A SCHEME FOR A PAPER CURRENCY (n.p. 1739), in 3
COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 255, 255-56; A LETER FROM A COUNTRY
GENTLEMAN AT BOSTON TO HIS FRIENDS IN THE COUNTRY (n.p. 1740), reprinted in 4 COLONIAL
CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 27, 30; A LE'ITER RELATING TO A MEDIUM OF TRADE
(Boston, New Printing-Office 1739), reprinted in 4 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note
20, at 3, 4-5.
268. A PROPOSAL To SUPPLY THE TRADE WITH A MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE (Boston, n.p.
1737) [hereinafter A PROPOSAL], reprinted in 3 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20,
at 163, 171.
269. [WILLIAM DOUGLAS], AN ESSAY CONCERNING SILVER AND PAPER CURRENCIES,
MORE ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE BRITISH COLONIES IN NEW-ENGLAND (Boston, S.
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There is voluminous evidence of the scarcity of money in this period.
Laborers complained of being paid solely in "shop notes," limiting their
expenditures to a particular shop, and a narrow set of goods.27 Even
creditors and employers complained about "truck" practices. According to
a 1740 pamphlet:
[Tihe most laborious and industrious among us... have been
greatly distressed by Means of the Want of a Sufficiency of Bills:
by having their Debts postponed; by being obliged to take Goods
(and in a much greater Degree of Quantity and Fineness than their
Inclinations or Circumstances required) in lieu of Bills ... and in
fine, by being put under a Necessity of pursuing a despicable
Trucking (and naturally a cheating) Trade.27" '
In 1739, the House of Representatives approved Boxford's constable's
plea that the town be allowed to accept certificates for hemp and flax as
taxation in place of money.272 W.T. Baxter's examination of the Hancock
family's business papers also reveals the extent to which the currency crisis
affected businesses in Boston. In 1740, Thomas Hancock wrote, "[I]f I can
raise Cash, which name is almost unknown among us, Such Times New
England never see before, for years past I could Sooner raise £500 or £1000
at a pinch than £100 now . . "273 According to the Hancock records, the
economic crisis beginning in 1737 decreased demand for trade goods in the
colonies, leading to stagnation in English trade and making credit difficult
to obtain.274
Colonial citizens also complained that currency scarcity led to further
debt litigation. According to a 1739 letter addressed to the General Court by
Richard Fry, who was then serving a prison sentence for debt, the colony
needed
Kneeland & T. Green 1738), reprinted in 3 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at
217, 225-26.
270. See 1 DAVIS, supra note 150, at 93-95; see also Ernst, supra note 231, passim
(describing how the history of the movement protesting the "truck" system-payments to wage
laborers in credit, such as in shop notes-related to the "currency question" throughout the first
half of the eighteenth century). Ernst describes how wage laborers were particularly interested in
the currency question because currency scarcity often meant that they would be paid in shop
notes. This practice was condemned as unfair to laborers, and as requiring excessive purchase of
goods imported from England.
271. AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND USES OF MONEY (Boston, S. Kneeland & T. Green
1740), reprinted in 3 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 365, 387.
272. 17 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1739-1740, at
200 (Mass. Historical Soc'y 1940).
273. BAXTER, supra note 69, at 79 (quoting Thomas Hancock's Letter Book entry for Aug. 2,
1740).
274. See id. at 45-75.
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[rielief under their present difficult and distressing Circumstances,
for want of a sufficient Medium; whereby the Trade and Business
of the Town is very much decayed, Low-Suits increased, and Cash
to purchase the Necessaries of life hard to be attained, even by
many of good Estates among them. 75
In the 1739 and 1740 House of Representatives sessions, House
members appealed to the Governor that, because the " [b]urthen already laid
on this and the two succeeding Years, are equal if not beyond the People's
Ability," calling in the bills according to the Instructions would "bring on
the greatest Oppression on Multitudes, Stagnation of our Trade, and the
terrible Consequences of publick Confusion." People were "groaning
under heavy Burthens and distressing Difficulties."276 Fears of economic
distress grew with the approach of 1742, when all outstanding bills were to
be recalled. The journals of the House of Representatives show that House
members were extremely concerned about the problems their constituents
faced. Trade increasingly occurred through barter. The currency that existed
was of low value. To comply with the Royal Instructions, the tax burden
would have to increase each year until 1742. There was a growing
resentment about the requirement that the Board of Trade give prior
approval for new currency issues. Representatives took action and began
accepting proposals for currency reform. In June 1739, it was argued in the
House that
there is a great scarcity of Bills of Credit, which are the only
Medium of Commerce among us, and in as much as those Bills
only which may be issued for the necessary Support of His
Majesty's Government here, can by no Means be a sufficient
Supply for carrying on the Trade and Business of this Province,
which must therefore be brought under great Declensions unless
some further Expedient can be found. 77
The House voted to accept "any Scheme or Proposals from any Persons
whomsoever for the furnishing a further Medium of Trade, in such Way
and Manner as that the Value thereof may be maintained." 278
The vote to solicit proposals for new currencies deepened tensions
between the Representatives and the Governor. The Governor insisted that
"His Majesty has given this Instruction, in his Royal Grace and Wisdom,
from a real Regard to the true Welfare and Prosperity of His good Subjects
275. FRY, supra note 267, at 255-56 (emphasis added).
276. 17 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1739-1740, supra note 272, at 125-
26.
277. Id. at 79.
278. Id.
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of this Province" and that advocacy to ignore the Instructions "is owing to
a desire of keeping out a great quantity of Paper Currency, rather than to the
Disabilities of the People." 279 House members responded by arguing that
the Instructions directly violated Massachusetts's Charter, which permitted
the government to determine its own public finance policies. According to a
letter presented by the House to the Board of Trade,
besides this inextricable Difficulty as to paying their Debts, arising
by this Instruction, it also... seems contrary to that Power given
them by the Royal Charter, to make such Laws in the raising
Money, and Ways and Means for the discharging the publick
Debts, as the General Court shall think from time to time to be for
the Good and Welfare of this your Majesty's Province, and the
People inhabiting the same."' °
Tensions escalated when two proposals were presented to the House to
establish private banks that would issue bills of credit to replace the
Massachusetts currency. A proposal for a Land Bank was endorsed by 395
people from sixty-four towns around the colony.' The proposal sought to
issue £150,000 in New Tenour values, secured by land mortgages and
personal property. A set of mostly wealthy Boston merchants proposed a
"Silver Bank," which would issue £120,000, redeemable in silver after
fifteen years.282 Neither plan received government approval. Nevertheless,
both schemes were put into effect in 1740 and began issuing bills.283
The Land Bank and the Silver Bank became the focus of political
controversy in Massachusetts. 2 4 Generally speaking, merchants supported
the Silver Bank and vehemently opposed the Land Bank.28' The Land Bank
had tremendous popular support and was viewed as a legitimate remedy to
an urgent problem.28 6 Threatened by the Board of Trade and pressured by
English and New England merchants, Belcher exercised his authority as
279. Id. at 149-50.
280. Id. at 151.
281. Billias, supra note 203, at9.
282. Id. at 10.
283. Id. at 12-13.
284. It is beyond the scope of this Article to describe the histories of the Land and Silver
Banks in detail. For information on the Banks, see JOHN L. BROOKE, THE HEART OF THE
COMMONWEALTH: SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN WORCESTER COUNTY,
MASSACHUSETIS, 1713-1861, at 55-128 (1989); 2 DAVIS, supra note 150, at 130-67; NASH,
supra note 203, at 212-16; Billias, supra note 203, passim; and Andrew McFarland Davis,
Provincial Banks: Land and Silver (1895), reprinted in 3 PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL
SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS 2-40 (1900). For Thomas Hutchinson's critique of the Land Bank,
see 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 298-308. For more detailed discussion of the political
repercussions of the Land Bank controversy, see Billias, supra note 203, at 32-42.
285. Davis, supra note 284, at 15-16, 22-24. The debate over the Land Bank can be followed
in the pages of the Boston News-Letter during the summer and autumn of 1740 and the early
issues of 1741.
286. Billias, supra note 203, at 15.
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Governor by taking action against government officials who supported the
Land Bank. On November 5 and 6, 1740, he issued proclamations stating
that any government official or military officer who received or passed a
Land Bank bill or gave encouragement to the Land Bank would be
dismissed from office.28 7 In response, in November and December of 1740,
Samuel Adams, Sr. (father of the famous revolutionary), William Stoddard,
Robert Hale, and John Choate resigned from their positions as Justices of
the Peace and were officially dismissed by Belcher."' Nine Massachusetts
military officers resigned voluntarily on December 29, 1740.289 By January
3, 1741, Belcher had dismissed seven other Justices of the Peace for
receiving and passing Land Bank bills. 9 Going further, the Governor
ordered military officials to investigate whether their subordinates were
involved with the Bank and required Justices of the Peace to prevent the use
of Land Bank bills as judicial remedies.291 On January 27, 1741, the
Governor and Legislative Council extended the prohibition on use of Land
Bank bills to all lawyers.292
Meanwhile, the number of subscribers to the Land Bank grew to 920,293
Land Bank bills went into general circulation, and many towns agreed to
accept Land Bank bills in payment of taxes. 294 Despite the Governor's
efforts, in 1741 Land Bank supporters picked up seats on local boards of
selectmen throughout Massachusetts295 and gained a majority of both the
Massachusetts House of Representatives and the Assembly.296
287. Davis, supra note 284, at 19.
288. See PAPERS AND RECORDS RELATING TO THE LAND BANK OF 1740, IN THE
MASSACHUSETTS ARCHIVES AND SUFFOLK COURT FILES, in 4 PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL
SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 284, at I (providing dates of resignations and
dismissals of Massachusetts's Justices of the Peace in connection with the Land Bank affairs);
Davis, supra note 284, at 19-22 (describing the resignations and dismissals of the Justices of the
Peace favoring the Land Bank).
289. Davis, supra note 284, at 20.
290. See id. at 19-20.
291. Id. at 20-21.
292. The Governor's proclamation reads:
Voted, That no person shall be admitted to appear and plead before this Board as an
attorney and counsellor at law, on any pretence whatever, who shall pass, receive, or
give encouragement to the bills called the Land Bank or Manufactory Bills ....
Id. at 22.
293. 2 DAVIS, supra note 150, at 292-93; see also id. at 295-313 (listing the names of all
Land Bank partners).
294. See BROOKE, supra note 284, at 61 (describing how, in 1741, Mendon, Hardwick,
Brookfield, and Leicester agreed to accept Land Bank bills for town charges).
295. Id. at 61-62 (describing how Land Bankers were elected to seats in town governments in
1741 but "rarely retained a dominant position in subsequent years").
296. According to Thomas Hutchinson, "by far the majority of the representatives for 1740
were subscribers to or favorers of the [land bank] scheme, and they have since been distinguished
by the name of the land bank house." 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 300; see Davis, supra




On March 27, 1741, however, Parliament dealt a legislative blow to the
Land Bank by applying the Bubble Act of 1720 to the colonies.297 The
Bubble Act had been enacted to prevent speculative financial ventures in
England by prohibiting joint-stock ventures. Most contemporaries believed
that the Act's provisions were not applicable to the Land Bank, because it
was not strictly a joint-stock company.2 8  Nonetheless, Parliament's
extension of the Bubble Act to the colonies gave the opponents of the Land
Bank sufficient legal support to suppress the Bank.
Parliament's extension of the Bubble Act provided legal justification
for Belcher's earlier repressive measures. In August 1741, however, he was
replaced by William Shirley, a longstanding Massachusetts resident and a
respected politician. 9 Shirley took a more sympathetic approach towards
the Land Bank. He restored many subscribers to their public offices and
accepted their nominations to the Council. 0 Parliament meanwhile sought
to suppress the Land Bank more directly. Parliament ordered Shirley to
enforce the provisions of the Bubble Act that required redemption of
outstanding Land Bank bills at full value. This order proved devastating to
Land Bank subscribers. Land Bank bills had been sold at a fifty-percent
discount. The holders of the bills sought to redeem them at heavy costs to
subscribers.3"' Samuel Adams, Sr., for example, lost much of his estate as a
consequence.
The Land Bank episode led to growing distrust and hostility towards
British policies.30 2 Indeed, there are strong links between the Land Bank
crisis and the American Revolution. Sam Adams's career as a
297. Billias, supra note 203, at 15; Davis, supra note 284, at 26-29.
298. Historians have interpreted the Bubble Act as inapplicable to the colonies, making it
irrelevant to the legality of the Land Bank. According to Billias, "[t]he Land Bank could hardly
be construed as coming under the scope of the old Bubble Act.... Moreover, in two earlier
decisions the British government had made it quite clear that the issuance of paper money by
private persons in the colonies was legal." Billias, supra note 203, at 15. According to Davis,
The pretence that the Bubble Act originally applied to the Colonies was more than
absurd, it was wicked; and the language of the preamble of the Act of 1741 practically
recognizes that fact .... More than that, the Attorney-General himself had filed an
opinion which might have been quoted to show that what was then being done had been
pronounced to be legal by the highest counsel in the realm.
Davis, supra note 284, at 29.
299. See BENJAMIN LYNDE, JR., THE DIARtES OF BENJAMIN LYNDE AND OF BENJAMIN
LYNDE JR. 114 (photo. reprint Cambridge, Riverside Press n.d.) (1880). Belcher was ultimately
dismissed because he was suspected of complacency toward the Land Bank and disloyalty toward
England. According to Thomas Hutchinson, Belcher's opponents deceptively portrayed him as
disloyal: Belcher was dismissed after a false accusation that he failed fully to suppress the Land
Bank because his brother-in-law had spoken out in favor of the Land Bank. 2 HUTCHINSON, supra
note 154, at 303.
300. Billias, supra note 203, at 37.
301. See 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 300-02; Billias, supra note 203, at 38-40.
302. According to the historian John Schutz, "[w]hen Jonathan Belcher was recalled from the
governorships of Massachusetts and New Hampshire in 1741, the provinces were nearly in
revolution." John A. Schutz, Succession Politics in Massachusetts, 1730-1741, 1958 WM. &
MARY Q. 508, 508.
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revolutionary, for example, began with his resistance during the resolution
of Land Bank affairs. One biographer has argued that the currency crisis led
Adams to write his 1743 master's thesis at Cambridge, entitled, "'Whether
it be lawful to resist the Supreme Magistrate, if the Commonwealth cannot
be otherwise preserved.' [Samuel Adams] fearlessly maintained the
affirmative... "'303 According to Hutchinson, Sam Adams "first made
himself conspicuous" upon his father's death in 1748 when the police,
under order of execution, attempted to seize and to put up for public auction
several buildings on his father's estate in order to repay alleged debts still
outstanding from the Land Bank. Adams harassed both the auctioneers and
the potential buyers of the estate with such vehemence that the auction was
called off, which increased his notoriety as a staunch advocate of colonial
liberties.3" As mentioned earlier, John Adams viewed the British
suppression of the Land Bank as more offensive to the citizens of
Massachusetts than the Stamp Act.3"5
As will be described in greater detail in Part IV, the monetary crisis of
the period from 1738 to 1741 led to the highest levels of debt litigation in
the first half of the eighteenth century. Soon after Shirley's appointment as
Governor, he and the colonial assembly enacted two statutes aimed at
quelling the litigation crisis. The first statute rejected the common-law
nominalism doctrine by requiring all courts to adjust their judgments in
accordance with an inflation schedule.3" The statute required that the
schedule would be recalculated and adjusted every six months to
correspond to changes in the value of outstanding currency.3 7 In theory,
creditors would no longer suffer from depreciation of the bills of credit.
According to Shirley,
Justices of his Majy's Courts in every County within the Province,
who are required to proceed by them as their Rule in making up
Judgments for all Debts and Dues to be contracted after the last
Day of March 1742 ... and in case it shall appear by those
Valuations that the Bills are depreciated since the Debt was
contracted then the Judges are bound to make up Judgment for the
303. 1 WILLIAM V. WELLS, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF SAMUEL ADAMS to & n.*
(2d ed., New York, Books for Library Press 1865).
304. Hutchinson writes that Adams became famous for attending the public auction, where he
threatened to bring an action against the sheriff and menaced any potential purchasers, thereby
preventing the sale of the estate, which was viewed as advancing the cause of liberty. 3
HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 212; see also WELLS, supra note 303, at 25-29 (discussing the
impact of the suppression of the Land Bank on Sam Adams's career as a revolutionary, and
reprinting correspondence with respect to the attempt to possess Adams's father's estate).
305. Supra text accompanying note 29.
306. An Act To Ascertain the Value of Money (1742), reprinted in 3 THE ACTS AND
RESOLVES PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETrS BAY, supra note 163, at
1083-85.
307. Id. at 1084.
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true value of the Debt in Silver, or in want thereof for the nominal
value of the Debt in Province Bills with an Addition of so much
more in those Bills as will make the Creditor amends for the
depreciating of 'em since the time of the Debts being contracted."'
The Plymouth Court Records show an adjustment of judgments to
compensate for inflation beginning in May of 1742."0
The second statutory response to the litigation crisis was to increase all
court fees.31 The costs of litigation, generally speaking, create a
disincentive to sue and to allow oneself to be sued. The court fees in
Massachusetts had been reduced in absolute terms in proportion to the
depreciation of the currency. Lower court fees gave debtors a greater
incentive to delay payment of their debts, and to allow creditors to obtain
judgments against them, in order to benefit from depreciating currency.
Increasing court fees was therefore a natural way to reduce debtors' use of
legal process in this manner.3 '
A surprising external development, however, reduced the importance of
these statutes. War broke out between France and England in the spring of
1744. Massachusetts organized and led a large-scale, and ultimately
successful, attack on the French fort at Louisburgh. To encourage this
attack, the Board of Trade reversed its policy regarding redemption of the
Massachusetts currency. On September 9, 1744, the Board of Trade
formally retracted its requirement that all acts authorizing currency issues
include a suspending clause and permitted Shirley "in cases of
emergencies" to give his consent " to such acts as may be necessary for the
supply of the treasury... with bills of public credit during the continuance
of the present war.''3'2 In 1744 and 1745, Massachusetts began issuing bills
308. Letter from William Shirley to the Lords of Trade (Mar. 19, 1742), in 1
CORRESPONDENCE OF WILLIAM SHIRLEY, supra note 264, at 102 (emphasis added). There have
been varying accounts of how broadly and how successfully the Act was implemented. For a
discussion of details pertaining to the enactment and enforcement of the Act, see I DAVIS, supra
note 150, at 172-202. According to Thomas Hutchinson, "[Tihe councellors appointed to estimate
the depreciation never had firmness enough in any instance to make the full allowance, but when
silver and exchange had rose 20 per cent. or more, an addition was made of 4 or 5 only." 2
HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 307.
309. 6 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, supra note 77, at 312.
310. An Act for Establishing and Better Regulating Fees Within This Province (1742),
reprinted in 3 THE ACTS AND RESOLVES PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OF THE PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY, supra note 164, at 13-18.
311. For further discussion of colonial court fees and their impact on the timing of litigation,
see Priest, supra note 24, at 2430-33.
312. Massachusetts Bills of Credit During War (1744), reprinted in I LABAREE, supra note
55, at 224. According to Hutchinson, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives, once
Massachusetts began organizing its seizure of Louisburgh:
Nothing further was heard of the royal instruction against bills of credit. Such sums as
the service called for and to be redeemed at such periods as the house thought proper
were consented to by the governor. It soon appeared that these sums would vastly
exceed what had been computed, and many declared that had a right estimate been
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of credit at a much greater rate than before to finance wartime expenditures.
According to Hutchinson, two to three million pounds in bills of credit were
issued during the war, and the bills "had so much depreciated that, at the
end of the war, eleven or twelve hundred pounds was not equal to more
than an hundred pounds sterling." 3'
As described in Part IV, the volume of litigation declined dramatically
once the war started. The mobilization of men for the war is one likely
reason why debt litigation declined. A second reason is that the inflation
was so severe that credit became unavailable. According to Hutchinson,
"for some time, even for English goods, which ordinarily sell for the
longest credit, no body pretended to ask credit." 3 4
After the war, the Massachusetts currency underwent a transformation
of monumental proportions. The English government was expected to
reimburse Massachusetts for its Louisburgh expedition with £180,000
English Sterling. Thomas Hutchinson, now Speaker of the House, proposed
that the government use the Sterling to return to a hard-money system.315 As
shown in Figure 2, and as described by Hutchinson above, by 1749,
Massachusetts's bills of credit were so depreciated that between ten to
eleven Massachusetts pounds equaled one pound Sterling. Hutchinson
argued that by exchanging the bills at a rate of eleven to one, £180,000
Sterling would be close to sufficient to draw in all of the bills. The rest
could be drawn in through a series of minor taxes.
31 6
Many initially opposed the plan, viewing the move to hard money as a
means for the wealthy to gain at the public's expense. A second opposition
group, led by William Douglass, a longstanding opponent of paper money,
proposed that the government repay creditors for losses they suffered over
decades of depreciation by slowly increasing the value of the bills of credit,
thereby forcing debtors to pay back more in value than they owed.317
Douglass's plan was extremely unpopular and, by comparison, led to
support for the return to hard money. Even former Land Bank partners
became supporters of the return to hard currency, in their case, because they
thought that hard money after wartime depreciation would increase
made they should never have voted for the expedition, but it was now too late to go
back.
2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 315.
313. 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 333. For a schedule of amounts in bills of credit
issued in the period from 1744 to 1748, see I DAVIS, supra note 150, at 168. See also BROCK,
supra 14, at 34 (characterizing this period as the "great inflation").
314. 2 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 334.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See id. at 335. Hutchinson's criticism of Douglass's proposal was that "the creditors and
debtors would not be the same in one instance in a thousand, and where this was not the case the
injury was the same, to oblige any one to pay more as to receive less than was justly due." Id.
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credit." I The English government eventually paid Massachusetts £183,649
as war compensation, 319 and Massachusetts returned to a hard-money
system over the subsequent years. 20 All debts due after March 31, 1750,
were deemed "payable in coin'd silver only," at exchange rates with silver
coins established by the government.32" ' All new debts were to be paid in
silver "at six shillings and eightpence per ounce" and pieces of eight at six
shillings. 22
Silver and gold regained dominance.323 The English government,
however, began efforts to ensure currency stability in the future. These
efforts culminated in the Currency Act of 1751, which applied to all of New
England. The Currency Act of 1751 prohibited bills of credit from being
legal tender for the purposes of payment in any private obligations,
prohibited any extension of the redemption period for outstanding bills, and
required immediate dismissal of any governor who violated the Act.324 A
principal justification stated in the Act of 1751 was that, by making the
depreciating paper money legal tender, "all debts of late years have been
paid and satisfied with a much less value than was contracted for, which
318. Id. at 336-37.
319. BROCK, supra note 14, at 218 & n.92.
320. The transformation to a hard money system nevertheless led to further periods of
currency scarcity and economic hardship. In 1748, Thomas Hancock wrote in his letter books that
"Peace hath put a stop to all our trade" and that money had become "monstrously scarce."
BAXTER, supra note 69, at II1- 12 (quoting the papers of Thomas Hancock). Referring to the
return to a hard money system, Hancock wrote in 1750 that "This d - d Act... has turn'd all
Trade out of doors and it's Impossible to get debts in, either in Dollars or Province Bills." Id.
Moreover, Hancock complained that the move to hard money made Massachusetts's creditors lose
in relations with other colonies. According to Hancock, merchants were
greatly perplex'd in Trade, or rather none at all, & the people for debts largely to us at
Connect' R Island & N. Hampshire, tell us we must come there & take our pay in their
money, which is no better to us than oak leaves, Distress and Ruin attend this Province
if no Act to settle the others on the footing we are on, & you'l find worse Remittances
than ever you had from this country.
Id. at 112.
321. An Act for Drawing Bills of Credit (1749), reprinted in 3 ACTS AND RESOLVES PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, supra note 164, at 430-441.
322. Id. at 434.
323. The fear that only the wealthy would have access to hard money after the monetary
transformation proved unfounded. Although Hutchinson may be slightly biased on this point, he
argued:
[I]t was as easy for a frugal industrious person to obtain silver, as it had been to obtain
paper ....
... From an aversion to a silver currency, the body of the people changed in a few
months, and took an aversion to paper, though it had silver as a fund to secure the value
of it.
3 HUTCHINSON, supra note 154, at 6-7.
324. BROCK, supra note 14, at 237-39. Sometime later, the Massachusetts government issued
treasury notes, redeemable at a specified time in silver with interest, that represented the
continuation of the currency finance system. These notes, however, did not circulate as a medium
of exchange (they were an investment security), and the government meticulously enforced their
provisions. E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
FINANCE, 1776-1790, at 7, 10 (1961).
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hath been a great discouragement and prejudice to... trade and
commerce." 
325
New England's experience with currency policies in the first half of the
eighteenth century led to a qualified receptiveness to these restrictions.
Soon after the adoption of the Act of 1751, however, merchants in England
began promoting the extension of the restrictions-in particular, the
prohibition on making bills of credit a legal tender-to the middle atlantic
and southern colonies. They ultimately succeeded with the enactment of the
Currency Act of 1764.326 The Currency Act of 1764 was received with great
protest, particularly by the merchants of New York City and Philadelphia.32 7
The Act was ultimately repealed in 1774, but by that time, as the monetary
historian Leslie Brock describes, "the resentment aroused by the restraints
of the Currency Act of 1764 had already added itself to the forces operating
to widen the breach between mother country and colonies." "328
IV. A CURRENCY POLICY EXPLANATION OF TRENDS IN DEBT LITIGATION
Current legal historical scholarship advances the position that a steadily
increasing volume of debt litigation signals steady economic expansion and
commercialization in the first half of the eighteenth century. In the
modernization account, the volume of civil litigation serves as a proxy for
the outstanding number of contracts: Thus, economic development during
the first half of the eighteenth century led to an increase in the total number
of contracts, which resulted in a corresponding increase in the number of
lawsuits based on claims related to those contracts. 3 9 As has been shown,
however, both economic studies and contemporary accounts suggest that
there was little economic growth during the period; and surely not steady
economic growth. This Part shows how analysis of the complex and volatile
transition to a paper money economy can largely explain colonial litigation
trends and legal developments.
A. The Modernization Analysis of Debt Litigation Data
Figure 3 presents Bruce Mann's and Cornelia Dayton's empirical
findings. Cornelia Dayton measured debt litigation volume in decade-long
intervals in the New Haven, Connecticut, County Court and found an
325. An Act To Regulate and Restrain Paper Bills of Credit in His Majesty's Colonies
(1751), 24 Geo. 2, c. 53 (Eng.).
326. For a discussion of the tensions leading to the Currency Act of 1764, see BROCK, supra
note 14, at 465-527; and ERNST, supra note 45, at 43-88.
327. BROCK, supra note 14, at 524-25.
328. Id. at 527.
329. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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exponential increase in litigation volume over the period from 1670 to
1750.330 More particularly, she found that the debt caseload increased each
decade between 1710 and 1750 at rates ranging from 80% to 120%, which
far exceed population growth.33' To Dayton, these findings reveal a link
between increases in litigation volume and the presumably greater
economic prosperity during this period.332
FIGURE 3. CORNELIA DAYTON'S AND BRUCE MANN'S DATA:
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Sources: CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW
& SoCIETY IN CONNECTICUT, 1639-1789, at 85 tbl.2 (1995); BRUCE H. MANN,
NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT app.
tbl.I (1987).
Mann's data from the Hartford County Court show a similar general
exponential increase in litigation exceeding population growth from 1700 to
- Dayton: New Haven
S- -. -Mann: Hartford
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330. DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR, supra note 7, at 85 tbl.2.
331. See id. at 90-91 & n.38.
332. See id. at 90, 94-95.
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1740. 333 Mann used a methodology that differed slightly from Dayton's: He
calculated the number of debt cases in the first and fifth years of each
decade (the number for 1700, for example, includes the total of cases in
1700 and 1705)."' 4 He found that, over this period, the number of debt cases
increased fifteenfold, which, like Dayton, he attributes to modernization. In
contrast to Dayton's findings, however, Mann's data show a notable decline
in litigation after 1740 .3 " As mentioned above, Mann attributes the
particularly high litigation volume in 1740 to an unanticipated decline in
farm prices and a resulting high rate of loan default.336 Mann does not,
however, explain his statistical finding of a subsequent decline in debt
litigation volume after 1740. The decline in litigation volume would be
consistent with Mann's theory only if the New England economy declined
dramatically after 1740.337
B. Currency Crises and Debt Litigation Volume
As has been described in previous Parts of the Article, close
examination of the economic implications of currency policies suggests the
possibility of a direct correlation between currency crises and trends in the
volume of debt litigation. This correlation is supported by contemporary
accounts, which reveal a widespread concern about the substantial increases
in litigation volume coinciding with times of fluctuating currency values.
Contemporaries viewed currency policies as affecting litigation in two
ways. First, depreciating currency (see Figure 2), in combination with legal
tender rules permitting payment of the nominal sums of contract debts,
provided an incentive for debtors to default on payment agreements. By
postponing the judgment, debtors were able to benefit from the decrease in
value of the monetary amount to be repaid. In a 1743 pamphlet, one writer
claimed:
This [legal tender] Law ... habituat[ed] Debtors to suffer
themselves to be sued for indisputable Debts, and to appeal from
Judgments obtain'd against 'em upon their own Defaults to the
Superior Court merely for Delay; and as the Fees of the Courts of
Judicature were further lessen'd (during the Continuance of this
Law) by the depreciating of the Bills, so this Sort of Actions
333. MANN, supra note 7, at 33 n.48, 171 tbl.I.
334. Id. at 171 tbl.I.
335. Id.
336. See supra note 11.
337. Quite similarly, Rosen discovered that, in the Mayor's Court in New York in the late
1690s, there were 9.1 cases initiated for every thousand city residents, and in the mid- 1750s, there
were 15.9 cases per thousand people. Rosen, Courts and Commerce, supra note 7, at 147. Here,
too, this increase in litigation is attributable to modernization.
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multiply'd in Proportion, to the great Hurt and Scandal of the
Country; insomuch that the Number of such Suits within the
Province was increas'd during this Administration, viz. between the
Years 1730 and 1742, to near double what it was before.33
Second, in times of currency scarcity, more debt contracts ended in
litigation because debtors became unable to raise funds to pay their debts. A
commentator in 1736, for example, claimed that if more bills of credit were
circulating, "that would prevent hundreds of Law-suits which are brought
into the Courts only through the scarcity of Money." "'
In order to test the hypothesis that litigation rates were affected by
currency policies, I calculated the annual number of cases brought for
repayment of goods and services in the Plymouth Inferior Court of
Common Pleas over the period from 1718 to 1751.340 Plymouth County,
south of Boston, had a population of approximately 25,000 during the
period examined.341 The county represented a mix of rural areas and towns
with strong commercial ties to Boston. As indicated, paper money passed at
par throughout the New England colonies, so currency crises were likely to
affect neighboring counties and colonies similarly, although perhaps not
simultaneously.
Figure 4 shows the total number of cases brought before the Plymouth
Court of Common Pleas to reclaim either money or durable goods. This
total includes suits based on credit instruments, such as notes, bonds, bills,
and book accounts; suits for money or goods based on no instrument; cases
for nondelivery of goods; and cases to collect wages. The total does not
include cases regarding land (cases for past due rent or trespass and
ejectment actions); cases for money owed by apprentices to their guardians;
and cases based upon torts such as slander and intentional harms.342
The changes in the volume of debt cases illustrated in Figure 4 appear
substantially inconsistent with the hypothesis that economic expansion and
338. ENQUIRY, supra note 190, reprinted in 4 COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note
20, at 162-63 (internal citation omitted). For a discussion of the impact of court fees on litigation
timing during this period, see Priest, supra note 24, at 2424-39.
339. THE MELANCHOLY STATE, supra note 251, reprinted in 3 COLONIAL CURRENCY
REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 144.
340. The jurisdiction of the Court is described supra note 77. For a discussion of the
publication of the court records and the representativeness of Plymouth County within New
England, see William E. Nelson, Introduction to 1 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, supra note 77,
at 1, passim. Nelson, for example, states that "throughout the period [1686 to 1859] the county
had a pattern of economic growth and change that mirrored that of Massachusetts as a whole." Id.
at 3.
341. See id. at 5.
342. My intention was to count the cases related to commercial debts of many kinds that
would have been affected by economic conditions. Some of the cases excluded may have fallen
into that category: Cases for past-due rent, for example, would be likely to increase in a time of
economic depression and currency scarcity. I decided, however, to establish clear guidelines for
inclusions and exclusions to obtain consistent, if not all-inclusive, results.
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legal formalization are highly correlated with an increasing litigation
volume. Dayton's New Haven County data in Figure 3 show exponentially
increasing debt litigation throughout the period from 1680 to 1750. Mann's
Hartford County data show a steady increase in litigation volume in the
period from 1700 to 1740,34' and then a steady decline, with litigation
volumes in 1750 and 1760 lower than the volume in 1730. Mann and
Dayton allude to a decline in agricultural prices in 1740 that may account
for the substantial increase in debt cases in that year.3" Their arguments
suggest, however, that these changes reflect only a single variation from the
trend of increasing litigation volume paralleling economic expansion.
FIGURE 4. DEBT CASES: PLYMOUTH, 1718-1751
0+-
1718 1723 1728 1733 1738 1743 1748
Source: 5-7 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS,
1978).
1686-1859 (David Thomas Konig ed.,
343. Indeed, according to Mann, greater commercialization led book account cases to
increase by 600% during this period, despite the reduction in percentage in relation to cases on
bonds and promissory notes. MANN, supra note 7, at 28.
344. See supra notes 11, 336 and accompanying text.
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Figure 4 shows first that, while there is surely a rise in the volume of
debt litigation after 1723, the growth does not demonstrate the steadiness
predicted by the modernization hypothesis. Although the decade-end
numbers of Figure 4 show, as Mann suggests, a "steady" increase to 1740
and decline thereafter, it seems evident that the "steady" growth in
litigation found by Mann and Dayton is the result of counting cases in five-
year and ten-year intervals, rather than annually. Mann's data and Dayton's
data conceal substantial annual variation.
Second, Figure 4 confirms Mann's finding for Hartford of a sharp drop
in debt litigation after 1740. Mann explains that after the recession of the
1740s, "prosperity returned to farmers in Connecticut." 345 A reduction in
litigation during a time of economic prosperity, however, is inconsistent
with the modernization interpretation. Figure 4 shows that litigation volume
from 1746 through 1749 was roughly equivalent to the litigation from 1718
through 1724. The modernization theory cannot explain these relationships.
In contrast, Figure 4 shows a close relation between debt litigation and
currency events. As explained in Part III, contemporary accounts suggest
that scarcity of currency compelled the resort to barter at various points in
the first half of the eighteenth century-1720 to 1721, 1733 to 1734, and
1738 to 1741. Figure 4 shows a low litigation volume through 1723. After
1723, the litigation volume began to increase sharply, with a peak in 1730.
In 1731 and 1732, the volume of litigation declined by approximately one-
third, then increased and peaked again in 1733 and 1734. The final peak,
more extreme than those preceding it, occurred in the period from 1738 to
1740. After 1740, litigation volume declined steadily-still remaining at
high levels until 1744, but falling to early 1720s levels in 1746.
As Figure 4 shows, the currency crisis of the period 1720 to 1721 had
no visible impact on litigation. Prior to 1721, however, Massachusetts's
bills of credit had been retired on schedule, with perhaps some minor
exceptions, and had not yet substantially depreciated. 4' Because the
residents of Massachusetts had never experienced prolonged depreciation of
the bills of credit, they might have had no expectation that the bills would
decline in value in the future.347 Moreover, because there had been little
currency depreciation, court fees were still high in real terms during this
period. Debtors therefore had less incentive than in later years to use legal
process to delay payment of their debts. This explanation is speculative.
There may be other reasons that litigation volume did not increase; for
example, the litigation data might more accurately reflect economic
conditions, and the contemporary accounts exaggerate the crisis.
345. MANN, supra note 7, at 64.
346. See supra text accompanying note 212; Figure 2.
347. Ronald Michener suggested to me that in 1720, creditors may have anticipated a
deflation that would restore former price levels.
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With respect to each of the other periods of extreme barter and currency
crisis, however, Figure 4 shows sharp increases in litigation consistent with
depreciating currency and a widespread inability to pay creditors. Again,
these litigation data are deeply inconsistent with modernization: Debt
litigation increased when economic conditions were the most primitive and
citizens were forced, because of the absence of a stable currency, to engage
in barter. More precisely, the currency events of the period from 1726 to
1741 occurred in distinct stages. The first stage, in the period from 1726 to
1727, consisted, it may be recalled, of (1) a credit crisis in England that
increased demand for specie among New England merchants, and (2) the
impending retirement of a large number of bills loaned out by the
Massachusetts government. The government responded to the resulting
currency shortage by suspending the scheduled bill retirement, and by
issuing a large volume of new bills. The currency began to depreciate
steadily for the first time during this period.
In 1730, Belcher was appointed Governor and was presented with the
Instructions to increase taxes in order to retire all outstanding bills of credit
beyond £30,000. There was initially an expectation that the Instructions
would be followed. Political tensions led to the closing of the treasury in
1731 and 1732, and Massachusetts experienced a severe currency shortage.
Massachusetts's currency problems were exacerbated over the succeeding
years because of (1) the government's failure to retire the bills of credit
according to schedule; (2) the flooding of the Rhode Island bills of credit
throughout New England; (3) the hoarding of the Merchant's Notes; and (4)
the issuance of three years of public funds at one time. The government's
position changed more dramatically in 1738, when it began to redeem all
outstanding bills of credit and to impose substantial general taxes on the
population to accumulate the necessary redemption funds. The period from
1738 to 1741 was a time of extreme currency scarcity and economic
stagnation.
As can be seen in Figure 4, the volume of debt litigation began
increasing sharply in 1726, when the currency first began to depreciate
steadily. The volume of debt cases reached an initial peak in 1730, the year
the Instructions were announced. Litigation volume may have dropped in
1731 and 1732 because the Instructions were likely to have created the
expectation that currency values would be restored: Debtors who
anticipated a deflation would have wanted to avoid the delays and fees
associated with litigation. In a deflation, delay will increase the cost in real
terms of an outstanding debt. The number of cases rose sharply in 1733 and
1734. 1733 and 1734 were years of tremendous currency uncertainty: As
mentioned, Rhode Island notes were flooding into the colony; the
government routinely failed to retire its bills on schedule; the Merchant's
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notes were issued and then hoarded; and the government issued three years'
worth of new bills of credit at one time. Moreover, the steady depreciation
of this period would have lowered the cost of court fees in real terms.
Litigation volume reached its highest level in 1738, when the government
began to retire bills of credit through taxation in compliance with the
Instructions. The volume of litigation remained high throughout the
currency crisis of 1739 to 1740, then dropped off dramatically after 1740.
Governor Shirley's policies of 1742-requiring judgments to be
adjusted to reflect currency values and increasing court fees-surely
contributed to the drop in litigation. To the extent it was effective, the
indexing statute prevented debtors from benefiting from depreciation by
using legal process to delay payment of their debts. Increasing court fees
also likely lowered the litigation volume. Court fees had declined in value
in real terms with the depreciation of the currency. Increasing the fees
increased the cost to debtors of allowing themselves to be sued and
therefore reduced the incentive to litigate. The participation of
Massachusetts residents in battles against France from 1744 to 1748 was
likely to have further reduced the litigation volume. In 1750, the colony
returned to a hard-money system; gold and silver became the exclusive
legal tender in Massachusetts. The return to an exclusively hard-money
system led to a reduction in the litigation volume to that of 1720. This is not
to say that the New England economy was the same in 1750 as in 1720, as
the modernization hypothesis implies: Rather, only that levels of currency
stability were similar.
Figures 5 and 6 extend the analysis. They break down the more general
statistics in Figure 4 to show the volume of cases according to specific
credit instruments-bonds, book accounts, and promissory notes. Figure 5
shows the volume of cases brought on bonds and book accounts. Again, one
might expect from the modernization theory that litigation based on
primitive book-account transaction methods would steadily decline over
time. As is evident, however, the litigation trends here offer a sharper
depiction of the general litigation trends shown in Figure 4: The volume of
litigation relating to bonds and book accounts peaked in 1730, 1734, and
1738. In addition, as before, the volume of litigation dropped significantly
after 1740. Again, quite contrary to the predictions of the modernization
hypothesis, the volume of this commercial litigation after 1744 was roughly
equal to the volume from 1718 through 1724.
Figure 6 illustrates the number of cases brought on promissory notes.
This graph shows a steady increase in note litigation throughout the period.
Figure 6 appears to provide the greatest support for the modernization
hypothesis, at least in its simple form: The figure shows a relatively steady
increase in litigation involving notes from a low in 1718 to a peak in 1740.
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FIGURE 5. BOND AND BOOK ACCOUNT CASES: PLYMOUTH, 1718-1751
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Source: 5-7 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, 1686-1859 (David Thomas Konig ed.,
1978).
Figure 6, however, shows a sharp decline in litigation involving notes after
1740, a finding once again inconsistent with the modernization explanation,
but consistent with the effects of currency stability.
The relatively steady growth in note litigation in the period preceding
1740 does not contradict the currency explanation. Promissory notes were
short-term debts to be repaid in money. As described, they were assignable,
and thus functioned as a medium of exchange in contexts in which the
ability of the issuer to repay the debt could be monitored. 4 Thus, their use
increased during times of currency shortage when there was demand for
short-term debt. Litigation on notes was generated when the holder of the
note became uncertain about the ability of the issuer to uphold his or her
promise. This was likely to be the case during the economic and litigation
348. See Neal, supra note 89, at 162-63.
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FIGURE 6. NOTE CASES: PLYMOUTH, 1718-1751
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Source: 5-7 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS,
1978).
1686-1859 (David Thomas Konig ed.,
crises of 1726 to 1730, 1733 to 1734, and 1738 to 1741, as debtors
increasingly became unable to repay their debts. The principal difference
between the trend in note litigation, shown in Figure 6, and the changes in
bond and book account litigation, shown in Figure 5, is the absence of an
increase in note litigation during the crisis of 1726 to 1730. The peaks in
1734 and 1740 and the decline thereafter are otherwise quite similar.
Finally, Figure 7 shows the volume of litigation involving suits
demanding repayment in goods rather than money, such as cases based on
bonds or notes that promised payment in specific goods. The modernization
historians have not specifically addressed suits of this nature. It is not
obvious, however, why suits for repayment in goods would increase
progressively with economic growth. Indeed, it is more plausible that
economic growth would lead to a decline in such suits, as the colony
became more generally commercialized.
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FIGURE 7. SUITS FOR GOODS: PLYMOUTH, 1718-1751
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Source: 5-7 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, 1686-1859 (David Thomas Konig ed.,
1978).
The volume of litigation regarding payment in goods as shown in
Figure 7 tracks generally the trends observed in the more commercial
litigation of the preceding Figures. Repayment in goods is more likely to be
sought in times of currency scarcity, especially if the absence of currency
makes a money judgment uncollectible. Here, litigation volume peaked in
1740. Again, consistent with the currency crisis explanation, litigation
volume declined dramatically thereafter, remaining at very low levels after
1491742.34
These graphs suggest that the modernization argument that litigation
rates reflected "economic expansion" or can be attributed to "growing
commercialization" is inadequate. The fact that litigation rates increased
349. The small sample size of cases demanding repayment in goods makes the interpretation
somewhat vulnerable. Contemporary accounts of the general reversion to barter during this
period, however, suggest that a similar study with broader scope-one that included, for example,
the Suffolk County Courts (Boston)-might reveal a result consistent with that presented here:
fewer monetary damage awards during currency crises.
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exponentially during times of problems with Massachusetts currency, and
then declined to very low levels following the adoption of indexing statutes
and a hard money system, indicates that the volume of litigation was
determined principally by the economic effects of uncertain currency
policies, and not by (questionably) growing prosperity.
New England's litigation crises of the first half of the eighteenth
century, thus, directly resulted from a combination of extreme depreciation
of the currency; currency scarcity; legal tender laws permitting repayment
in colonial bills of credit without regard for depreciation; and, particularly
during the period between 1738 and 1741, recession. When currency is
scarce and there is reversion to barter, demand for consumer goods drops,
interest rates rise, and prices decline, as those who need money are willing
to sell their assets at lower prices."' During such periods, more business
deals fail to go forward and many lose money. In the recessions of the
1730s and 1740s, as currency policies led to an environment with an
inadequate medium of exchange (either scarce or depreciating), creditors
called in their existing debts to gain money to engage in trade. Because of
the lack of money in circulation, however, their debtors were unable to pay,
and were themselves required to call in their outstanding debts to avoid
foreclosure on their property. Litigation volume increased as each sued
down the "chain of debt" to get money to pay off his or her creditors.35" '
The correlation between currency events and litigation volume
undermines the assertion of the modernization hypothesis that increases in
the volume of litigation were principally caused by commercial expansion.
The correlation does not, however, preclude the possibility that
commercialization contributed to an increase in the volume of litigation
during the currency crises. Indeed, it is highly likely that the initial issuance
and circulation of currency increased the total number of outstanding
contracts, because currency reduced the problems of a barter economy that
had previously limited exchange and reduced profit-making opportunities.
Thus, the litigation explosion attending each currency crisis was more
dramatic than it would have been without paper money's positive impact on
commercialization and market development.
The inadequacy of the modernization theory derives from its
assumption of a stable currency. If currency were entirely stable and
circulated in an optimum quantity, and if no other legal rules distorted
colonists' propensity to file lawsuits, one might expect litigation volume to
350. The author of A Word of Comfort, for example, complained that when currency is
scarce, "Moneyed Men higgle down every thing; and use many unfair Artifices to sink and lower
the Price of what comes to the Market." A WORD OF COMFORT, supra note 214, reprinted in I
COLONIAL CURRENCY REPRINTS, supra note 20, at 185.
351. See Chu, supra note 194, at 92 (describing creditor anxiety in the 1785 Massachusetts
recession).
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rise proportionately with economic expansion: An increase in the absolute
number of cases brought to trial might approximate the increase in number
of contracts formed in response to economic and population growth (or
decline).352 The chaotic state of New England's public currency during the
first half of the eighteenth century, however, suggests that currency crisis is
the more likely explanation of exponential increases in litigation volume
during these periods.353
V. COLONIAL LAW AND THE ECONOMY: A REINTERPRETATION
The close correlation between currency crises and periods of
exponentially increasing litigation volume reveals the need for a new
352. The modernization theorists, however, also claim that the law was becoming more
predictable, a claim inconsistent with increased litigation rates. Litigation volume will rise with
economic expansion only when the rate of economic expansion is greater than any diminution in
the level of legal uncertainty. See supra text accompanying note 12.
353. Legal scholars discovered various other changes in eighteenth-century civil litigation
that they interpreted as deriving from modernization: During the period from 1710 to 1720, formal
credit instruments replaced book accounts as the form of debt agreement most commonly found in
litigation, and pleadings became more technical and legal. During the 1730s and 1740s,
defendants increasingly failed to contest debt cases or to avail themselves of jury trials. Mann
argues that these changes, in combination, created a more rationalized legal system that promoted
certainty and predictability over responsiveness to community norms. To Mann, each change
represents a response to the new demands of an expanding economy. But given that the economy
was not expanding, how can these changes be explained?
The timing of the transformation is revealing: As described by Mann, book account cases
declined most dramatically between 1700 and 1720-the same period in which Mann found a
radical decline in jury trials and pleadings on the merits, and a corresponding increase in the
percentage of uncontested debt cases. See MANN, supra note 7, at 183 & tbl. 13 (jury trials); id. at
185 & tbl.15 (pleadings); id. at 172 & tbl.2 (contestation levels). The fact that this legal
transformation occurred between 1710 and 1720 strongly suggests that the widespread circulation
of government paper money largely explains these changes. Paper money replaced coins as the
principal medium of exchange in New England during the period from 1710 to 1715, supra text
accompanying notes 169-172, the exact period when book accounts declined as a percentage of all
cases. Thus, rather than resulting from legal modernization propelled by an expanding economy,
the transformation to greater use of formal credit instruments is most plausibly a direct result of
the widespread circulation of paper money: The availability of paper money allowed greater use
of cash in exchanges and reduced the need for debt agreements, such as book accounts, to serve as
"currency." Thus one can see an increase in the percentage of formal credit instruments, with all
of the attendant changes-fewer jury trials, fewer pleas of the "general issue" and more default
judgments-as deriving from the transition from an economy plagued by currency scarcity to a
cash economy.
Mann explains some of the changes as resulting from an increase in cases represented by
lawyers, see MANN, supra note 7, at 93-100, which, it may be argued, cannot possibly be related
to currency circulation. There is currently substantial debate among legal historians concerning
the extent to which lawyers influenced legal change during the first half of the eighteenth century.
Gerard W. Gawalt argues that lawyers had little influence on legal change because there were, in
fact, few lawyers practicing in New England during the period. GERARD W. GAWALT, THE
PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1760-
1840, at 7-35 (1979). He found, for example, that in 1740, Massachusetts had only fifteen
practicing lawyers (one per 10,108 people). Id. at 14 tbl. 1. Peter Hoffer follows Gawalt's analysis
and argues that lawyers were a consequence, not a cause, of legal and economic development.
Hoffer, supra note 7, at 305-06 & n,34.
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interpretation of the relation of law to economic development in colonial
New England. This Part reassesses two aspects of the relationship between
law and the economy in this period. First, I propose that currency policy is
central to the creation of law through decisionmaking by judges and juries.
In the colonial period, currency policies were formulated within an
institutional structure highly vulnerable to political tensions.354 The impact
of currency policy on litigation therefore suggests a direct connection
between political processes and the "law" generated within courthouses.
Second, the fact that an escalation of litigation on debts occurred during
times of recession and currency crises, rather than during periods of
economic growth, suggests the need to reexamine the role of courts in the
colonial economy. In light of the fact that an important function of the
colonial court system was to manage litigation crises, how should its role in
advancing economic development be reassessed? This Part analyzes the
relationship between common-law litigation and a variable market economy
during the first half of the eighteenth century.
A. The Centrality of Currency Policy and Politics to Debt Litigation
Trends
Colonial legal historical scholarship has almost exclusively
characterized the principal sources of court-made law either as judicial
efforts to maintain community cohesion and consensus or as judicial
responses to economic relationships emerging out of local social and
market conditions.355  The importance of currency policies and
macroeconomic conditions in propelling litigation during particular periods
reveals that legal historians' narrow focus on highly localized sources of
law has been misguided. To the extent currency policies affected litigation
trends, "law" should not be characterized as created exclusively by
endogenous processes. The influence of currency issuance and currency
policies on civil litigation reveals that even litigation on book accounts-
the most community-oriented form of economic relations-reflected
colonial responses to conditions of barter generated by decisions made by
Parliament and the English Board of Trade, decisions that occurred
thousands of miles away. Local communities and the norms prevailing
within them were irrelevant to the process of establishing and implementing
currency policies. Indeed, as a source of law, currency policies were
354. As emphasized in Bray Hammond's classic work, Banks and Politics in America, supra
note 48, American banking and monetary policy was, in fact, highly susceptible to political
tensions throughout the pre-Civil War period.
355. See the description of Morton Horwitz's view of colonial law, supra text accompanying
notes 1-6, and the summary of Bruce Mann's and Cornelia Dayton's work, supra notes 7-11 and
accompanying text.
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anything but sensitive to the moral climate of local communities. Neither
were they driven by economic growth and local market conditions.
The problems generated by currency policies-including skyrocketing
litigation-instead can largely be attributed to weaknesses in the
institutional structure of colonial governments. The currency policies of
each colony were determined by the decisions of elected assemblies,
constituted by members representing the various interests of debtors,
creditor groups, merchants and other sectors within the society.356 This in
itself was likely to lead to greater uncertainty, for example, than the
currency policies of the United States in recent years, which are determined
by unelected officials, purposefully removed from the political process to
the extent possible.357 Intracolony political dynamics, however, were only
one aspect of the problem. As has been described, the policies were also the
outcome of a struggle for authority between the English Parliament and
Board of Trade on the one hand and the colonial legislatures, who resisted
English authority on the currency issue long before the famous tensions of
1765 and onward, on the other. The English were principally focused on
safeguarding profits for English merchants, and their goals often did not
coincide with the interests of the colonies.
Each of these tensions, among the English and colonial governments
and among various interests within the colonies, generated an instability
that stood in the way of sound currency policy. The inability during this
period of the government to develop a stable currency within the existing
institutional structure was a principal reason why the Framers prohibited a
government-issued medium of exchange in the U.S. Constitution 8 Private
banks dominated the market for currency between the Revolution and the
Civil War. Not until the widespread issuance of Greenbacks to finance the
356. For a discussion of the political tensions within the Massachusetts assembly during the
currency crises of the 1730s and 1740s, see Billias, supra note 203.
357. Government paper money has a historically unprecedented stability today in the United
States largely because currency policy has been removed from the realm of politics and
determined within the Federal Reserve, a remarkably independent institution. The Federal Reserve
has been able to generate tremendous confidence in the United States dollar in large part because
it has committed itself not to use currency policy to achieve political ends. This approach is the
result of lessons learned the hard way throughout the history of the country, most recently with the
failings of monetary policy during the Great Depression of the 1930s.
358. It is uncontroversial that the Framers did not view the Constitution as giving Congress
the power to issue paper money to be invested with the status of legal tender. Discussions of state
and federal money powers at the 1787 Constitutional Convention are documented in detail in
Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 367, 382-90. See U.S. CONST. art.
I., § 10, cl. I ("No State shall ... coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; [or] pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts .... "). Article l, Section 8 gives Congress the "Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts ... of the United States"; the power "To borrow Money on
the credit of the United States"; and the power "To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and
of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures." Id. art. I, § 8. See also
HAMMOND, supra note 48, at 95-103, for a discussion of the Framers' experiences with the paper
money issue in the period between the end of the Revolution and the Constitutional Convention.
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Civil War and the subsequent enactment of Lincoln's National Banking Act
of 1865, which taxed private state bank notes out of existence, did the
federal government assume the responsibility of managing a national paper
money with legal tender status.359
In evaluating the relationship of law to economic growth and the
development of markets, one might conclude that, while New England's
paper money experiments represented an advance over the previous system,
in which the need for a medium of exchange was never satisfied, the
colonial institutional structure lacked the stability necessary for uniformly
successful currency policies. Although a principal purpose of currency
issuance was to promote economic growth and the development of markets,
the results in New England were highly problematic. Moreover, through the
policies adopted by colonial governments, this institutional structure had a
profound impact on the creation of law in colonial courthouses.
B. Reassessing the Role of Courts in Promoting Economic Growth
Although this Article suggests the centrality of currency policy to
trends in litigation within colonial courthouses, the question remains
whether judges during the first half of the eighteenth century in New
England promoted or limited the expansion of markets through their
decisionmaking processes. As has been described, there were two principal
reasons why exponential increases in litigation occurred during times of
currency crisis. First, during times of inflation, debtors delayed payment in
order to benefit from declining currency values, forcing their creditors to
sue to reclaim their debts. Second, currency crises coincided with recession
conditions, and there were greater rates of default by debtors who were
unable to pay their debts. Recession conditions also created uncertainty
about which debtors would remain solvent, giving all creditors an incentive
to sue to secure a place in line to be paid in debtors' assets before they were
claimed by other creditors. These two reasons for litigation are obviously
quite different: The first represents a strategy on the part of debtors to
benefit from declining currency values; the second is a strategy of creditors
to beat other creditors to debtors' assets, as well as an expected response to
recession conditions when people are unable to pay their debts on a
widespread basis. Each relates to different aspects of the colonial legal
system.
359. See Dam, supra note 358, passim, for a discussion of the issuance of Greenbacks and the
Legal Tender Cases, which vested them (ultimately) with legal tender status. See also Veazie Bank
v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869) (upholding the constitutionality of the National Banking Act).
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1. Nominalism
As has been described, debtors' use of legal process to benefit from
changes in currency value was a direct result of the consistent application of
the nominalism doctrine throughout the currency crises of the 1730s and
1740s. Nominalism requires debtors to pay only the amount agreed upon,
irrespective of changes in currency values. 36" The strict nominalism applied
in colonial courts was an inflexible approach to deciding cases. An
alternative might have been more flexibility, such as by requiring judges to
adjust the amount debtors owed based on changes in the real value of
currency.
In analyzing the economic impact of nominalism, it must be recognized
that contracting parties themselves were able to set the terms of the contract
according to the changes in currency value they expected. If the parties
predicted a future period of inflation, they were likely to increase the
amount of the debt according to the expected decline in the value of
currency. If they predicted a period of deflation, they would be likely to
reduce the debt amount. In an environment of uncertainty about future
currency values, creditors could require an increased payment to
compensate for their incurred risk. During the currency crises described in
this Article, however, there were clearly changes in currency policy that
could not have been anticipated in advance. It can be assumed that all or
most creditors were harmed by the unanticipated skyrocketing inflation
depicted in Figure 2. It does not necessarily follow, however, that a default
rule for contract interpretation other than nominalism would have led to a
more equitable result for creditors and debtors.
The merits of the doctrine of nominalism might be analyzed according
to the central question within contract law scholarship of asking how judges
should design default rules to address the problem of unforeseen
circumstances. If one assumes that a particular currency policy could not
have been anticipated, one can view the contract as having a "gap" with
respect to that policy. The parties neglected to incorporate the likelihood of
that policy within the terms of their contract. The question, then, is what is
the optimal policy response for the court system to take with respect to
contract gaps of this nature. Should it have adopted a policy that adjusts
contracts on an individual basis, to ensure an equitable result in all cases?
Or, should it penalize one of the parties for not anticipating the occurrence
and incorporating the likelihood of that occurrence within the contract? Ian
Ayres and Robert Gertner have analyzed this question in detail36' and have
360. Supra text accompanying notes 187-190.
361. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling the Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
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suggested that courts adopt "penalty" default rules-rules that penalize one
or both parties for not incorporating an unforeseen condition within the
contract terms-when it is efficient, that is, "when it is cheaper for the
parties to negotiate a term ex ante than for the courts to estimate ex post
what the parties would have wanted." 
3 62
Here the cost to courts of adjusting debts according to an inflation
schedule would not be high (since exchange rates with pounds Sterling,
which were relatively stable, were well known). The problem with a purely
individualized system, however, is that judges would have to determine
whether the contracting parties had in fact already incorporated the
expectation of inflation within the terms of the contract. When parties did
incorporate expectations about inflation or deflation within the terms of the
contract, ex post adjustment by judges would be unfair. The greatest cost to
the court system of a flexible, individualized approach would be in
determining which contracting parties anticipated which events.
Nominalism places the burden on all contracting parties to incorporate
changes in currency value within the terms of their contracts.
An additional problem, however, is that a simple application of Ayres
and Gertner's analysis fails to account for the way legal process can impact
debt amounts. The most common complaint among creditors, it may be
recalled, was that debtors used the delay inherent to litigation to benefit at
the expense of creditors. Debtors declined to pay their debts, requiring
creditors to sue them. At trial, debtors defaulted (often even failing to
appear in court). Then debtors appealed the decision, usually obtaining an
affirmance of the original judgment against themselves. In a climate of
constant depreciation, creditors' greatest losses were caused by the passage
of time. It may be that some creditors protected themselves against losses
within the terms of their contracts, but it is hard to imagine that creditors
could fully protect themselves against the costs of both inflation and
procedural delay during the unprecedented depreciation of the 1730s.
Contemporaries were largely against nominalism. As has been
described, one of Governor William Shirley's first acts in office was to
overturn the nominalism doctrine by statute in 1742, requiring all judges to
adjust litigated debts based on changes in currency value.363 While, in
theory, nominalism appears to be a classic example of an efficient use of
penalty default rules, it is not clear that nominalism was the optimal
approach in this particular case. Massachusetts during the period from 1710
to 1742 suffered extreme changes in currency value. Contracting parties
were often not likely to have been able to anticipate these changes.
Moreover, the changes may have affected all contracts litigated in the
362. Id. at 93.
363. See supra notes 306-309 and accompanying text.
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courts differently. In sum, it cannot be concluded that nominalism worsened
economic conditions, but the strict application of nominalism is also not an
example of a judicial measure leading to positive economic growth.
2. The Colonial Court System and Economic Recession
Recession conditions led to a second category of litigation that
contributed to exponential increases in litigation volume during the 1730s
and early 1740s. During recessions, more debtors were simply unable to
pay their debts. As debtors defaulted on their debts, their creditors were
likely to have trouble paying their own debts, leading the creditors to
liquidate their assets by instituting lawsuits to reclaim any money which
was owed to them.
Debt litigation is likely to increase during times of recession during any
time period, even today. There are, however, two principal reasons why
litigation volume was likely to be more sensitive to economic conditions
during the colonial period than during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. First, banking institutions were prohibited by the English
throughout the colonial period, and stock markets were highly undeveloped.
In the absence of banks in which to place deposits and stock markets in
which to invest money, many investments were negotiated by means of
debt contracts. People with assets invested their money by lending it
directly to borrowers. Banks today serve the function of "delegated
monitor": They serve as an intermediary between investors and borrowers.
In the colonial period, there were no banks to serve this intermediary role
and therefore creditors often dealt with debtors directly. Thus, creditors
liquidated their "savings" by means of lawsuits.
Colonial litigation crises might therefore be characterized as
predecessors to nineteenth-century bank runs. In bank runs, individuals
withdraw money from banks both because of the greater demand for money
during recessions (liquidity crises)364 and because of uncertainty as to which
banks will remain solvent after the recession.3 6' Banks are more likely to
remain solvent if depositors leave money in the bank. During bank panics,
however, depositors' uncertainty as to the soundness of their banks propels
them to get in line to try to withdraw their deposits so as to avoid the risk
that their banks will fail. Similarly, fearing the loss of their money,
creditors in colonial New England instituted lawsuits in order to be first in
line to reclaim a debtor's funds.
364. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401,401 (1983).
365. See Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models,
Facts, and Bank Regulation, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 109, 111 (R. Glenn
Hubbard ed., 1991).
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The second reason why litigation volume was more sensitive to
economic conditions during the colonial period was that there was no out-
of-court priority lending scheme and no bankruptcy system to enforce rules
such as an automatic stay on debt collection. Priority to a debtor's assets
was established according to the chronological order of litigation. The
principal way to ensure priority over a debtor's other creditors during the
colonial period was to institute a lawsuit against the debtor before the other
creditors had done so. As mentioned, recession conditions are associated
with tremendous economic uncertainty. When it was not clear whether a
debtor would remain solvent and whether a debtor's other creditors had
information that would lead them to sue, creditors were more likely to
institute a suit simply to secure a place in line. The accumulated effect was
a swamping of the courts with lawsuits.
In reassessing the impact of the court system on economic
development, one may ask whether the courts were institutionally set up to
minimize the negative consequences of the colonial lending system. The
lack of a priority lending scheme outside of the litigation context suggests
that they were not. Indeed, litigation during economic recessions in the
colonial period represents a textbook case of the prisoner's dilemma
outcome used to justify the existence of a bankruptcy system. An
underlying goal of bankruptcy procedures is to preserve firms when their
going concern value exceeds their liquidation value. Modem bankruptcy
law in the United States attempts to make this calculation by halting all
collection efforts within ninety days after a firm files for bankruptcy, and
then independently assessing the worth of the company. If the bankruptcy
judge finds that the liquidation value is greater than the going concern
value, the judge then distributes the firm's assets according to the law and
to a priority lending scheme. If the going concern value exceeds the
liquidation value, the bankruptcy judge approves a plan to get the firm back
on its feet.
In the absence of the automatic stay and priority lending scheme, a firm
(or a debtor) is likely to have its assets liquidated, even in the case of short-
term financial trouble. Bankruptcy textbooks refer to this as an example of
a prisoner's dilemma because each creditor acting in his own interest will
liquidate his debts upon a sign that a debtor is in financial trouble, even if
creditors as a group are worse off as a result. The colonial court system
encouraged this problem by systematically granting creditors default
judgments against debtors and executing on their property-often selling a
debtor's assets at auction. Each creditor had an incentive to sue to protect
himself, even though the system itself was likely to lead to more creditors
being worse off than if there had been no race to the courthouse. Debtors
who might otherwise have survived the recessions described in this Article
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would find their estates sold off or otherwise liquidated under the colonial
court system.
A priority lending scheme gives creditors security that they will be paid
in a debtor's assets before creditors with lower priority. The existence of an
out-of-court lending scheme in the colonial period, therefore, would have
eliminated suits brought purely because of uncertainty and to establish
priority. The absence of such a scheme is a second example of a policy of
the colonial courts that was not likely to have promoted economicdevelopment."6
The overall assessment of the colonial court system's effect on
promoting economic growth is therefore ambiguous. Certainly the existence
of a stable court system that reliably enforces contracts is a great asset to
any society. Whether the colonial courts adapted in a way to promote
economic growth during the first half of the eighteenth century, however, is
far less clear.
VI. CONCLUSION
In his article Critical Legal Histories, Robert Gordon characterizes the
principal feature of modernization accounts of legal history as the
assumption that law fulfills society's needs and that, as those needs change,
law adapts to fulfill newly created needs.367 Current colonial legal
scholarship fits this description. According to the current consensus, law in
the seventeenth century had adapted to fulfill the needs of a relatively
insular society. Economic growth changed the law needed by the society,
and legal institutions adapted to fulfill the society's new needs.
There is ample evidence that this interpretation of colonial legal
development is in need of revision, and not only because economic growth
was episodic and, in aggregate, modest. First, that the legal changes
described as characterizing modernization largely occurred during times of
recession and reversion to barter suggests that legal historians have not
identified the right "needs" to which the legal system was to have been
adapting.
366. For further discussion of the absence of a priority lending scheme in the New England
colonies, see generally Priest, supra note 24.
367. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 59-67 (1984).
Gordon describes five features of what be terms the "evolutionary functionalism" approach that
has dominated legal history: (1) "'Law' and 'society' are separate social categories, each
describable independently from the other but related to each other through various mechanisms of
causal linkage." (2) "Societies have needs." (3) "There is an objective, determined, progressive
social evolutionary path." (4) "Legal systems should be described and explained in terms of their
functional responsiveness to social needs." (5) "The legal system adapts to changing social
needs." Id. at 59-64.
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Second, understanding the importance of currency events to legal
developments suggests that colonial legal historians have not adequately
interpreted the basic sources of colonial legal development. Current
colonial legal scholarship derives from a large body of work emphasizing
the centrality of New England communities, particularly New England
towns, to the lives of colonists. The current modernization account assumes
that law emerged from within those communities, adapting to their
changing needs. These legal historians have overlooked the fact that
litigation trends and changes in the types of contractual obligations litigated
can largely be explained as a response to legislation formed in the struggle
between the upper levels of colonial governments and English authorities.
Finally, the history of currency events in the first half of the eighteenth
century suggests that legal institutions did not adapt optimally to changing
societal needs as indicated by modernization narratives. During the period
from 1710 to 1750, the English government, the Massachusetts legislature,
and the courts each enacted policies that worsened an already unfortunate
economic situation. The English government's decision to recall all but
£30,000 in government bills of credit was excessively harsh, imposing deep
costs on the colonies, however beneficial to English creditors. Moreover,
the strict application of the nominalism doctrine was highly problematic, as
was the absence of a priority lending scheme that might have reduced the
volume of litigation propelled by uncertainty during times of severe
recession. Although by reducing reliance on barter and money substitutes,
the colonial currency experiments brought the colonial economy one step
closer to the modem, New England colonial law can be characterized as
having established, at best, an uncertain foundation for the later
development of a more modem economy.
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